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SUMMARY
The study discusses exclusive dealing agreements relating 
to vertical distribution.
It examines exclusive dealing agreements in their economic 
as well as legal contexts.
The importance of exclusive dealing agreements for the 
proper marketing of the produced goods and the different 
economic aims of the parties in question is surveyed.
The study concentrates on the legal side, considering first 
the substantive law.
After covering the different types of exclusive dealing 
agreements, the study proceeds with relevant Decisions of 
the Commission and judgments of the European Court of 
Justice.
The various exemptions applicable to exclusive dealing 
agreements under Article 85 (3) of the EEC Treaty are 
pointed out, with reference to block exemptions and 
individual exemptions.
The study also deals with the procedural dimensions of the 
law applicable to exclusive dealing agreements. It examines 
in detail the different types of Decisions by the Commission
- iv -
referring to exclusive dealing agreements, and the 
possibilities of challenging them before the European Court 
of Justice.
Especially considered in this section are the problems 
involved in procedures and their effects for the parties 
concerned.
The study finally examines the question whether there are, 
with regard to exclusive dealing agreements, any 
identifiable trends in the developing competition system of 
the EEC.
- v -
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P A R T  I
CHAPTER 1
Introduction, purpose of the study; scope and 
delimitration; contents, method and sources.
The purpose of the study is to analyse exclusive dealing 
agreements under the EEC competition system in their 
economic and particularly legal relevance.
Firstly, the study deals with the economic side of ex­
clusive dealing agreements as to their general function and 
justification in commercial life. The importance of ex­
clusive dealing agreements for the producers of high 
quality brand-products as well as their function is pointed 
out, with reference to the producer's interests in in­
fluencing all levels of the vertical distribution. There­
after the need and function of exclusive dealing agreements 
in their economic entirety, as well as their justification, 
is examined.
The economic context of exclusive dealing agreements should 
not be underestimated; it influences competition and
- 2 -
competition policy thus pointing to the need to define the 
aims of competition law.
Competition policy and competition law are mutually re­
lated, as competition law transposes the aims of com­
petition policy into a legal system of application and 
compliance. Competition law is thus an instrument to make 
competition policy effective, and from its effects con­
clusions may be drawn, influencing in turn competition 
policy.
Secondly, the study defines and delimits exclusive dealing 
agreements in relation to other trading contracts.
They are delimited in terms of horizontal distribution 
agreements, concluded between partners at the same market 
level. Exclusive dealing agreements are also distinguished 
from company contracts and from mere purchasing contracts. 
The study also refers to the delimitation of exclusive 
dealing agreements against agreements on intellectual 
property, a point which may also influence the further 
distribution of the products.
After having defined and delimited the relevant notions, 
the study proceeds to the various forms and different types 
of exclusive dealing agreements, in accordance with their 
function in economic life. With referring to this point,
- 3 -
the problems concerning the adaptation of exclusive dealing 
agreements to the requirements of the quickly changing 
commercial life are shown. In this context the possiblities 
of termination are also considered, together with the 
important question as to which system of legal rules may be 
applicable for the validity of the agreements under civil 
law.
Continuing from the economic and legal basis established in 
the introductory Chapters 1-3, the study turns in Part II/A 
to the jurisdiction governing exclusive dealing agreements. 
Chapter 4 considers the situation in the past (1960s to 
1980s) with respect to the different types of exclusive 
dealing agreements. This concerns the practice of the EEC, 
more particularly the practice of the Commission as the 
body in charge of adopting Regulations, monitoring the 
application and observance of the competition rules and 
taking Decisions which may be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice. The question is considered 
whether certain trends can be detected in the Decisions of 
the Commission and in the judgments of the European Court 
of Justice, that is, with reference to the treatment of the 
different types of exclusive dealing agreements. It should 
be noted that the study concentrates on the judgments 
affecting exclusive dealing agreements under EEC Article 
85.
4 -
Whilst in the first section of Chapter 4 infringements of 
the EEC Treaty are examined, the second section deals with 
exemptions of exclusive dealing agreements under EEC 
Article 85 (3), considering both block exemptions and 
individual exemptions. The third section takes into account 
the situation of small and medium-sized businesses, under­
takings and enterprises under EEC competition law. These 
undertakings are usually in a difficult position, as they 
mostly have powerful international company groups as part­
ners for their exclusive dealing agreements, and these 
company groups can impose their contracting terms on their 
weaker business partners. With this point in mind, economic 
and legal aspects are shown together with efforts, to keep 
the competitiveness of small and medium-sized undertakings. 
Fourthly, after having elucidated the situation of ex­
clusive dealing agreements in the past, the study examines 
the situation under current EEC competition law.
Chapter 5 is thus treated as being a reflecting image of 
Chapter 4.
The study figures out if past trends are being continued, 
developed or replaced. It also takes into consideration the 
principles underlying the Commission’s current competition 
policy and the judgments of the European Court of Justice.
(The decisions are related to the different types of 
exclusive dealing agreements).
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In section two of Chapter 5 the study proceeds to to the 
survey of the current system of exemptions and asks if new 
policies with reference to block exemptions and individual 
exemptions have been developed.
In section three of Chapter 5 the study details the current 
situation affecting small and medium-sized businesses, 
undertakings and enterprises, and examines the position 
they have in the current competition policy and judicial 
decisions.
Fifthly, in Part II/B (Chapter 6) the study, after having 
dealt with the substantive law, proceeds to the procedural 
law concerning exclusive dealing agreements. It considers 
the different procedures which are available: application 
for a negative clearance, notification to obtain an in­
dividual exemption and, not to be underestimated, in­
fringement proceedings.
The study examines in section two of Chapter 6 the dif­
ferent forms of available procedures, taking especially 
into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of 
applications and notifications by the involved private 
parties. The third section of Chapter 6 surveys the dif­
ferent decisions relating to exclusive dealing agreements. 
The study also deals with the topic of informal
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settlements, especially the "comfort letters" and their 
effects for the parties concerned.
Time problems in decision taking are also discussed; time 
may be an essential factor affecting exclusive dealing 
agreements and the marketing of the goods in question. 
Decisions at the right time are most relevant for the 
parties of the agreement, as only they can provide ef­
fective legal protection, for the coordination of the 
undertaking's distribution policy, and prevent third 
parties or a contracting partner from claiming damages. 
Timely decisions are also relevant for cases where in­
fringements of the EEC Treaty have to be terminated. Only 
quick decisions act as necessary deterrent to lead to 
fairness for the competitors.
Section four of Chapter 6 explaines the possibilities of 
challenging a Decision of the Commission before the 
European Court of Justice. Also in this section too time 
problems relating to the conclusion of proceedings before 
the European Court of Justice are considered. In section 
five (of Chapter 6) the study treats the enforcement of 
decisions with special reference to fines imposed on the 
parties concerned.
Sixthly, in Part III the study reviews the conclusion 
obtained in the preceding chapters and examines whether 
certain trends are detectable and which conclusions may
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further follow therefrom. Once more, the importance of time 
for decision taking will be mentioned, essential for the 
marketing of a brand product through exclusive dealing 
agreements.
As to the sources relevant to the present study, the main 
source relating to substantive law is the EEC Treaty, with 
particular reference to the competition rules, in the first 
place EEC Article 85. Other sources are (secondary 
Community legislation) Regulations, especially governing 
block exemptions; Notices and Recommendations of the 
Commission; its Annual Reports on Competition Policy. 
Further sources include the Decisions of the Commission and 
the judgments of the European Court of Justice; compendia; 
text-books and commentaries on European competition policy 
as well as articles from relevant periodicals.
With regard to procedural law, the main sources are EEC 
Articles 173, 174 and 175 relating to the judgments of the 
European Court of Justice.
For the Commission's procedural system main source is 
Regulation 17/62. As further affecting procedural matters, 
reference may be made to Forms A/B and the Complementary 
Note, as well as further Regulations, the Commission's 
Annual Report on Competition Policy, Decisions of the 
Comission and judgments of the European Court of Justice, 
compendia and text-books on procedural law.
CHAPTER 2
The economic and commercial function of exclusive dealings; 
the need and function of exclusive dealing agreements.
In times of increasing competition it is not sufficient for 
an undertaking to produce high quality goods, it is also of 
enormous importance to provide for the best possible 
outlet.
Distribution is the connecting link between the producer 
and the ultimate consumer.
According to Fulop,•distribution is an "essential corollary
of production and makes products available where, when, and
1
in the form in which they are required by consumers".
An undertaking - supposing it is not producing the goods 
for its own consumption - has many different ways of 
releasing its goods to the market.
Basically the distribution as a rule is carried out at dif­
ferent vertical levels:
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Producer
Distributor |
I I
Wholesaler ---- | Intermediaries
I I
Retailer I
Consumer
In everyday commercial life, this system is to be found in 
many variations. There may be more than one party involved 
at one level, or there may be none of the levels at all 
(which means that the producer consumes the goods for him­
self or he is into direct-selling (by mail / telephone
2order or factory to consumer) to the ultimate consumer).
For the present study, the term producer will be used for
the undertaking which manufactures the goods in question.
According to the definitions of Whish, the term distributor
will be used for a firm "whose business is to resell goods
but not to the public"; the term retailer will be used to
describe firms "whose function is to sell goods to their
3ultimate consumer".
As shown above, distribution is an essential corollary to 
production and also essential for the firm's flourishing.
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If the producer is considering the establishment of a 
contractual marketing distribution system, he has to 
consider economic as well as legal factors whith mutual 
strong interdependences. Therefore, legal problems have to 
be solved in all phases of the contractual distribution 
system's lifetime:
" - for the decision on the outlet system strategy and its 
legal foundation (in particular review of the legal 
preliminary questions)
for the draft outlet system (in particular for an 
adequate draft agreement),
for the realisation of the outlet system (in particular 
protective legal measures), and
for the adaptation of the outlet system strategy to
changed conditions (again: review of the legal preliminary
4questions, draft agreement, legal foundation)."
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The interdependences between the above mentioned four steps 
are pointed out in the following figure (with German 
equivalents of the terms in English):
Realisation of the outlet system, in 
<------ - -------- ■—  particular protective legal measures
Praktizierung des Vertriebssystems 
(insbes. rechtliche SchutzmaBnahmen)
Draft outlet system, in particular 
an adequate draft agreement
Adaptation of the outlet system 
strategy to changed legal or 
market conditions
Anpassung des Vertriebs systems 
gewandelte Verhaltnisse
Kbnzeption des Vertriebs systems, 
insbesondere Entwurf eines geeig- 
neten Vertrag swerke s
> Decision on the outlet system 
strategy and its legal foundation
Entscheidung uber die Absatzkanal- 
strategie, als deren rechtliches 
Fundament das Vertrags system dienen 
soil.
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Beside direct selling, there are basically two ways of 
distribution the producer can turn to: he can either estab­
lish his own distribution system or he can appoint some
5third parties to do it on his behalf.
Deciding on the outlet system strategy, the producer has to 
consider carefully, which way of distribution he will 
choose, because this is to determine the long term posture
c
of the company in its business environment.
Every producer will choose the best possible way consider­
ing special requirements of his goods, market requirements, 
competition with other producers and so on.
He will be interested in efficient and cheap distribution 
with secure guaranteed outlets and reasonably large quan­
tities of sold goods. He will also want his goods promoted 
in a suitable way in order to protect the brand image. 
Finally he will try to maintain the demand for his products
at a high level in order to guarantee high prices and 
7
profits.
Drafting the outlet system strategy, the producer has to 
consider also the external environments, in particular the 
aims of the consumer, the aims of the intermediaries and 
the legal situation as to national and EEC law.
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The consumer expects easy availability and access of the 
goods with as many retailers as possible, accompanied by a 
complete range of products and a reliable service. He will 
also want the goods to be sold at reasonable prices.
The intermediaries desire low risks, as few as possible 
obligations, especially no price recommendations, to make 
profit as large as possible. Their specific aims depend 
entirely on their relation to their contracting partners as 
employees, agents, subsidiary firms, or complete 
independent firms.
Surveying the legal situation, the main aim of the EEC 
author-ities (for the consumer's sake) will be a perfect, 
fair competition in a single European market, and for this 
purpose EEC competition law will be applied and enforced.
Regarding these aims the producer has to consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of the establishment of his 
own distribution system. With his own distribution system 
he has the advantage to dispose of the firm's entire 
distribution policy.
He can also dispose of the prices, even if price bindings 
are not allowed. The producer's own distribution network 
may be more efficient because with skill, know-how and a
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reliable service for the customers. It will guarantee a 
reliable distribution outlet with no competitors or com­
peting products within the system. Another advantage is, 
that the whole systems is looked upon as an economic entity 
and falls outside the competition law provisions, so there 
is usually no cause for the EEC authorities to start
g
investigations under EEC Article 85.
As a disadvantage, a producer firm's own distribution 
system may require a whole network with employees, sub­
sidiary companies and retail outlets in connection with the 
necessary know-how and detailed knowledge of the markets. 
That may require high costs and investment, usually beyond 
the capacity of small and medium sized firms. Also it is 
connected with high risks, if the necessary know-how on 
vertical sectors is not available, especially where foreign 
markets with different languages, laws, consumer habits, 
advertising, are in question.^
These problems will become very important, especially for 
small and medium sized firms, when in 1993 a uniform Euro­
pean market will be established and the firms will have 
to consider the changed competition conditions making it 
necessary to expand with investment into foreign markets.
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On the one hand, a producer's own distribution network may 
be more flexible to respond to market trends, but it may on 
the other hand involve difficulties, if the market re­
quirements demand to discard a whole distribution network 
from "one day to the other." Many employees may have to be 
made redundant; they may seek the enforcement of their 
statutory rights before Industrial Tribunals with long- 
lasting proceedings involving further risks for the under­
taking. ^
So, when deciding about a firm's distribution policy, the 
entire posture of the undertaking, including external 
factors as well as internal factors, has to be considered.
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This very complex system with its varying factors is shown 
in the following figure:
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
Consumer
change
Suppliers Technology
Social
change
Market
structures
Economic
change
External
factorsLegislation
Competitors
The retail 
business 
environment
Buying Administration
Internal
factors
Manpower
Merchandising
Systems
Finance
ManagementProduct-
rango
development Operations
Distribution
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Source: Derek Knee and David Walters, The Strategy in 
Retailing Theory and Application (1985) Chapter 4, Figure 
4.1, see also n.6 above.
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Because of the disadvantages shown above, not every 
producer will choose to have his own distribution network, 
and beside the factory-to-consumer sale channel there may 
be another category of producers who do not actually need 
a complex distribution network or influence on such a 
network. These are the producers who manufacture cheap 
mass products and are only interested in selling as many 
articles as possible, no matter who is going to buy them. 
However, if the product in question is a quality product 
and the selling depends also on its brand image, the 
producer has to care much about the way the goods are 
distributed. It depends on the producer's market posture 
in its entirety, if he decides for or against his own 
distribution network.
Furthermore, small and medium sized firms will not be able 
to cover the high costs and risks of a self-owned distri­
bution network. Also firms whose product ranges are 
dependent on unsteady market requirements and therefore 
have to change quickly, will - geared to market re­
quirements and resonable planning - not establish their 
own distribution system.
In commercial life the above mentioned two ways of dis­
tribution are often found mixed with many variations.
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There are whole networks of partly subsidiary and partly 
third companies charged with the distribution.
Having decided to charge third parties with the whole or a 
part of the distribution, the producer will be interested 
in having sufficient influence over the way of distribu­
tion. It is this situation which may cause inquiries by 
the EC authorities, i.e, the Commission, which decides if 
the agreement falls within Article 85 of the EEC Treaty or
In opposition to that, there normally will be no cause for
the authorities to start inquiries when a producer chooses
12to establish his own distribution network.
Because the undertaking is selling the goods within the 
economic unity there is no need for distribution agree­
ments; the undertaking has no interest in influencing the 
distribution where the whole system is based on the 
company’s policy.
Here another advantage for interlinked companies can be 
made out: a big company can provide for all the sub­
sidiaries, risks etc. connected with its own distribution 
system and therefore can fall outside the ambit of en­
quiries of the Commission and of EEC Article 85, while a
- 19 -
small business may attract enquiries by the Commission and 
measures according to EEC Article 85.
The justification of a firms's interest in influencing the 
way of distribution firstly results from the manufacture 
of the goods in question. The undertaking may have 
mobilised high investments for product development with 
material costs, wages, storage, advertising etc. Even the 
idea (which may be patented) of the manufactured product 
itself may have been the undertaking's own. With all such 
investments incurred, in a free economic system the 
producer is entitled to earn the results of investment by 
selling the goods and making profits.
The successful sale of goods - as shown above - does not 
only depend on the quality, but also on various additional 
circumstances as service, brand image, marketing etc.
These are of enormous importance for the successful
marketing of a product. So it is important that the
producer be entitled to gain enough influence in the
entire selling system in order to pursue the firm's policy
and earn the results of productive investment. Not least
with an exclusive dealing agreement, the producer can also
13increase the efficiency of the whole outlet system. An
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other argument for the justification of exclusive dealing 
agreements is the participation of intermediaries and 
end-users in the advantages of the outlet system. The 
intermediaries can benefit from the brand image connected 
with marketing, detailed product information and assist­
ance in management decisions.^
Exclusive dealing agreements are also justified by ad­
vantages for the consumer. They can provide better quality
and a wider distribution of the products, and can promote
15inter-brand competition . They also provide the end-user 
with a wider range of products and more qualified staff 
and service.
Tendencies can be observed in some sectors, which "seem to
have a natural propensity to vertical integration", as for
16example beer and petrol. That may be so, because under­
takings produce goods on successive delivery, i.e. 
liquids, whose storage is connected with quite high 
expenses and risks (especially petrol, where pollution is 
concerned). Because of the storage problems, such under­
takings need a reliable outlet to sell their products.
A recent trend of going into vertical sectors can be 
noticed in the computer business and connected industries, 
where complex machines are concerned, requiring efficient
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service and supervising, especially for the software.
There seems to be a general tendency that the more complex 
the sold goods are, the more the producers tend to verti­
cal integration. It can be observed that computer pro­
ducers go into vertical integration, where the big systems 
are concerned, and tend to charge third parties with the 
distribution of the small systems (for example personal 
computers), which do not need much service.
Beside the above mentioned advantages, it is nevertheless 
necessary to consider the danger of exclusive dealing 
agreements in forming oligopolies connected with market 
power and the possibility of imposing prevailing high 
prices.
The present study considers the limitations of exclusive
dealing agreements under the EEC competition policy as to
17open markets and undisturbed competition , points which 
may sometimes differ from the agreements of the parties 
concerned.
Having mentioned the economic and commercial function and 
need of exclusive dealing agreements, we may now look to 
the legal side.
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All distribution contracts, especially the exclusive
dealing agreements, are instruments of vertical work-
sharing between trade and industry, and thus instruments
18of the sales strategy of undertakings. Every member of 
the distribution chain will try to translate his economic 
aim into the best possible legal form.
The present study looks at the possibilities and limits of 
pursuing commercial interests at the level of the law.
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CHAPTER 3
Notions and types of exclusive dealing agreements.
1. Definition and delimitation in contrast to horizontal 
agreements, company contracts, licensing and franchising.
Definition
Surveying the literature on exclusive dealing agreements, 
one finds a wide variety of meanings and definitions. In 
the present the different meanings will be explained and 
definitions adopted for the present study.
In some sources the term "exclusive dealing agreement" is
used as a kind of general term, covering all kinds of
agreements "whereby undertakings agree to deal only with
19each other, to the exclusion of third parties". In other
sources the term defines only a small segment of the above
20mentioned agreements. Exclusive dealing agreements are
also found defined as contracts, where " a producer may
agree to deal exclusively with a particular customer or the
customer to purchase exclusively from the producer other
21than m  the context of the distribution of products." 
Deriving from that definition, the "exclusive dealing 
agreements" are delimited against "distribution agree­
ments" .
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On the premises that "not all vertical restraints are 
essentially concerned with distribution policy" the term 
exclusive dealing agreement is used for agreements which 
are not part of the producer's distribution system, but 
concern the supplies which a firm may require for its own
needs, e.g. for its own production program(s) or in the
. . 22form of semi-finished goods for further processing.
Different definitions and meanings of the term exclusive
dealing agreements are also found in the literature in
German on EEC law. As a general term very often the word
23"Alleinvertriebsvereinbarungen" is used , also the term
2 4"Absatzvertrage" is found.
Recently there seems to be a tendency to replace the term 
exclusive dealing agreement with a general meaning by the 
term "vertical agreements affecting distribution or 
supply".^
Also the term "exclusive distribution agreement" is to be 
found.
This definition, used in Regulation 1983/83, has to be 
interpreted in connection with Regulation 1984/83.
The Commission makes clear in the Notice on Regulations 
1983/83 and 1984/83 that the legal definitions should not 
be altered. It says: "Regulations (EEC) No. 1983/83 and
- 25 -
(EEC) No. 1984/83 are both concerned with exclusive agree­
ments between two undertakings for the purpose of the
27resale of goods". The conclusion can be drawn that the 
term "exclusive agreements" is used as a kind of leading 
term for both Regulations 1983/83 and 1983/84.
For the present study the term exclusive dealing agreements 
is used with a wide meaning as a leading term, concerning 
all agreements between undertakings for the purpose of the 
resale of goods, all the more as every resale agreement 
excludes some or all competing parties, either inter­
mediaries or producers. Otherwise there would be no need 
for the establishment of a special outlet system (see above 
Chapter 1).
The agreement itself is not defined by Article 85 of the
EEC Treaty. Agreements are "bilateral or multilateral
understandings in which at least one partner is legally
2 8bound to a certain act or omission."
(In the present text, the meaning of bilateral and multi­
lateral agreements will be rendered by the term "trans­
frontier" relating to agreements between firms in more than 
one, that is in two or more member states. Correspondingly, 
the term "non-transfrontier" will relate to an agreement, 
concluded between firms in one and the same member state).
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The particular agreements and their validity are subject to
the specific national legal system, where they take their
effect, "national law determines what constitutes an
29agreement, contents and purpose do not matter".
An exemption from this principle is made, where the agree­
ment is infringing EEC provisions, especially EEC Article 
85. The infringing agreement - however valid according to 
national law - is automatically void. EEC Article 85 (2) 
provides that "any agreements or decisions prohibited 
pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void".
Delimitation in contrast to horizontal agreements, company 
contracts, licensing and franchising
Having defined the exclusive dealing agreements for the 
present study, they have to be delimitated also against 
other, similar contracts.
Firstly, it must be considered that in general there are 
two main types of exclusive dealing agreements: horizontal 
and vertical agreements. Horizontal agreements are agree­
ments "between undertakings at the same level of supply, 
usually agreements between competitors, for example an
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agreement, not to compete on price or to seek new 
30markets". Vertical agreements are agreements "between a
31supplier and a customer to whom he supplies" , i.e. they
are agreements between undertakings at different market 
32levels.
The present study concentrates on the vertical agreements, 
because for the purpose of distribution, as pointed out in 
Chapter 1, it is most important to gain influence on the 
following market levels, and such influence can be secured 
only by vertical agreements.
Vertical agreements between partners at different market
33levels can also be based on company contracts.
Company contracts create independent legal entities as 
private or private limited companies, public companies or 
co-operative associations.^^
These agreements based on articles of association will be 
set aside for the present study, as the study concentrates 
on the exchange trading contracts with exclusive dealing 
agreements.
The exclusive dealing agreements have also to be delimi­
tated against mere purchasing contracts, which can also be 
agreements between parties at different market levels.
Purchase contracts are basically reciprocal contracts about
3 5the exchange of goods and money . Once the exchange has
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been carried out, the consignee is free to do with the 
goods what he likes. So these purchase contracts can be 
delimitated against exclusive dealing agreements, because 
they only affect the exchange and do not place the con­
signee under additional obligations concerning distribution
or further buyings, even when the original exchange con-
3 6tracts are already wound up. Mere purchase contracts are 
not useful for a producer, who wants to influence the 
further business connections as well as the following 
contracting partners of the distribution chain.
Also the delimitation of exclusive dealing agreements 
against agreements on intellectual property, i.e. licensing
agreements is not always easy to make out. Agreements
/
relating to intellectual property rights, especially
37licensing agreements can be vertical agreements as well.
In the decision on the agreements of the Burroughs Cor-
3 8poration the Commission says about licensing agreements :
"A patent confers on its holder the exclusive right to manufacture
the products which are subject of the invention. The holder may
cede, by licences for a given territory, the use of the rights
39derived from its patent".
Licensing agreements are defined as contracts, which oblige 
the proprietor of a transferable intellectual property
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(industrial property right) to transfer it or allow the use 
40of the right. Thus they can be distinguished from ex­
clusive dealing agreements, which are agreements relating
41 .to distribution of goods , whereas licensing agreements 
relate to the transfer of rights.
Very complex is the delimitation of exclusive dealing 
agreements against franchising contracts found in many 
varying forms.
Basically there are at least three distinct types of
franchising agreements: service franchise agreements,
distribution franchise agreements and production (indus-
42trial) franchise agreements.
The difference with the first and the last can be recog­
nised by the subjects in question: service and production. 
More difficult is the delimitation to distribution fran­
chise agreements or to the above mentioned types, if they 
are found mixed, because the same subject, distribution, is 
concerned. About the difference of franchise agreements and 
exclusive dealing agreements the European Court of Justice 
established in the case Pronuptia:
"In a distribution franchise system such as this, an enterprise which 
has established itself as a distributor in a market and which has thus 
been able to perfect a range of commercial methods gives independent
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businessmen the chance, at a price, of establishing themselves in 
other markets by using its mark and the commercial methods that cre­
ated the franchisor's success. Mare than just a method of distribu­
tion, this is a manner of exploiting financially a body of knowledge, 
without investing the franchisor's own capital. At the same time this 
system gives businessmen who lack the necessary experience access to 
methods which they could otherwise only acquire after prolonged effort 
and research and allows them also to profit from the reputation of the 
mark. Distribution franchise agreements are thus different from either 
dealership agreements or those binding approved resellers appointed 
under a system of selective distribution which involve neither use of 
a single mark nor application of uniform commercial methods nor pay­
ment of royalties in consideration of the advantages thus con- 
43ferred."
In the decision of 17 December 1986 (Yves Rocher) the Com­
mission said:
"Commission Regulations No 67/67/EEC (OJ no 57, 25.3.1967. p. 849/67) 
and (EEC) No 1983/83 (OJ L 173, 20.6.1983, p. 1), as last amended by 
the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, on the block exemption of 
exclusive dealing and exclusive distribution agreements are not ap­
plicable to the standard form franchise at issue, the legal nature of 
which is different (Case 161/84 (Pronuptia), points 15 and 33). The 
franchise contracts go beyond mere distribution agreements, for the 
franchisor undertakes to grant rights to use its identifying marks and 
its proven trading methods with a view to the application of an origi­
nal an changing distribution formula. It must therfore be decided
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whether the contracts at issue qualify for an individual exemption
44under Article 85 (3)".
In July 1987 the Commission took another Decision in a case
45involving Computerland Europe. The Commission confirmed
46the principles established m  Pronuptia. The Commission 
made clear that restrictions for the franchisees, e.g. 
so-called location clauses, can be accepted for the ad­
vantages passed on to the consumers. This is the first 
decision where a distribution franchise agreement was 
clearly not found illegal under the EEC competition law.
The Decision confirmed the conclusion that the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice do not find the Regula­
tion 1983/83 applicable for franchising contracts and 
therefore regard them as different from exclusive dealing 
agreements.^
Consequently the Commission prepared a new block exemption 
for franchise agreements.
In it the franchising agreement is defined as an agreement
"whereby one undertaking, the franchisor, grants the other,
the franchisee, in exchange for financial consideration,
the right to exploit a franchise for the purpose of
49marketing determined goods and / or services."
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So the franchise itself means "a package of intangible 
property rights relating to trade marks, trade names, shop 
signs, utility models, designs, copyrights, know-how or 
patents, to be exploited for the resale of goods or the
provision of services to end-users and which include at
50 .least certain minimum criteria". The further examination
of the recent developments concerning franchising agree­
ments would exceed the extent of the present study which
51concentrates on exclusive dealing agreements.
As a conclusion exclusive dealing agreements can be de­
limited against franchising agreements by the relation to 
the resale of goods in general, whilst franchising agree­
ments refer also to licences of intangible property rights, 
e.g. to the use of the undertaking's name, trade marks and 
know-how.
2. The different types of exclusive dealing agreements.
Continuing from exclusive dealing agreements as a general 
term, the different types of exclusive dealing agreements 
(including selective dealing agreements) and their rel­
evance for the EEC competition system can be pointed out.
As shown above, distribution in commercial life is a very 
complex matter with many varieties. According to this
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requirement the exclusive dealing agreements are found in 
many modifications, making them difficult to classify.
In literature - beside the difficulties in definition -
52mostly ennumerations of the singular cases are to be 
found, whilst fundamental lines and meanings are difficult 
to identify.
An attempt of classification can be made when regarding how 
the agreement binds the contracting partners (type of 
restriction). ^
The different types of exclusive dealing agreements are 
shown in the following figure:
horizontal dealing
Multipartite 
(collective) 
exclusive dealing 
agreements between 
manufacturers
Exclusive 
agency • 
agreements
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EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS
agreements vertical dealing agreements
Collective
exclusive
dealing
agreements
Multipartite 
exclusive 
dealing 
concerning 
raw materials
Exclusive
distribution
agreements
Exclusive
purchasing
agreements
(requirements
contracts)
Selective
distribution
systems
Definitions: Bellamy/Child op. cit. (n.25) at paragraphs 4-047, 4-064, 
4-078, 6-001 et sequ.
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The above mentioned figure is showing the basic structures
of the different types of exclusive dealing agreements.
(For a complete picture, the horizontal exclusive dealing
agreements are also included in the figure. Although the
horizontal dealing agreements might infringe Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty, they will be set aside for the present
study, which will, as already mentioned, concentrate on
54vertical exclusive dealing agreements. )
In practical commercial life it may be difficult to find 
out the different types, because they are found mixed in 
many variations, adapted to the requirements of the spe­
cific economic situation. However, this part of Chapter 3 
will deal with the different types of exclusive dealing 
agreements as a basis for analysing the legal situation in 
the past (Chapter 4) and at present (Chapter 5).
Vertical agreements include firstly the exclusive agency 
55agreements.
According to Bellamy/Child the relationship between the 
parties is "one of principal and agent strictly so called. 
The principal is typically restricted as to the other 
agents through whom he may supply, while the agent is
C C
restricted from acting for another principal."
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These agreements are to be defined as agreements between 
the producer and its subsidiaries rather than as agreements 
between the producer and independent third parties.
As usual these contractual bindings are recipocal: the
principal is restricted from supplying other agents within
a specified part of the territory of the Common Market, and
the agent assumes the obligation to work exclusively for 
57one principal. Provided that the agreement is one between 
principal and commercial agent, the agent is looked upon as
5 8performing "an auxiliary function in the commodity market" .
On these premises the whole distribution system is looked
upon as an economic entity with the consequence that
pursuant to the Commission Notice on Exclusive Agency
Agreements Article 85 of the EEC Treaty is not applicable,
even if the agent is appointed sole agent for a given 
59territory.
The Commission Notice on Exclusive Agency Agreements is 
only relevant where the agent is acting as a commercial 
agent, not as an independent trader.
The differentiation in the individual case may be diffi­
cult; the Commission regards as decisive criterion the 
lacking of the commercial agent's reponsibility for finan­
cial risks other than the giving of delcredere guaran-
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The independent trader on the other hand is assuming
financial risks, as he is acting on his own account. He
will act for more than one principal or at least, beside
working for one principal, acting on his own account as
well. In contrast to the commercial agent he is thus not
integrated fully into the distribution system of the 
61principal. Because the independent trader is regularly 
working for other employers too, he cannot be regarded as 
auxiliary of the employer in question.
Therefore such agreements fall within the provisions of 
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
So exclusive agency agreements have the advantage for the 
producer that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty is not appli­
cable, they also provide enough influence over details of 
the distribution. For the agent such arrangements are of 
advantage because he does not run high financial risks and 
does not need to make big investments. On the other hand 
the agent has to consider the strong economic dependance on 
the producer, who may impose his terms on him.
Secondly, there are the exclusive distribution agreements 
(exclusive supply terms).
Exclusive distribution agreement means "an agreement by 
which one party (the supplier) agrees to deliver certain
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products only to the other (the distributor) for resale 
within a certain area".^
These agreements contain mutual obligations as well. The 
supplier is normally prevented from appointing a third 
party in the territory or selling in the territory him­
self, while the distributor is assuming the obligation not
6 3to sell competing products.
If the supplier is only restricted from supplying other 
distributors, the agreement in some sources is defined as 
"sole distributorship agreement", if the supplier in addi­
tion to that is restricted from selling in the territory
himself, it is referred to as an "exclusive distributor-
64ship" agreement.
In some sources the exclusive dealing agreements are found 
defined as agreements with the essential that "the distri­
butor should be given an exclusive sales area and the 
competition issue is the degree of exclusivity he should be 
afforded; the essence of an exclusive purchasing commitment 
on the other hand is that the purchaser should only be 
allowed to purchase from a given supplier, and the com­
petition problem is that this forecloses access to that 
outlet".^
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In such exclusive distribution cases the territorial
element is a most important one. For the supplier it means
expansion into new markets, secure guaranteed outlets,
saving of transport expenses and costs connected with the
maintaining of several different outlets, which leads to
more efficiency and rationalisation. The distributor gains
a kind of territorial monopoly, so he will provide for the
necessary promotion, advertising etc, i.e. he will develop
6 6the "incentive he needs to promote the product". He will 
be interested in taking investments, because he can be sure 
that no other competitor in the area can — provided he is 
acting on legal grounds - get hold of the goods, so that he 
has no intra-brand competitor. This kind of agreement has 
advantages especially for the distributor, because the 
producer (supplier) is restricted from the supplying of 
competitors in a certain area. The producer on the other 
hand has the advantage of secure guaranteed outlets, but in 
cases of difficulties between the partners or sale diffi­
culties even crises there is the strong dependance of 
having only one outlet.
Exclusive distribution agreements might infringe Article 85
of the EEC Treaty. In the case of Consten and Grundig v
Commission the Court made clear that agreements conferring
absolute territorial protection upon a distributor fall
6 7within Article 85 of the EEC. Treaty. The details and the 
possibilities of a block exemption (Regulation 1983/83 on
- 40 -
Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Categories
6 8of Exclusive Distribution Agreements ) or an individual 
exemption are pointed out in the following chapters below.
Thirdly, there are the exclusive purchasing agreements for
resale (exclusive purchasing terms). They mean that the
person to be supplied undertakes to obtain all his require-
69ments of certain goods from one particular supplier. It 
is not always easy to distinguish an exclusive purchasing 
agreement from a (mere) contract of purchasing large 
quantities of certain goods in practice. The distinction is 
even more difficult where the purchasing contract provides 
future delivery.
Exclusive purchasing agreements may infringe Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty. In the Case Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin
70(No.l) the European Court of Justice stated that Article
85 of the EEC Treaty may be applicable to agreements by
which the purchaser renounces the freedom to buy his goods
from competing producers, and the other producers are
excluded from an outlet of their products.
In addition to that, the Commission made clear in the
71decision of BP Kemi/DDSF , that when distinguishing mere 
purchase contracts from exclusive purchasing agreements, 
the time element is an important one. It said: "However,
- 41 -
when a purchasing obligation of a longer duration is
entered into, the relationship of supply is frozen ... it
is possible that competition is restricted within the
72meaning of Article 85 (1)."
Analysing these decisions, in practice it is most im­
portant, when drafting future contracts for the parties, to 
acquire the complete facts of the case, and pay attention 
especially to the duration of the contract, before de­
ciding, if the contract is to be regarded as a long term
73sales agreement or an exclusive purchasing agreement.
Many exclusive purchasing agreements may now benefit from
the block exemption for categories of exclusive purchasing 
74agreements , the details of which are pointed out in 
Chapter 5.
An exclusive purchasing system is of advantage especially 
for the producer, who gains guaranteed outlets and, in 
addition to that, enough influence over the way of dis­
tribution, because the contracting partner is obliged to 
buy all his goods requirements from him. For the distri­
butor this system means that the producer will supply him 
also with know-how, advertising etc., but it can not be 
ignored that he may slide into a strong economic de­
pendence, agreeing to buy all his requirements from one 
producer. And this dependence will increase, even if his
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business is doing well, because he has to agree with the 
terms the producer is imposing on him, in order to satisfy 
his customers' demands on the branded goods, and there are 
no competitors he can turn to as long as the agreement is 
valid.
Regarding the basic structures of the three above 
mentioned types (exclusive agency agreements, exclusive 
distribution agreements and exclusive purchasing agree­
ments) , it stands to reason that the different types of 
exclusive dealing agreements are found mixed in many 
variations, depending on the requirements of the market.
The terms also depend essentially on the aims the con­
tracting partners are pursuing, and on their market powers, 
which may enable them to impose the most favourable clauses 
on their contracting partner.
Fourthly, there are the selective distribution systems.
All the above mentioned terms, especially the exclusive
distribuion agreements, are often found in connection with
selective distribution systems, in order to choose the
following contracting partner, to whom the product will be
7 5delivered, before it gets to the end-user.
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Basically, the producer is free to choose the ways of dis­
tribution and his contracting partners he wants to deliver
with the goods, as long as he has no monopoly or dominant 
7 6position. As long as there is no monopoly or dominant
position - limitation is EEC Article 8 6 - the producer
cannot be forced to deliver the product to everyone who
wants to be supplied with it. The producer is free even to
77deal with similar distributors m  a different way.
When reviewing the definitions of selective distribution 
systems, no uniform tendency can be found. In some sources 
selective distribution is defined as the producer's system­
atically accomplished limitation of the distribution
mediators in a particular market area (on one or more
7 8distribution levels). In other sources, the term is used
for "a system of distribution whereby the supplier limits
the resellers he is prepared to supply and the appointed
resellers are forbidden from reselling to any one other
79than end-users or other appointed resellers".
In this study the term is used in the latter sense, with a 
wide meaning covering every limitation of resellers.
Typically the producer of sophisticated consumer goods 
wants to limit type and number of retail outlets through
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which the products are sold to the end-users, he wants his
8 0brand goods sold by "approved dealers only".
The producer may operate such a selective distribution 
system without infringing Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 
However, the system has to fulfill certain criteria, as 
both the ECJ and the Commission have stated on a number of 
occasions, otherwise there may be an infringment of Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty. The legal situation of selective 
distribution will be considered in detail later in this 
study, including the block exemption provided by Regulation 
123/85.
Selective distribution systems secure the producer's in­
fluence on the following members of the distribution chain. 
The producer is free - within certain limits - to define 
the criteria, which have to be fulfilled concerning tech­
nical expertise, shop outfit, skill of staff etc. These 
criteria may vary with the brand image, and the consumer's 
requests when buying the specific brand products. The 
reseller on the other hand has to undergo certain pro­
cedures to become an "approved dealer"; he may have to make 
several financial investments (e.g. shop outfit, staff 
training etc.) in advance - as a kind of venture - not 
knowing, if the producer will acknowledge his exertions 
with the desired "approved dealer certificate".
- 45 -
Having explained the basic types of exclusive dealing 
agreements, we should complete the present review by 
mentioning that there are many other types of vertical 
agreements which affect purchase or supply, e.g. franchise 
agreements, vertical industrial supply or purchase agree­
ments, and subcontracting.
Franchising agreements have been considered above, the
other vertical agreements affecting purchase or supply do
not relate to the distribution of the final product, but to
81its stage before entering the distribution chain.
As a conclusion it can be said that exclusive dealing 
agreements are difficult to classify. The different types 
are mostly found mixed in all kinds of variations depending 
on their purpose of application in commercial life.
The following Chapters examine whether the decisions of the 
Commission and the Court of Justice show trends which could 
lead to certain classifications.
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3. Adaptation of exclusive dealing agreements to the 
requirements of economic and commercial life
The quickly changing commercial life requires contracts, 
which can easily be adapted to changing market situations; 
but, at the same time each party wishes to have a reliable 
partner for long-term planning and therefore wants to have 
long-term contracts which cannot be easily terminated. 
Therefore it has to be examined, according to which legal 
system the exclusive dealing agreements can be adapted to 
the requirements of everyday commercial life.
Generally, an exclusive dealing agreement requires many 
detailed provisions to respond to complex market 
situations. To establish provisions for every development 
which may occur in the future is, in practice, very diffi­
cult and voluminous, if not utopian. The best and most 
reasonable draft agreement includes as many provisions as 
necessary and as few provisions as possible. Many detailed 
provisions require especially those agreements in which the 
parties wish long-term contracts with as few as possible 
rights of termination. This is mostly of advantage for the 
producer, who gains secure guaranteed outlets. Never­
theless, in practice, very often surprising market develop­
ments arise, which none of the parties could have con­
sidered or envisaged.
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Where the parties have agreed about long-term binding 
obligations, the possibility of terminating a contract in 
reaction to changed market conditions may gain increasing 
importance; the survival of the undertaking may be con­
nected with it. So, the corresponding legal provisions also 
gain' enormous importance (see Chapter 2) jointly with the 
question as to which legal system is applicable to the 
contract.
The most important European Community provision is Article
85 of the EEC Treaty. To each contract EEC Article 85 is
directly applicable public law, the application of which
8 2the parties cannot exclude by agreement.
Article 85 (2) of the EEC Treaty provides that "agreements
or decisions pursuant to this Article shall be automati- 
8 3cally void" , but the Treaty gives no further provisions
for validity, adaptation and termination of the agreements.
Thus, in respect of validity - beside Article 85 of the
Treaty -, adaptation and/or termination or an agreement is
subject to international private law, referring to the
84applicable national law m  question or to that national 
law the parties want to apply. In their agreements the 
parties are within certain limits free to choose the 
national law they want to be applicable^. Where national 
law is applicable, there may be differences between the 
provisions stating validity, adaptation and termination of 
the agreement. The parties will take such differences into
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account when deciding which national law shall apply on 
their agreement. If they have not made a decision, the 
agreement is subject to this national law, which comes
o c
close or is connected with the agreement. Where the 
parties make no agreement about the applicable law, the 
industrial location becomes very important for im­
plementation, because it decides about the national law 
which is linked with the agreement. E.g. where German law 
is applicable, the parties can terminate an agreement 
according to § 13 GWB. § 13 GWB is public law, which can 
not be set aside of by the parties. However, the
termination pursuant to § 13 GWB requires certain criteria,
8 7which have to be observed.
Summarising, it can be stated that beside EEC Article 85 
validity, termination and adaptation of exclusive dealing 
agreements are subject to the relevant national law and 
have to be judged according to the national law in 
question.
The completion of the European internal market in 1992 will 
increase the number of private and/or commercial bi- or 
multilateral agreements across the boundaries of the member 
states, and it would be desirable to have uniform or at 
least harmonised European Community provisions about 
validity, adaptation and termination of exclusive dealing 
agreements, and to establish such uniform or harmonised 
provisions as a matter of Community law.
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P A R T  II/A
Chapter 4 
Exclusive dealing agreements 
under EEC competition law in the past
1. 1960s - 1980s: the practice of the Commission and the
European Court of Justice
(a) General remarks
Having discussed the different types of exclusive dealing 
agreements, the study now turns to the legal side of the 
exclusive dealing agreements.
As already suggested, there are agreements which infringe
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty, others which have been
held to fall outside EEC Article 85 (1) entirely, and
others which may benefit from block exemptions or qualify
for an individual exemption under Article 85 (3). As a
result "there is a complex mosaic of what is permitted and
what is not permitted under Article 85, in which each kind
8 8of agreement must be considered separately".
It should be noted that the study is not attempting a 
survey of all the cases which have dealt with exclusive 
dealing agreements. Its purpose is to elaborate the main
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structures and tendencies; in this context it refers to the 
hereto relevant cases.
The analysis of the question whether an exclusive dealing 
agreement is infringing Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, has 
to be made in several steps. Firstly it has to be examined 
whether the agreement falls within EEC Article 85 at all. 
Secondly, if the agreement is infringing Article 85, 
possible block exemptions are to be considered. Where block 
exemptions are not applicable, the question of an in­
dividual exemption will have to be thirdly discussed.
In the first section of the two Chapters 4 - 5  the study 
will concentrate on the first problem: whether the agree­
ment is infringing EEC Article 85. The second section will 
consider block exemptions and individual exemptions.
(b) Exclusive agency agreements
In view of the situation in the past the study considers 
the different types of exclusive dealing agreements and 
firstly turns to the exclusive agency agreements.
In December 1962 the Commission issued the Notice on
8 6Exclusive Agency Contracts made with Commercial Agents.
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The Notice intends to give indications of the considera­
tions the Commission will take into account when inter­
preting EEC Article 85; the Notice is not prejudicing 
interpretation by other authorities or the European Court
 ^ t 4-- 90of Justice.
As the Commission stated, for the applicability of the
Notice it is essential that the contracting party, the
commercial agent, is such by the nature of his functions,
and is not engaging in activities proper to an independent 
91trader. In the Notice the Commission considered further
that contracts between the principal and a commercial
agent, in which the latter agrees in a specific part of the
territory and negotiates or concludes transactions in the
name (or his own name) and on behalf of the principal, "are
not covered by the prohibition laid down in Article 85,
92paragraph (1) of the Treaty".
This view was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in
9 3the case Italy v Council and Commission , where the Court 
stated that principal and agent had to be looked upon as 
one economic unity, the same way as employer and employee, 
with the consequence that such ageements fall outside EEC 
Article 85 (1).
Considering that true agency agreements do not fall within 
Article 85 (1) at all, the distinction between a true agent 
and an independent trader gains much importance.
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Confirming the Commission's view, the European Court of
Justice has adopted the distinction between commercial
agent and independent trader as pointed out in the case
94Consten and Grundig v Commission
95Consequently in Pittsburg Corning Europe the Commission 
stated, in agreement with and in addition to the Court's 
view and the Notice on Exclusive Agency Contracts, that for 
this distinction the responsibility for financial risks, 
the essential characteristic of an independent trader, is 
to be regarded as the decisive criterion.
The agent is not expected to accept financial risks other 
than delcredere-guarantees and has to be a true auxiliary,
integrated fully into the distribution system of his
. . n 96principal.
This view was developed further in the decision the Com-
97mission took in Formica , where it was made clear that not 
the label, but only the real relationship between the 
parties is relevant, and all surrounding circumstances are 
to be considered.
The oppinion that only true agency agreements fall outside
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty was reconfirmed in 
9 8Sugar , where the Court held that EEC Article 85 is not 
applicable to a clause prohibiting the agent from trading 
in products competing with those of his principal.
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In this judgment the ECJ upheld the Commission's opinion 
that agreements were not agency agreements where the agent, 
who is himself a powerful broker, carries out business for 
third parties as well, and is playing two roles: one as an 
agent and one as an independent trader. Where the agent is 
not entirely integrated in the principal's firm, e.g. when 
the agent is acting in the above mentioned two roles, 
Article 85 (1) is applicable to the agreement.
Similar considerations were applied by the Commission in
9 9SCPA/Kali und Salz , where it was stated that EEC Article 
8 5 (1) may apply where competing firms agree in appointing 
the same agent, and the "agent" is doing business trans­
actions for more than one firm.
With the intention to harmonise the national laws on the 
relationship of principal and agents, the Commission has 
published the Directive "Proposal re Self-Employed Commer­
cial Agents".^ ®  Its application and future cases before 
the Commission and the ECJ, as well as practice in the 
single European Market after 1992, will show, if this
Directive is leading to more clarification, and is apt to
\
guarantee an uniform legal system for agency contracts.
Reviewing the Court's and Commission's decisions it can be 
said that they continue in not applying EEC Article 85 (1) 
on agreements with (true) commercial agents. However, the
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uncertainity appears, when an agency contract has to be 
delimitated against a contract with an independent trader. 
Considering the Case Sugar, the delimitation seems even 
more problematic in cases where the agent himself has a 
strong economic position; it is not clear, how wide or 
narrow this decision should be interpreted.
There might be a tendency to apply the benefits of the 
Notice on Agency Contracts only to such agents who have a 
weaker economic position, are entirely integrated in the 
principal's undertaking, and completely dependant upon the 
principal.
Although the Commission Notice on exclusive Agency Con­
tracts suggests to remove the incentive for firms to obtain 
a Negative Clearance or a decision about an individual 
exemption, the cases show that in practice there may be 
considerable difficulties in distinguishing an agent from 
an independent trader. In such cases it seems advisable to 
be on the safe side and apply for a negative clearance 
under Article 2 of Regulation 17/62. A negative clearance
may always be submitted without grounds for application,
10]and the Commission is obliged to adopt a decision.
- 55 -
(c) Exclusive distribution agreements
(i) General remarks
Having discussed the exclusive agency agreements, we will 
secondly turn to exclusive distribution agreements.
It has to be introductory considered, as already mentioned, 
that exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing in 
practice are very often found in combination with other 
clauses, especially selective distribution clauses or 
systems. Therefore quite a few decisions may refer both to 
exclusive distribution/purchasing and to selective dealing 
systems.
There also may be a number of decisions referring to a few 
other legal problems. These decisions will be analysed in 
the respective context.
Further the present study will, before dealing with the 
particulars of exclusive distribution agreements, consider 
the preliminary question of the relevant facts for a given 
case on exclusive distribution agreements.
In the very early Case of Soci&t& Technique Miniere v
102Maschinenbau Ulm the ECJ established that for the 
judgment of a case not only the provisions of the agreement 
but also the surrounding legal and economic circumstances 
and the question what would have happened in the absence of
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the agreement are to be considered. The ECJ held that the 
nature and quantity of the goods, market position of 
grantor and concessionaire, isolated or series of agree­
ments, and the severity of the clauses have to be taken
into account. The ECJ confirmed this principle in many
103subsequent cases , and therefore not the isolated agree­
ment itself, but the whole network and the economic circum-
104stances surrounding it may have to be considered.
This assessment makes clear that in practice the legal 
nature of the respective agreement depends first .of all on 
the particular clauses and on the whole surrounding circum­
stances and facts of the given case. Even when applying 
general principles, each case has to be examined carefully. 
ECJ and Commission have passed many decisions on the 
particular agreements and clauses.
As already suggested, the study also concentrates in this
section these clauses, agreements and cases, which show 
trends and general principles of what is contravening EEC
Article 85 and not fit for an exemption.
(ii) Export bans and similar agreements
The first important case in which the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice gave a judgement on permitted and 
prohibited exclusive distribution agreements, was Consten
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105and Grundig v Commission . There the ECJ passed a 
decision which for the present study is relevant with 
regard to various legal aspects.
The facts of the case.
Grundig, a German producer of electric equipment agreed 
with Consten, its French distributor, that Consten will not 
deliver any Grundig products directly or indirectly outside 
France, and in France Grundig will not deliver its products 
to any other distributor but Consten.
Similar agreements were made with other distributors in the
Member States. With the German wholesalers there were
agreements made which prevented them to import the Grundig
products to France or to the other Member States.
In addition to that a special collateral arrangement was
made between Grundig and Consten, which authorised Consten
to register in France the Grundig mark "GINT", which is
10 6used on the products together with the "GRUNDIG" mark. 
Nevertheless, a parallel importer of Consten mananged to 
obtain the Grundig products, and Consten sued him under the 
French law of unfair competition and for infringement of 
the trademark "GINT".
The case was brought before a French court which suspended 
proceedings (stayed proceedings pending) and submitted the 
case to the Commission.
The Commission found itself competent and passed a Decision 
that was challenged before the European Court of Justice 
for a final decision.
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The legal grounds/the Commission's Decision.
107The Commission stated that the exclusive distribution 
agreement conferring absolute territorial protection upon 
the distributor was caught by Article 85 (1).
The Commission argued that the agreement reserved the trade 
between France and Germany in Grundig products exclusively 
to Consten. As no competitors could obtain the products 
without great difficulties, the agreement had the effect 
that the French market was isolated by Consten, and com­
petitors could not obtain the products, with the result 
that parallel imports were practically obstructed.
The obligation that Consten was not allowed to export the 
products in other Member States took, together with cor­
responding agreements, the same effect in the other Member 
States, i.e. parallel imports were made nearly practically 
impossible. Together with the use of the trademark "GINT" 
by Consten the isolation of the French market was com­
pleted.
With these effects in mind the Commission drew the con­
clusion that the agreements between Consten and Grundig 
were affecting and restricting trade between the Member 
States, and thus infringing Article 85 (1) of the EEC
Treaty. In addition to that the Commission refused an
10 8individual exemption under EEC Article 85 (3).
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The legal grounds/the judgment of the European Court of 
Justice.
109 . . . .The ECJ confirmed the Commission's decision m  most
parts. It made unmistakably clear that both horizontal and 
vertical agreements fall within Article 85 of the EEC 
Treaty. It refused the then discussed opinion of EEC
Article 85 being only applicable to horizontal agree-
110ments.
The ECJ stated that the vertical Grundig/Consten agreements 
fell within EEC Article 85 (1).
Having distinguished the agent from an independent trader
(see section (b) above, the ECJ confirmed the Commission's
Decision that the given agreement was infringing the
competition between the member states, as it had the object
or effect of restricting distribution between distributors
of the same branded products, and therefore violated
111Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty. The ECJ confirmed also
the Commission's refusal to grant an individual exemption
112under EEC Article 85 (3).
In conclusion it can be said that the ECJ thus established 
two fundamental principles. Firstly, the Court stated that 
both horizontal and vertical agreements fall within Article 
85 of the EEC Treaty. Secondly, it made clear that such 
agreements artificially separate the national markets by 
conferring absolute territorial protection to the distri­
butor and imposing an export ban on him. The ECJ held that
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these agreements granting absolute territorial protection, 
and thus "export bans", infringe EEC Article 85 (1).
Subsequent to the ECJ judgment in Consten and Grundig v 
Commission, many efforts have been made to gain the same 
effect as from the - now prohibited - export bans and 
absolute territorial protection, indirectly by similar 
agreements. Very apt to achieve the effects of an export 
ban has seemed the method of fixing different prices (price 
discrimination) according to the territory the products are 
to be delivered in, in order to favour "home deliveries" or 
supplies to certain member states with convenient prices. 
However, the Commission and the ECJ have firmly disapproved 
of such indirect export bans, too, and have made clear,
that such agreements infringe Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
.,113as well
In 1978 the Commission passed an important decision on
114indirect export bans in The Distillers Company Limited 
In this case the producer made rebates and allowances where 
the products’ destination was the "home trade" and not the 
export. The Commission made clear that there were no 
adequate reasons for such practices and that EEC Article 85 
(1) was infringed.
115On appeal, the ECJ confirmed m  Distillers v Commission 
the view that such price policies contravene EEC Article 85 
(1). The question of an exemption under EEC Article 8 5 (3),
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which the ECJ discussed in the judgment as well, is pointed 
out below.
Beside pricing to restrict exports, producers have tried, 
with an abundance of other measures, to impede parallel 
imports and establish export bans. In the past such
measures included especially the exercise of trademark
116 11Vrights and the use of national law , if the latter
involved less strict provisions than Community law.
Attempts were also made to prevent parallel imports by
refusing to honour guarantees from products not acquired in
118a certain territory. Reviewing the practice in the past, 
it can be said that the ECJ and the Commission have not 
been (and are not) sympathetic towards such attempts to
avoid direct export bans and absolute territorial re-
119 •strictions. They have analysed carefully m  every given
case, if EEC Article 85 (1) was being infringed.
(iii) Agreements obliging the supplier to sell exclusively 
to the distributor
Such agreements, obliging the supplier (producer) to sell 
only to the distributor, can be regarded as the inversion 
of exclusive purchasing agreements, for the exclusive 
obligation is not on the buyer's but on the seller's side. 
Thus common to both agreements is that the exclusivity 
imposes a severe tie on the supplier/purchaser and a 
restriction of competition on the other competing suppliers
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or purchasers. In this context too the decision in Consten 
120and Grundig has important aspects. In its Decision the
Commission held that an agreement obliging the supplier to
sell only to the distributor within a given area, without
containing any restrictions on parallel imports, may
infringe EEC Article 85 (1). This part of the decision was
reversed on appeal by the European Court of Justice, but
121only on grounds of lack of reasoning.
122In another early decision, Socifetfe Technique Miniere the 
ECJ stated that an agreement granting merely exclusive 
distribution rights, without absolute territorial restric­
tions and export bans, did not necessarily fall within EEC 
Article 85 (1). However, in the past in many subsequent 
Decisions the Commission stated that an inter-state ex­
clusive supply clause may by itself fall within EEC Article 
12385 (1).
(iv) Restrictions on resale (other than selective 
distribution systems).
As already stated in Chapter 2, in economic life a producer 
of brand goods may have for many reasons an interest in 
influencing not only his contracting partner, but also 
further members in the distribution chain. He may achieve 
this by establishing a selective distribution system and 
limit the number of distribution intermediaries in each 
particular market area, or by imposing on his contracting
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partner other restrictions on resale. This contracting 
partner for his part is then bound to act in accordance 
with the restrictions.
The selective distribution systems will be dealt with 
separately below. As other restictions on resale are often 
found in connection with exclusive distribution agreements, 
they will be considered here in this present section.
An important part of restrictions on resale are resale 
price maintenance clauses, where, similar to pricing to 
restrict parallel imports, prices are used as a market 
instrument.
In the past, resale price maintenance conditions have on
severals occasions been scrutinised by the ECJ and the
Commission. In its First Report on Competition Policy the
Commission expressed that in general only national systems
of resale price maintenances do not fall within the scope
124of EEC Article 85 (1). It is therewith clear, however,
that the Commission regarded EEC Article 85 (1) to be
infringed, whenever bilateral, i.e. transfrontier, resale
price maintenances are in question; in these cases ob-
125viously an exemption would not be granted.
As illegal and contravening EEC Article 85 were also found 
to be agreements on transfrontier resale price maintenance 
for imported or reimported goods. In uniform Decisons the
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Commission has stated that such practices do infringe EEC 
Article 85.^^
This strict approach was maintained and further developed
in the Decision the Commission adopted in Re GERO-fabriek,
when it held that even a national resale price maintenance
system was apt to infringe EEC Article 85 (1), if it
restricted competition and affected trade between the 
127Member States. Reviewing these Decisions, it can be
said that a transfrontier resale price maintenance agree­
ment is most likely to infringe EEC Article 85 (1), while 
the assessment of a non-transfrontier agreement will depend 
on its effects on trade between the member states.
As beside resale price maintenances, also the other re­
strictions on resale may be desirable for the producer, the 
judicial practice at EEC level has scrutinised them with 
not too much sympathy.
128The Commission stated in Omega that a clause prohibiting
a retailer from supplying certain kinds of customers may
infringe EEC Article 85 (1). This view was confirmed in Re
129Deutsche Philips , when the Commission found an agreement 
prohibiting the reseller from supplying resellers in other 
member states contravening EEC Article 85 (1), on grounds
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that these restrictions on horizontal supply may have the 
same effect as export bans.
A particular approach was formulated by the European Court
13 0of Justice in Metro v Commission No.l . The ECJ held that 
an agreement prohibiting the wholesaler from directly 
supplying private consumers did not contravene EEC Article 
85 (1). In addition to the Commission's Decision which the 
ECJ upheld, a distinguishment was made by the Court between 
agreements prohibiting supply to other traders at the same 
level, and agreements corresponding to the separation of 
functions in the distribution chain, where a wholesaler per 
se is not supposed to go into direct selling.
However, also the other restrictions on resale have to be
closely examined. Thus a producer is not allowed to impose
restrictions on the distributor with reference to the
ultimate purpose the products are sold, or with reference
131to the number of products to be sold together.
A restriction on resale in the form of information by the 
distributor does not necessarily infringe EEC Article 85
(1), provided the producer will not use the information for
132an improper purpose, e.g. for influencing the distributor.
133In BP Kemi/DDSF the Commission's Decision made clear 
that also the supply of competitive information from one of 
the dealers to other dealers may constitute such an im­
proper use. In addition to infringing EEC competition law
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such an act may also contravene national law and may 
generate claims for damages for breach of contract under 
national law.
(d) Exclusive purchasing agreements
At first/ exclusive purchasing agreements were sparingly 
considered by the Commission, and, if at all, then in the 
light of Article 8 6 of the EEC Treaty.
Only gradually did the Commission recognise the importance 
of exclusive purchasing agreements in respect to EEC 
Article 85 (1) before adopting one of its first important 
Decisions in 1978.
134In EEC v Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd (Spices) , an agreement 
obliging the supermarkets to buy spices only from Liebig 
was found to infringe EEC Article 85 (1). Earlier the 
Commission had stated that a non-competition clause pro­
viding for exclusive purchasing was caught by EEC Article 
13585. The Decisions in question are significant, because 
the Commission did not base its conclusions solely on the 
contents of concrete agreements, but considered also the 
serious effects which the anti-competitive conduct would 
have on the market.
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A year later in 19 79 the Commission generated another
important decision on exclusive purchasing agreements in BP 
129Kemi/DDSF . It made an attempt to distinguish between an 
exclusive purchasing obligation and the apparent "anti­
competitive" effect of any purchase contract of large 
quantites of goods. The Commission established:
"However, when a purchasing obligation of a longer duration is entered 
into, the relationship of supply is frozen and the role of offer and 
demand is eliminated to the disadvantage of inter alia new competitors 
who are thereby prevented from supplying this customer and old com­
petitors who in the meantime may have become more competitive than the 
137actual supplier."
It can in conclusion be noted that the Commission has grown 
cautious against exclusive purchasing agreements and has 
been scrutinising them carefully, taking into account 
especially the market strength of the parties.
(e) Selective distribution systems
As mentioned earlier, all selective distribution systems 
impose restrictions on the resellers and the "approved 
dealers", and in addition to such restrictions they include
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the obligation not to sell the goods in question to any 
non-approved dealers. Otherwise the whole system would be, 
however minimally, breached and its purpose foiled.
The Commission took its first Decisions on selective
distribution systems in 1970, in Kodak and Omega. In
13 8Kodak the Commission made clear that selective distri­
bution systems do not necessarily infringe Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty, and that there may be systems which may 
completely fall outside the scope of EEC Article 85 (1).
As a preliminary question it has to be scrutinised whether 
a selective distribution system is appropriate for the 
goods which are sold. In Kodak the Commission stated that a 
system which limited supply only to (all) resellers who 
provided suitable premises, trained staff and sufficient 
servicing arrangements (i.e. qualitative criteria), is for 
the purpose of the law adequate for cameras.
So, such a system may completely fall outside the scope of 
EEC Article 85 (l).139
140In Omega the Commission found - as in Kodak - a 
selective distribution system reasonably necessary for the 
proper sale of expensive Swiss watches, so that the se­
lective distribution system would not per se infringe EEC 
141Article 85 (1). However, for the Commission the case 
gave reason to adopt a Decision particularly about the
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given restrictions. The Swiss watch company had agreed with 
the "Omega general agents", the main distributors, to 
restrict the number of the "Omega concessionnaires" as 
retail outlets, by using qualitative criteria with re­
ference to technical qualification, and also by using 
quantitative criteria with reference to the size of the 
local population and its presumed purchasing power. Even 
though the Commission considered the qualitative part of 
the distribution system to be appropriate for expensive
Swiss watches, it found that the quantitative part of the
142system infringed EEC Article 85 (1). It stated that a 
selective distribution system would - even if appropriate 
to the goods in question - fall only outside the ambit of 
EEC Article 85 (1), if it was an "open system", imposing 
only "simple", objective and qualitative conditions on the 
reseller with respect to professional qualifications. As 
the Omega system was not allowing each retailer, who 
fulfilled the qualitative criteria, to become an "approved 
dealer", that is an "Omega concessionnaire", the Commission 
found that the system infringed EEC Article 85 (1) , es­
pecially because the number of retail outlets was re­
stricted by additional quantitative requirements based on 
the presumed market power of the region. Thus, the 
Commission found that competition was infringed, because
the quantitative requirements effected "a maximum retailer
143quota per town and per region". In such decisions the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice have
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consistantly considered the relevance of specific economic 
circumstances and have thus adopted an economic decision as
i i 144well.
A differing Decision, relating to objective criteria, that
145is the "minimum standards", took the Commission m  BMW ,
when it stated that even if the objective criteria where
uniformly and equally applied, the system infringed EEC
Article 85 (1). In later Decisions the principles in BMW
referring to the applicability of EEC Article 85 (1) were
abandoned and the line of approach pointed out in Omega was
developed further, as made clear in the important case of
146Metro v Commission No.l.
The facts of the case.
SABA a German producer of television, radio and tape- 
recorder equipment, operated a selective distribution 
system in Germany and other member states. The purpose of 
the distribution system was to secure that SABA products 
were distributed only through a network of approved dealers 
and wholesalers.
All SABA dealers had to assume the following obligations:
(1) no delivery to any dealer who does not fulfil 
objective qualitative criteria for resale;
(2) accomplishment of certain qualitative criteria as 
technical qualification, employment of specialist 
staff, suitable trading premises, provision of adquate 
service;
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(3) accomplishment of additional criteria as six-month- 
supply contracts, achievement of what SABA considered 
to be an adequate turnover for each dealer, maintenance 
of a stock level and general participation in the 
creation of the SABA sales network.
SABA/the Commission's Decision.
Confirming the principles laid down in Kodak and Omega, the
Commission held that for the SABA products the selective
distribution system with the (above mentioned) obligations
(nos. 1 and 2), requiring certain objective and qualitative
criteria, were adequate and therefore fell completely
147outside the scope of EEC Article 85 (1)
In respect of the additional obligations under no. 3 
(above) the Commission stated that they went beyond the 
qualitiative criteria in a "simple", open system and that 
they thus restricted competition, falling therewith within 
EEC Article 85 (1). The Commission was inclined, however, 
to grant an exemption under EEC Article 85 (3). The 
Commission's Decision was challenged by Metro, a self- 
service cash and carry warehouse, which had been refused 
supplies by SABA on the grounds as it did not fulfill the 
requirements for admission to the distribution system.
SABA/the Court's judgment.
The ECJ wholly confirmed the Commission's Decision. It 
acknowledged the difference between qualitative and other,
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especially quantitative, criteria and confirmed that
selective distribution systems based on objective and
qualitative criteria such as the given obligations under
nos. 1 and 2 (above) are in agreement with EEC Article 85
(1). The objective requirements were defined as "objective
criteria of a qualiative nature relating to the technical
qualifications of the reseller and his staff and the
suitability of his premises and (...) such conditions (...)
laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and (...)
not applied in a discriminatory fashion".
The ECJ held that the wholesaler's obligation to supply
only to retailers which fulfill the objective criteria also
149falls outside EEC Article 85 (1).
In respect of the obligations under no. 3 (above) the Court 
accepted and completed the Commission's view that the 
additional promotional requirements partially fell within 
the scope of EEC Article 85 (1), because they went beyond 
qualitative criteria.
The Court also confirmed the Commission's Decision that the 
additional obligations such as six-month-contracts, main­
taining stocks and the achievement of an adequate turnover,
restictied competition and fell within EEC Article 8 5 (1),
151because they exceeded the qualitative criteria.
These principles have been consequently applied in the
152later decisions. The EEC authorities first examined 
whether a selective distribution system is adequate at all
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for the sold products. When they found it to be adequate, 
they distinguished between mere qualitative (technical) 
criteria, not infringing EEC Article 85 (1), and 
(exceeding) quantitative criteria falling within the ambit 
of EEC Article 85 (1), which, as such, are to be examined 
in the light of EEC Article 85 (3). Therefore, in relation 
to selective distribution systems containing quantiative 
restrictions, the question of an exemption becomes one of 
vital importance.
2. The system of exemptions
(a) Block exemptions (Regulation 67/67)
(i) Purpose
Having dealt with the problems of exclusive dealing agree­
ments infringing EEC Article 85 (1), the study will now 
turn to block exemptions. It should in general be reminded 
that when an exclusive dealing agreement is caught by EEC 
Article 85 (1), the next step to consider is the review 
under EEC Article 85 (3) and the question of a block 
exemption.
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The most important provision on block exemptions in the
past has been Regulation 67/67 on the Application of
Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
153Exclusive Dealing Agreements. Regulation 67/67 was 
enacted by the Commission under powers given by virtue of 
EEC Article 87 (2) (b) and 155, Article 24 of Regulation
17, and Regulation 19/65. Pursuant to Article 9, Regulation 
67/67 entered into force on 1 May 1967 and expired on 30 
June 1983, after having been extended twice by Regulation 
2591/72 and 3577/82.
Under Regulation 67/67 many exclusive dealing agreements, 
normally falling under EEC Article 85 (1), benefited from 
the block exemption, i.e. the general exemption from 
applicability of EEC Article 85 (1). With the block 
exemptions the Commission intended to achieve an im­
provement in distribution, help the consumers to get a 
"proper share of the resulting benefits", while some but no
absolute territorial protection would be allowed, and
154parallel imports would still be possible.
(ii) Application of Regulation 67/67 in general
The Commission established, that only agreements infringing 
EEC Article 85 (1) would have to be dealt with. The 
Commission said, that it is not expressly necessary to
- 75 -
exclude from the category of exemptions those agreements
which are not caught by the conditions of EEC Article 
15585. Regulation 67/67 was applicable to agreements
between undertakings in one member state (unilateral
agreements) or undertakings in different member states
156(bilateral agreements) . In spite of the provision m
Article 1 (2) of Regulation 67/67, the European Court of
Justice stated that the Regulation is applicable to parties
157within one member state as well.
The Regulation was applicable to both horizontal and
vertical agreements, i.e. to agreements at any level in the 
158market. Pursuant to Articles 1 and 8 of Regulation 
6 7/67, the exemption was applicable only to agreements or 
concerted practices between two undertakings. Multipartite 
agreements could not benefit from the exemption. Regulation 
67/67 would also apply to a whole network of distribution 
agreements possibly treated as a series of bilateral
159contracts between supplier and the contracting partner.
Article 1 (1) (a)-(c) provided that only agreements on
goods for resale were covered by the exemption, as the 
Commission intended to improve distribution and not pro­
duction.
- 76 -
(iii) Substantive provisions
Article 1 of the Regulation referred to the types of 
agreements, while Article 2 specified the obligations, and 
Article 3 defined the clauses not fit for a block ex­
emption.
Article 1 (1) (a) - (c) of Regulation 67/67 provided an 
exemption for three types of agreements whereby
" (a) one party agrees with the other to supply only to that other 
certain goods for resale within a defined area of the common 
market; or
(b) one party agrees with the other to purchase only from that other 
certain goods for resale; or
(c) the two undertakings habe entered into obligations, as in (a) and 
(b) above, with each other in respect of exclusive supply and 
purchase for resale."
Exempted were both exclusive supply agreements with re­
ference to a defined area, i.e. the exclusive distribution 
agreements, and exclusive purchase agreements.
Article 2 established, which clauses in these agreements 
were allowed ("white list");
"2. (a) to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum quantities;
(b) to sell the goods to which the contract relates under trade marks
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on packed and presented as specified by the manufacturer;
(c) to take measures for promotion of sales, in particular:
- to advertise,
- to maintain a sales network or stock of goods,
- to provide after-sale and guarantee services,
- to employ staff having specialised or technical
. . . ,,160 training."
The Regulation, in addition to the above quoted Article 2
par. 2, provided also, in Article 2 par. 1 for
"no restriction on competition (...) imposed on the exclusive dealer
other than:
(a) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute, during the 
duration of the contract or until one year after its expiration 
goods which compete with the goods to which the contract relates;
(b) the obligation to refrain, outside the territory covered by the 
contract, frcm seeking customers for the goods to which the con­
tract relates, from establishing any branch, or maintaining any 
distribution depot."
The latter amounted to a qualified territorial restriction,
as the producer could not prevent parallel imports in the
161area, and thus export prohibitions could not be imposed
... 162either.
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The fact that only qualified territorial restrictions were 
permitted within Regulation 67/67 had important con­
sequences for the selective distribution systems. In a 
selective distribution system it is essential that the 
person to be supplied is not allowed to sell to dealers 
other than to "approved dealers". This requirement could 
take whole selective distribution systems outside Regula­
tion 67/67, as the Commission had made clear that only an
obligation to supply solely technically qualifed dealers
163would be conform to the Regulation. From this the 
conclusion can be drawn that the Commission intended to 
privilege only the restrictions based on objective, quali­
tative criteria; other restrictions with reference to the
persons to whom the goods are resold, or the user of the
164goods, would not be permitted.
Reviewing these - permitted - obligations with reference to
the decisions passed on selective distribution systems, it
is to be noted that Article 2 (2) (a)-(c) was not limited
to qualitative objective restrictions, but exempted also
other additional restrictions, clearly found to be going
beyond objective criteria, such and as especially measures
165for promotion. It seems that the Commission had at this
point considered particularly the interests of the producer
in promoting his (brand) goods at every level of distri-
1 fi fibution in order to intensify their marketing.
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Article 3 made clear which kinds of agreements did not 
qualify for an exemption under Regulation 67/67 ("black 
list"). Article 3 (a) referred to horizontal agreements, 
where competing manufacturers appoint each other as ex­
clusive dealer. The term "each other" in this context means
that only reciprocal agreements contravened Regulation 
1 fi 767/67. Article 3 (b) confirmed the principle that the 
agreements must not effect an absolute territorial pro­
tection for the distributor. Article 3 (b) (i) and (ii)
referred to examples for such undesirable clauses. It 
should be noted that Article 3 (b) did not allow absolute 
territorial protection; for the prohibition it was already 
sufficient that the clause effected difficulties for 
intermediaries or customers in obtaining the goods.
This approach was subsequently followed in decisions of the
168Commission and the European Court of Justice.
However, significant criticism was directed at Regulation
6 7/67 by the European Court of Justice, in De Norre and de
169Clercq v NV Brouwerij concordia , when the ECJ stated 
that the Regulation was treating exclusive purchasing 
agreements too leniently. This agreed with the above made 
observation (Chapter 4 (1) (d)), that for quite a time the
Commission did not see any reason to intervene in exclusive 
purchasing agreements.
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In consequence of the Court's judgment in De Norre v NV
Brouwerij Concordia in 197 8 the Commission drafted a new
Regulation. In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation
2821/71, the draft text of the envisaged Regulation was
published to enable the parties concerned to express their
comments. The new draft Regulation "attracted widespread
170criticism and in due course it was dropped".
(iv) Procedural provisions
Regulation 67/67 also contained several procedural pro­
visions. Articles 4 and 5 made transitional provisions for 
agreements, already in existance when the Regulation 
entered into force. Article 7 (1) referred to Article 4 (2) 
(a) of (repealed) Regulation 27. Article 7 (2) complemented 
the transitional provisions referring to not amended 
agreements. Article 6 required the Commission to examine 
each individual case under Article 7 of Regulation 19/65, 
i.e. it empowered the Commission to withdraw the benefits 
of the block exemption, if it were of the opinion that 
competition was restricted especially pursuant to Article 6 
(a)-(c) of Regulation 67/67. Article 9 laid down provisions 
on the validity of the Regulation. As already shown, 
Regulation 6 7/67 was extended twice after the draft Regu­
lation of 19 78 was not approved, and expired on 30 June 
1983. It was thus relevant for the whole time between the
- 81 -
1967 and 1983 and was, as said in Article 9 part 2, " 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all 
Member States.
(c) Individual exemptions
(i) General remarks
An agreement not qualifying for a block exemption may 
nevertheless be permitted to operate by virtue of an 
individual exemption under EEC Article 85 (3) . Unlike the 
block exemptions, whereunder an agreement, on the premise 
that the relevant requirements are satisfied, is auto­
matically exempted and not void according to Article 85 (2) 
of the EEC Treaty, individual exemptions are not granted 
automatically.
The application for an individual exemption under EEC 
Article 85 (3) in connection with Article 9 of Regulation 
17 has to be distinguished from a negative clearance under 
Article 2 of Regulation 17. A negative clearance means no 
exemption, but the certification by the Commission that on 
the basis of the given facts, there are no grounds for 
action under EEC Article 85 (1) (for details see Chapter 6 
below).
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EEC Article 85 (3) establishes that "the provisions of 
paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable."
Thus the undertaking in question is required to initiate 
the necessary steps itself and apply for an individual 
exemption, otherwise the agreement may be infringing 
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty.
The application has to be made to the Commission as Article 
9 (1) of Regulation 17 provides that "subject to review of 
its decision by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall 
have sole power to declare Article 85 (1) inapplicable 
pursuant to Article 85 (3) of the Treaty."
An agreement is qualifying for an individual exemption if 
the follwing four conditions are met:
(1) improvement of production or distribution of goods, or 
promotion of technical or economic process; and
(2) a fair share of the resulting benefits to the consumers; and
(3) not indispensable restrictions; and
173(4) no substantial elimination of competition.
In respect of EEC Article 85 (3) (1) the exclusive dealing
agreements obviously the first of the four above mentioned
conditions "improvement of distribution of goods" is 
174applicable.
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Concluding it should be noted that individual exemptions
. . 175are granted only for a specified period of time.
Although the exempting decision may be renewed, the Com­
mission is also empowered to revoke or amend its decision 
on the basis that the requirements established in Article 8
(3) of Regulation 17 are fulfilled.
(ii) Exclusive Agency Agreements
After dealing with the general aspects of EEC Article 85
(3), we now turn to details, and, in conformity with the 
order of points treated in Chapters 3 and 4 (1), firstly 
consider exclusive agency agreements.
Regarding exclusive agency agreements under Article 8 5 (3) 
of the EEC Treaty, the preliminary question of the
relevance of EEC Article 85 (3) to exclusive agency agree­
ments has to be dealt with.
Referring to the Commission Notice on Exclusive Agency
177Contracts as well as the Commission's and the Court's
178decisions , the vital question is that of making the 
distinction between a (true) commercial agent and an 
independent trader. If the agreement is one between an 
agent and his principal, it falls outside the applicability 
of EEC Article 85 (1) altogether. Thus, the question of EEC 
Article 85 (3) is of no importance for exclusive agency 
agreements.
- 84 -
This results as well from the application of Regulation 
67/67 where the Commssion stated that it was not necessary 
to exclude expressly "those agreements which do not fulfil 
the conditions of Article 85 (1) the Treaty."
Consequently, Article 85 (3) of the EEC Treaty has no 
relevance exclusive agency agreements, where the agent is a 
"true" agent in the sense as we have seen before.
Only where the agent is not an agent, but an independent 
trader and the agreement is thus infringing EEC Article 8 5 
(1), the question of an exemption under EEC Article 85 (3) 
becomes of importance.
(iii) Exclusive distribution agreements
Of much importance is EEC Article 85 (3) for exclusive 
distribution agreements. Whenever EEC Article 85 (1) is 
infringed and the provisions of a block exemption are not 
applicable, the granting of an individual exemption may be 
of vital significance for a distribution network.
Regarding territorial restrictions even under EEC Article 
85 (3) both the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice have not been sympathetic towards absolute terri­
torial restrictions, and a good example for it is Consten 
and Grundig. Therein Commission argued that the absolute
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territorial protection for Consten was not indispensable
for the improvement of production and refused an exemption
17 9under EEC Article 85 (3) .
On review the European Court of Justice indicated that it
would not intervene with this part of the Commission's 
180Decision. The Court held that the Commission in its 
decision has to consider economic issues as well, and it 
therefore has administrative discretion which may not be 
replaced by the Court.
However, the Court annulled parts of the Commission's 
Decision on grounds of lack of reasoning: the Commission 
had struck down the whole agreement, not only the par­
ticular clauses granting absolute territorial protection, 
without stating, however, the reasons pursuant to Article 
190 of the EEC Treaty.
So the partial annulment has to be interpreted not with 
reference to substantive law, but only with reference to 
procedural law. It can thus in conclusion be said that the 
Court mostly confirmed the Commission's view.
This aproach was developed further in Distillers v 
180Commission , where pricing was used to restrict exports. 
The Commission found that the agreements infringed Article 
85 (1) of the EEC Treaty and refused an individual 
exemption under EEC Article 85 (3). The argument of 
Distillers that a territorial protection is only the 
equivalent for promotion and advertising investments not
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181provided by the parallel importers, was rejected by the 
Commission. Although this argument was discussed on appeal, 
the appeal itself was decided on procedural grounds, mostly 
with reference to non-notification of the pricing 
agreements in question.
However, in cases where clauses concerned dealt with 
matters other than export bans, the Commission has been 
prepared to grant individual exemptions under Article 
85 (3) of the EEC Treaty.
In the past the Commission has given an individual ex­
emption to agreements prohibiting active sales policy
184outside the distributor's area, e.g. in Campari. For
various other agreements as well the Commission has granted
185individual exemptions, e.g. Duro-Dyne/Europair and
18 6Junghans. From the Commission's and the Court's approach 
in the past, the tendency can be elicited that an 
individual exemption under EEC Article 85 (3) was treated 
benevolently as long as there were no attempts to effect 
absolute territorial protection and obstruction of parallel 
imports.
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(iv) Exclusive purchasing agreements
Earlier in the present study the question of an individual 
exemption was mentioned as it arose, when an agreement did 
fall within EEC Article 85 (1) but at the same time did not 
qualify for a block exemption under Regulation 67/67.
As the Commission only gradually recognised the importance 
of exclusive purchasing (see above Chapter 4 (1) (d)) the
question of an individual exemption was also sparingly 
discussed.
187In EEC v Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd. (Spices) the possi­
bility of an individual exemption was taken into con­
sideration. However, the Commission indicated that an 
individual exemption would not be granted as the agreement 
in question was imposing restrictions on the resale prices 
and competition was adversely affected. Therefore, the 
requirements of EEC Article 85 (3), especially the im­
provement of distribution and no substantial elimination of
188competition, were not met.
(v) Selective distribution systems
Much more important has been and is the question of an 
individual exemption for selective dealing agreements. 
Mention has already been made of the requirement that only 
"approved dealers" are to be supplied with the products and 
that such a requirement may take entire selective
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distribution networks out of the relevant Regulations on
block exemptions, e.g. under Regulation 67/67. This made
the whole system dependent vitally on the question whether
an individual exemption could be granted. However, this
only applies to agreements that do not impose solely
objective requirements on the undertaking to be supplied,
thus making consideration under EEC Article 85 (3) or
189Article 85 (1) irrelevant at all.
The first important case on a selective distribution system
190under EEC Article 85 (3) was Omega. Although there was a
quantitative selection imposed ("a maximum dealer quota per
191town and per region" ) the Commission was prepared to
grant an individual exemption under EEC Article 85 (3). The
Commission found the requirements of EEC Article 85 (3)
fulfilled, i.e. an improvement of competition, a fair share
of the benefits for the consumers were given, and it
ascertained that no substantial elimination of competition
was effected; there were still many other competing watch- 
192makers.
Also relevant for EEC Article 85 (3) is the Commission
193Decision in BMW. An individual exemption was granted 
under EEC Article 85 (3). The main considerations of the 
Commission concerned the aspects of improvement of distri­
bution and the resulting benefits for the consumers. As to 
cars, involving also safety aspects with reference to
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expert and regular maintenance, better service as well as
the distributor's large investments in maintenance and
194service, had been taken into account.
Another important involved the Commission's and the Court's
195decision m  Metro v Commission.
As shown above, the Commission found that the SABA system
was going beyond a "simple" selective system and was thus
(partially) caught by EEC Article 85 (1). Investigating
further, the Commission granted, however, an exemption
under EEC Article 85 (3). It found the requirements of EEC
Article 85 (3) fulfilled, especially with regard to the
improvement of distribution and the resulting benefits for
the consumers in form of a regular supply. This view was
196confirmed on appeal by the European Court of Justice.
In summary, it can be observed that the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice have not been unsympathetic 
against exclusive distribution systems, while scrutinising 
each agreement carefully. Even some but no absolute terri­
torial restrictions may be accepted within certain limits, 
and if necessary for the distribution, as the cases Omega 
and BMW show.
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3. The situation of small and medium-sized businesses, 
undertakings and enterprises.
The above cited cases and decisions concern mostly large 
undertakings and company groups with enough captial and 
marketpower behind them in a competitive market. It is 
useful to turn also to the specific situation of small 
businesses, undertakings and enterprises (SMEs).
Realising that SMEs face more difficulites than large 
enterprises do in establishing trade relations across the 
boundaries of the member states, the Commission tried from 
the beginning to encourage cooperation between SMEs, to 
give them, on the one hand, the opportunity to strengthen 
their market position, to grow and make themselves inde­
pendent from unsteady customers' demands in only one member 
state, and to encourage on the other hand the competition 
between large and small undertakings as an issue which 
could intensify workable competition and could lead to more 
benefits for consumers.
197In the first case, Transocean Marine Paint I , the 
Commission pursued these issues. A group of marine paint 
manufacturers, scattered all over the world, with five of 
them situated in EEC countries, had tried to establish a 
common brand of "Transocean" paint. In such a sector of 
fierce competition, the Commission granted a five-year
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individual exemption to ensure that the small firms were
able to distribute their "Transocean" paint around the
world and make it available for the consumers. For similar
reasons, the Commission renewed the exemption for another
198period of six years. With respect to some points with
concerning conditions and obligations imposed under an
agreement, with reference to which the Commission had not
given the right to be heard, the Decision was challenged,
199and annulled by the European Court of Justice. Pursuant 
to the Court’s judgment the Commission passed another 
individual exemption with revised conditions.
Another attempt to encourage SMEs was made by the 
Commission in 1967, when Regulation 67/67 came into force. 
In the introduction to Regulation 67/67 the Commission 
established: "whereas, moreover, the appointment of an 
exclusive distributor or an exclusive purchaser who will 
take over, in the place of the manufacturer, sales pro­
motion, after-sales service and carrying of stocks, is
often the sole means whereby small and medium-size under-
201takings can compete m  the market."
In May 1970 the Commission published the "Notice on Agree-
202ments of Minor Importance", to bring also advantages to 
small and medium-size undertakings. One of the desires of 
the Commission was "in particular, to facilitate co-
203operation between small- and medium-sized undertakings."
The Commission established that such agreements of minor
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importance would not be caught by EEC Article 85 (1), and 
therefore no exemptions would be required.
However commendable these initiatives of the Commission 
were, it has in practice remained doubtful whether they 
were able to achieve their purpose. Difficulties arise 
already when trying to identify the segment of the market 
where the agreements would have their effects, and more 
difficulties arise when assessing the total annual turnover 
of the undertakings in question.
The Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance is
part of the 1 De-minimis-doctrine", first applied by the
205ECJ in Volk v Verwaecke . Although the agreement m
question provided absolute territorial protection against
parallel imports, the Court held that Article 85 (1) of the
EEC Treaty was not infringed, because the agreement "has
2 06only insignificant effects on the markets" .
With reference to it and the Notice on Minor agreements, it
should not be ignored, however, that there are serious
uncertainties in respect of the market sectors, oligopolies 
207etc. It may thus remain doubtful whether all these 
commendable initiatives have led to relief and success for 
SMEs, this may seriously be queried, because nearly all the 
decisions deal with large undertakings.
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CHAPTER 5
Exclusive dealing agreements under EEC 
competition law in the present time
1. The current situation: the policy of the Commission, its 
purpose, principles, contents and rules; jugdments of the 
European Court of Justice.
(a) General remarks
Having surveyed the situation in the past, we may now 
proceed to the current situation and examine whether trends 
and opinions from the past are carried further whether new 
trend are emerging, and if so, which relevance and feed­
back they yield for competition policy with particular 
regard to the Single European Market after 1992. Whereas 
Chapter 4 illuminated the first steps and opinions of the 
Commission and the ECJ after the EEC was established, the 
present Chapter examines further developments and recent 
trends, as a basis for conclusions.
It is for practical purpose, also most important to 
scrutinise current trends in the way an agreement is 
drafted for a party, in order to adapt its provisions to 
the current practice of the Commission and the European
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Court of Justice. For this purpose reference will be made 
to current decisions only.
(b) Exclusive agency agreements
Dealing firstly with exclusive agency agreements, we shall 
examine whether trends and judgments of Commission and 
Court on exclusive agency contracts show a continuity and 
were further developed from the past to current practice.
In the past both the ECJ and the Commission have emphasised 
that only true agency agreements should benefit from the 
exclusion of a true agency contract from the probhibition 
scope of EEC Article 85 (1).
This approach has been confirmed and elaborated in a recent
208Decision for Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe. The
Commission held that the aluminium producers from Eastern 
and Western Europe infringed EEC Article 85 (1) during the 
period 1963-1976 when distributing aluminium from Eastern 
Europe exclusively through western producers.
The Commission developed further the distinction between a 
(true) agent and an independent trader when it stated that 
it is contrary to EEC Article 85 (1) when an independent 
trader participates freely in a cartel and is acting on 
behalf of the cartel as agent. For the Commission such an
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agreement is not a (true) agency agreement and contravenes 
EEC Article 85 (1).2°9
When assessing this decision, it can be seen that the Com­
mission has confirmed its past practice and has specified 
the characteristics of a true agency contract. Thus, the 
recent decision on Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe 
harmonises with the earlier decisions of both the ECJ and 
the Commission.2 -^9
211Even the trend shown in Sugar namely, that the 
Commission seems to be more ready to apply the benefits of 
its Notice on Agreements made with Commercial Agents to 
agents with a weaker economic position, can be found 
confirmed. The agent in Aluminium was an independent trader 
with considerable influence.
Thus, the attitude of the Commission towards exclusive 
agency agreements has been stable, making spectacular 
changes in the near future not likely to happen.
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(c) Exclusive distribution agreements
(i) General remarks
The study examines secondly the recent developments with 
regard to exclusive distribution agreements. It con­
centrates on developments referring to agreements found to 
be contrary to Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and as such 
unfit for an exemption. With reference to the facts to be 
considered when judging a case, the ECJ has stated that all 
the circumstances surrounding the case are to be taken into 
account, already in early decisions. In recent decisions 
this line has been continued and completed. The Court has
again confirmed that all circumstances have to be con- 
212sidered. The ECJ has also ascerted the view that the
case must be approached in the light of as to what the 
situation would have been in the absence of the agreement.
When considering these recent decisions the conclusion 
applied to past practice can be but repeated: when 
evaluating an expert opinion on an agreement, it is of the 
utmost importance to take into account all the facts and 
circumstances of the matter.
213
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(ii) Export bans and similar agreements.
After the preceeding general remarks, we may now turn to 
the examination of particular clauses in agreements and 
begin with exclusive distribution agreements involving 
export bans and similar restrictive clauses.
In the past both the ECJ and the Commission have been of 
the opinion that agreements effecting export bans re­
stricted competition and thus infringed EEC Article 85 (1). 
This view has continued to be applied up to the present 
time, the Court and the Commission finding agreements 
containing export bans as being contrary to EEC Article 8 5 
(1), and not refraining from imposing heavy fines.
214In an early decision in Pioneer's distribution system,
the Commission found elements of horizontal and vertical
market-division by various price levels as effecting export
bans and did not hesitate to impose fines from 300,000 to
4,350,000 ECU, amounting to a total of nearly 7,000,000
ECU. Fines were imposed not only on the producer but also
on the distributor. On appeal, the ECJ upheld most of the
215Commission's conclusions, but halved the imposed fines. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ indicated in its judgment that in 
future cases as a general principle the Commission might 
impose even severer penalties for evident infringments of 
the EEC Treaty.
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Subsequently, large fines were inflicted on export bans in
2X6 2 X VJohnson & Johnson and Moet et Chandon.
An important judgment by the European Court of Justice
218concernes the case Hasselblad v Commission. Beside the
legal dimension with distribution clauses in question, on
the factual side the cameras had serial numbers on them to
enable Hasselblad finding out possible parallel importers.
The Court confirmed the Commission's view that a clause
prohibiting inter-state cross-supplies amounts to an export 
219ban. The Court established further that the same effects
can be generated by refusing to honour the producer's
220guarantees in their application to parallel imports.
Consistently, fines were imposed not only on the Swedish
221manufacturer but also on the distributors. This scheme
was confirmed in subsequent decisions of the Commission and
222the European Court of Justice.
However, in sp ite of the clear disapproval by the
Commission and the ECJ, undertakings have not refrained from
agreements including export bans. In 1984 the Commission in 
22 3Polistil/Arbois imposed a fine on an agreement granting 
absolute territorial protection to Italian Polistil SpA's 
French contracting partner Arbois.
Nevertheless, undertakings still continued to agree on and
224 225apply export bans. The most recent examples are Sandoz
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22 6and Tipp-Ex , involving export bans infringing EEC
Article 85 (1) and the firms were fined with ECU 800,000,
227ECU 400.000, respectively.
228In Tipp-Ex not only the West German producer Tipp-Ex,
but also its French distributor Belersdorf were fined; for
Belersdorf the fines were ECU 10,000. The other three
exclusive distributors, Belgian Burotex, Dutch Esveha-Rijam
and British Tipp-Ex (Leslie Mac Lean) were found acting
contrary to EEC Article 85 (1), but were not fined. The
Commission stated that they did not voluntarily take part
in the system, because Tipp-Ex "also exerted pressure on
its exclusive distributors in order to obtain their agree-
229ment and support".
A likewise determined attitude has been maintained by the 
EEC authorities towards indirect export bans and similar 
agreements. The Commission confirmed the opinion that price 
discrimination with reference to the different member
states is able to obstruct parallel imports and thus may
230 .effect an export ban. The view towards price dis­
crimination too has not changed. The recent decisions are 
based on the principles applied in the above cited earlier 
leading cases.
A critical view by the Commission and the ECJ has been 
taken also w^th respect to measures obstructing-parallel
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imports and thus effecting export bans. In ETA v DK In-
231vestment ("Swatch") the European Court of Justice held,
23in agreement with the earlier practice of the Commission 
that there was violation of EEC Article 85 (1) if a manu­
facturer refused to honour a guarantee referring to a
parallel imported product. Subsequent decisions confirm
233this principle.
These above quoted decisions have considerable implications 
for the undertakings' distribution and also for the con­
sumer. As shown earlier, vertical integration in whatever 
form is worthwhile and apt only for brand goods, i.e. 
sophisticated consumer goods. However, especially for such 
branded goods the consumer sets a high value on the pro­
ducer honouring the guarantee. When refusing guarantees or 
services affecting parallel imported products, the firm 
practically makes it impossible, at least economically 
uninteresting, to buy the parallel imported products. So 
the decisions in question of the ECJ and the Commission 
should enable the consumer to benefit from cheaper prices 
in other member states.
The same critical examination by the Commission and the ECJ
found other attempts to obstruct parallel imports, e.g.
information on the products to recognise their destination
235not to provide cross-supplies and so on.
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Summarising, it can be stated that in respect of export 
bans, there has also been a uniform development of the 
practice from the past to the present.
The Commission and the European Court of Justice have both 
left no doubt that they treat all types of export bans as 
contravening EEC Article 85 (1) and that they do not 
refrain from imposing large fines on the parties concerned.
With reference to the economic side these decisions in­
dicate that the firms consider export bans as indispensable 
for efficient vertical integration and distribution of 
their products. Despite the clear-cut attitude of the EEC 
authorities, the firms seem to consider export bans as 
being so important to achieve their economic aims that they 
even take large fines into account.
With relevance to the aims and reasons of the various 
parties, mentioned in Chapter 2, the decisions provide a 
vivid example of obviously conflicting opposite targets. On 
the one hand the authorities aim at ensuring a workable 
competition while on the other hand the undertakings pursue 
their economic interests.
It remains to be seen in which direction both sides will 
develop their further efforts.
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(iii) Agreements obliging the supplier to sell exclusively 
to the distributor.
In the past both the ECJ and the Commission have considered 
exclusive supply agreements as falling within EEC Article
85 (1). This was restated in decisions passed in the early
23 6 23 71980s. However, in Polistil-Arbois the Commission
decided that the exclusive distribution agreement between
the Italian supplier and the French producer per se did not
fall within Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty. This practice
was not pursued further, as in its most recent Decisions
the Commission restated the original view that exclusive
23 8supply clauses fell within EEC Article 85 (1). There­
fore, it may be reckoned that the Commission will pursue 
this recent approach in future decisions. It seems probable 
that future exclusive supply clauses too will be looked 
upon as falling within EEC Article 85 (1). This is im­
portant for the undertakings in question, as they have then 
to rely on (possible) block exemptions or an individual 
exemption granted by the Commission.
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(iv) Restrictions on resale (other than selective 
distribution systems)
An important part in the present section concerns resale
price maintenance clauses. From decisions in the past it
can be taken for granted that the EEC authorities will
regard transfrontier resale price maintenance systems as
contrary to EEC Article 85 (1). However, the question of
unilateral agreements under EEC Article 85 (1) is not yet
completely clarified. Of particular interest in this
context is the judgment of the European Court of Justice in
239VBBB and VBVB v Commission. In this case, referring to a 
Dutch-Flanders agreement on the distribution of books, the 
Commission had held - confirmed by the Court - that the 
resale price maintenance was infringing EEC Article 85 (1).^
The Commission has consistently found resale price main­
tenance clauses, used in the Italian market sector for 
spectacles, as being contrary to EEC Article 85 (1). The 
Commission held that such agreements including the whole
sector and being valid in the whole of the member state,
241contravene EEC Article 85 (1). In due course the under­
takings changed their clauses to resale price re­
commendations.
The Commission desisted from imposing fines with regard to
the new matter but indicated that future cases may lead to
242stricter sanctions. Thus, the Commission is expected not 
to change its view on resale price maintenances, and to
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scrutinise even non-transfrontier agreements with 
suspicion.
However, the other restrictions on resale also require
close examination. The EEC authorities' view on guarantees
has already been detailed above.
243In Hasselblad v Commission the European Court of Justice 
found - in accordance with the Commission's Decision - a 
clause giving the producer the right to stop each of the 
distributor's planned or proceeded marketing measure as 
incompatible with EEC competition law. The Commission seems 
to confirm also a strict view on clauses restricting the 
persons to whom the goods may be resold.
While holding that restrictions on resale by specialised
wholesalers may not be falling within EEC Article 
24485 (1) , the Commission has not hesitated to strike out
245other measures , e.g. binding the retailer not to supply 
certain kinds of customers, if this did not correspond to 
the separation of functions between the different levels of 
the market.
In 19 86 the Commission ordered the "Instituto Brazilero do
Caf£ (IBC) "to cancel the clauses restricting its coffee
247roasters from reselling raw coffee. This practice show 
that the Commission is closely scrutinising the agreements 
and is expected to do so in the future as well.
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(d) Exclusive purchasing agreements
Although the Commission made in the past clear that exclu­
sive purchasing agreements should be viewed with more 
attention, it is interesting to observe that currently the
Commission has taken only one decision with reference to
248exclusive purchasing agreements, m  Carlsberg. It 
remains to be seen whether this development may depend . on 
a new block exemption system which has been issued.
In Carlsberg the Commission established that a purchasing
agreement obliging a brewer to buy about half of the annual
requirement of lager from his contracting partner over a
period of 11 years, was infringing Article 85 (1) of the
EEC Treaty and stated: "The trade in lager to and from the
United Kingdom is thereby significantly altered from what
it would otherwise be. The agreement therefore falls within
24 9the scope of Article 85 (1)." The Commission took
especially into consideration the substantial market shares 
of the parties in question restricting competition by 
preventing the brewer to produce himself or to buy from 
other sources, and preventing the seller from supplying 
other competitors.
This decision indicates that the Commission is prepared to 
scrutinise exclusive purchasing agreements also with 
reference to their economic effects.
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(e) Selective distribution systems
Unlike exclusive purchasing agreements, selective distri­
bution systems have been subject of quite a few decisions 
passed by the ECJ and the Commission. It should be reminded 
that all vertical distribution systems are of enormous 
economic importance for the producer desiring to market his 
brand-products in the best possible way.
With the modern communication technologies there seem to be 
tendencies to intensify the specific brand images even in 
multi-market selling, including the thereto related circum­
stances as advertising etc. as well. Therefore the pro­
ducers seem to be increasingly interested in protecting the 
image of their brand-products and tend to vertical 
selective integration.
This may be one of the reasons generating an abundance of 
recent decisions on selective agreements.
Another reason may be the Commission's more critical view 
on selective dealing agreements. The particular cases will 
show whether certain trends can be identified.
When dealing with and deciding a case, the Commission 
confirmes its view already expressed in the past, that 
every selective distribution system, even one based solely 
on objective technical requirements, has to be appropriate 
for the sold goods. Only on such premises could the
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agreement system be regarded as falling outside EEC Article 
85 (1) .
Continuing from their decisions in the past, both the ECJ 
and the Commission have confirmed that a selective distri­
bution system may be appropriate for the selling of
251television-sets, hi-fi and similar products. This has
been recently confirmed by the Commission in a decision on
252the Grundig distribution system.
Selective distribution systems were found also appropriate
253 254 255for computers, jewellery, perfumes, ceramic table-
256 , 257ware and newspapers.
Referring to watches, the European Court of Justice con­
firmed the view that selective distribution systems are
necessary for the proper marketing and sale of high quality 
25 8watches. The Court, however, refused to accept the
existence of such a necessity for the mass produced
259"Swatch" watches. This judgment shows once more that the
EEC authorities take also into consideration the technical
and economic details of the products. The Court
distinguished the high-quality products from the Swiss mass
product "Swatch" which can not be repaired apart from
replacing the batteries and the wrist straps, although it
260is sold with a producer's guarantee.
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In other cases the Commission found a selective distribu­
tion system to be likewise unnecessary for tobacco pro- 
261ducts. Also not indispensable are selective distri-
2 62bution systems for plumbing equipement.
As pointed out in Chapter 4, with reference to selective 
distribution systems, the jurisdicial practice 
distinguished between clauses with objective, qualitative 
criteria, on the one hand, and quantitative criteria on the 
other. This has been maintained in recent decisions.
263An important case judged recently was AEG v Commission.
In 1973 AEG, a German producer of electrical equipement had
notified to the Commission a selective distribution system
allegedly based on qualitative criteria. In the follwing
time the Commission found this system implemented in a
discriminatory fashion with the effect that 18 dealers, who
met the required objective and technical criteria, had been
264refused admission. The Commission found this system, as
it was run, contrary to EEC Article 85 (1), as the refusals
to admit all retailers fulfilling the required objective
criteria were intended to maintain high prices.
Because this practised system was different from the one
that was notified, the Commission held that the protection
of the notification was lost, and a large fine was imposed
265on the undertaking.
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On appeal the European Court of Justice confirmed the
2 6 6Commission's Decision and dismissed the appeal.
The Court held that all surrounding circumstances, i.e. the
whole distribution network, have to be taken into account
and refused AEG's view that the system was being limited to
one member state only. The Court established further, in
267agreement with its decision in Metro (No.l), that only 
systems based on qualitative criteria and admitting all 
qualified resellers fall outside EEC Article 85 (1). If 
these conditions are not met, the Court stated, the system 
with its negative effects on price competition contravenes 
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty.
Thus the appeal was dismissed, the Court upheld the Com-
268mission's fine of one million ECU.
Another important decision took the European Court of
26 9Justice in Ford v Commission (No.2).
The case dealt with the selective distribution system Ford 
operated in Germany and other member states, inter alia the 
United Kingdom.
Up to 1 May 19 82 German Ford-Werke had sold to its German 
dealers both left-hand-drive and right-hand-drive (RHD) 
cars. With changes in exchange rates the British demand on 
RHD cars began to increase in Germany. Ford-Werke sent a 
circular to its German dealers stating that from 1 May 1982 
no more RHD cars would be sold to German dealers, in order
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to avoid effects which may be damaging for Ford Britain and 
the British dealers.
270In November 19 83 the Commission took a final Decision
that the refusal of supply of RHD cars was not itself
infringing EEC Article 85 (1), but that other clauses, e.g.
territorial allotments, prevention of cross-supplies etc.
fell within EEC Article 85 (1) and have to be examined
under EEC Article 85 (3) (see below Chapter 5 (2) (b) (v)).
On appeal the argumentation of the Court was different from
that of the Commission, but the ECJ reached the same
271conclusion in respect of EEC Article 85 (3).
The Court found the refusal to supply RHD cars to German 
dealers by itself contravened EEC Article 85 (1), because
therewith British dealers were more protected against 
parallel imports and could maintain their high price 
levels. Thus the cessation of supply had to be considered 
within Ford's whole distribution system and not only as a 
matter limited to one member state only. Because of its
effects of obstructing parallel imports, the agreement was
272found to be contrary to EEC Article 85 (1).
The view that a refusal to supply RHD cars to dealers on
the continent is contrary to Article 85 (1) has been
273subsequently confirmed in recent decisions.
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A third important decision which the ECJ and the Commission
2 74took concernes Metro v Commission (No.2). This case has
to be seen in connection with the earlier decisions of the
275Commission and the ECJ in Metro (No.l).
In 19 76 the selective distribution system of SABA was
granted an exemption under EEC Article 85 (3); the
276 27Vexemption was renewed in 19 83. On appeal the ECJ
confirmed the Commission's Decision and dismissed the
appeal. In the context of this case the Court also dealt
with some general principles on selective distribution
systems. It confirmed previous judgments referring to
"simple" (qualitative) selective distribution systems and
defined in more detail its practice.
It held that selective distribution systems based solely on 
objective criteria may on the one hand fall completely 
outside EEC Article 85 (1) , but that they may, on the other 
hand infringe the same EEC Article 85 (1), if they restrict 
competition. The Court established that "simple" (open) 
systems may restrict competition "where the existence of a 
certain number of such systems does not leave any room for 
other forms of distribution based on a different type of 
competition policy or results in a rigidity in price 
structure which is not counterbalanced by other aspects of 
competition between products of the same brand and by the
existence of effective competition between different
U  ^ 1.278brands."
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The Court made clear that EEC Article 85 (1) may apply in 
exceptional circumstances also to "simple" selective 
distribution systems based on objective criteria.
The decision shows once more that the Court, too, is 
reviewing each particular case with attention to the 
economic background.
The Commission found its policy of long standing on
selective distribution systems confirmed, especially where
the sector of entertainment-electronics is concerned, and
279indicated that it will pursue its policy further.
So this is in accordance with the other decisions passed on 
selective distribution systems.
Reviewing these recent decisions, it can be observed that a 
uniform approach can be made out in the judgments. Both the 
ECJ and the Commission based their decisions and attitudes 
on past practice and developed it further. The recent 
decisions are thus in agreement with the past judicial 
practice in pursuing the principles further. As the 
Commission indicated, this policy will be confirmed and 
continued in the future; rapid changes in the practice of 
the Commission and the ECJ may not be expected.
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2. The system of exemptions
(a) Block exemptions
The purpose of the exemptions is to exclude certain
abstractly defined agreements from the prohibition under
9 ft 1
EEC Article 85 (1).
(i) Regulation 67/67
As already mentioned, Regulation 67/67 expired on 30 June 
1983 and two successors Regulations 1983/83 and 1983/84 are
now in force, but two recent decisions, Hydrotherm v
282 2 83Compact and Hasselblad v Commission , have relevance
for the application of Regulation 67/67.
In the Hydrotherm v Compact the European Court of Justice 
passed an important judgment on the questionas to how 
Article 1 (1) of Regulation 67/67 referring to "two under­
takings" should be interpreted.
The Court ruled:
"Commission regulation 67/67 of 22 March 1967 on the application 
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive 
dealing agreements must be applied even if several legally inde­
pendent undertakings participate in the agreements as one con­
tracting party provided that those undertakings constitute an
284economic unit for the purposes of the agreement."
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This judgment is of particular relevance, as it can be 
applied to a great number of other agreements.
It is interesting to observe that the Court once more 
tended, in order to meet the economic requirements of a 
competition case, to apply more an economic rather than a 
limited grammatical interpretation. This approach had been 
applied in earlier decisions, e.g. when distinguishing an 
agent from an independent trader (Chapter 4 (1) (a) and 5
(1) (b)).
Thus, the Court's practice is marked by a uniform 
continuity.
In Hasselblad v Commission the Court was able to decide 
with reference to the interpretation of Article (2) (b) of
Regulation 67/67. As the problems with guarantee services 
in connection with obstruction of parallel imports have 
currently lost nothing of their acuteness, it is important 
to consider this aspect of the Hasselblad decision for 
current EEC policy and as well as for the application of 
the Regulations.
The Court established that one of the prohibited 
obligations (cf. Article 2 (2) (b)) of Regulation 67/67) is
the exclusive dealer's refusal to honour the producer's
guarantee, if a product has been obtained by parallel
. 285 import.
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This shows how the ECJ in its practice applies a uniform 
approach to general principles as relevant for various 
legal aspects. In addition, the judgment confirms once more 
how the Court is upholding the principle that export bans 
obstructing parallel imports have to be scotched.
With the above citation of recent decisions, the inter-
2 8 6pretation and application of Regulation 67/67^ , no longer
in force since 1983, after having been involved with
287respect to approximately 25,000, may be treated as 
concluded.
We now turn to the interpretation and application of the 
current successors of Regulation 67/67, namely Regulations 
1983/83 and 1983/84.288
(ii) Regulation 1983/83 
(oC) General remarks
After the expiring of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC on 30 June
28 91983, "with Regulations (EEC) No. 1983/83 and (EEC)
290No. 1984/83 the Commission has adapted the block 
exemption of exclusive distribution agreements and 
exclusive purchasing agreements to the intervening 
developments in the Common market and the Community
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As a guide to the interpretation of the new Regulations, 
the Commission published its Notice on Regulations 1983/83 
and 1983/84.292
While Regulation 67/67 dealt with several types of agree­
ments, there are now different block exemptions for 
different types: Regulation 1983/83 for exclusive distri­
bution agreements, with their main significance that "the 
supplier allots to the other, the reseller, a defined 
territory (the contract territory)", while "in exclusive 
purchasing agreements, the reseller agrees to purchase the
contract goods only from the other party and not from any
293other supplier".
Nevertheless several provisions are identical and the 
Commission states that "in so far as their wording permits,
these parallel provisions are to be interpreted in the same
„ 294 way" .
After the above general remarks, we now turn to the 
provisions of Regulation 1983/83 in detail. However, not as 
a commentary on block exemptions: the present study 
concentrates on the question whether tendencies can be made 
out in current developments.
- 117 -
((I) The provisions of Regulation 1983/83 in detail
Differences and trends, similarities and pecularities found 
in Regulations 67/67, 1983/83 and 1983/84, are pointed out 
in the following detailed figure:
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Differences between Regulations 67/67 and its 
successors, Regulations 1983/83 and 1983/84
Subject 67/67 1983/83 1983/84
scope of the 
Regulations
recital recital recital, then 
categories of
Article 1: Article 1: agreements
definitions defintions although the
Article 2: Article 2: Regualtion is
permitted permitted also based on
obligations obligations the
("white list") ("white list"); "white and
Article 3: Article 3,4,5 black list"
prohibited prohibited principle:
obligations obligations Definitions:
("black list") 
with specifica­
tion in Articles
("black list"). Articles 1,6,9 
White list: 
Articles2,7,11
4,5,6.
Procedural 
provisions: 
Articles 7-9
Article 6: 
withdrawal
Article 8: 
exemption not 
applicable for 
resale of beer 
and petroleum 
products.
Black List: 
Articles 4,5; 
8,9; 12,13.
Article 4: 
withdrawal
Articlesl6,17: 
provisions 
where the Re­
gulation not 
applies
exclusive both only exclusive only exclusive
distribution/ distribution purchasing
exclusive
purchasing
agreements agreements
applicability to only bilateral uni-/bilateral uni-/bilateral
uni-/bilateral agreements (but agreements agreements
agreements see Case Fonderies 
Roubaix/Fonderies 
Roux n. 157 
Brouwerij 
Concordia n.159
recital (3) recital (3)
continued
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"agreements and concerted practices which satisfy the 
conditions set out in this Regulation need not be notified; 
whereas an undertaking may nonetheless in a particular case 
where real doubt exists, request the Commission to declare 
whether its agreements comply with this Regulations." Thus, 
an undertaking in question can always apply for a decision; 
a procedure which in practice can be quite important (see 
Chapter 6 below).
Another guiding principle is stated in recital (11) (of 
Regulation 1983/83): parallel import have to remain pos­
sible.
This point, established as a principle in early cases, is 
once again expressed in the currently valid Regulations. In 
accordance with the recital, the Commission has worded 
Article 3 more stringently than Article 3 of Regulation 
67/67.
Another significant detail can be found in Articles 4 and 5 
of Regulation 1983/83. The Commission has detailed with 
precision the provisions on the "black list" in Article 3. 
This implies that the Commission has taken into account the 
economic effects of the agreements and accordingly set up 
the "black list". This approach is completed in Article 8 
of the Regulation, which provides that the block exemption 
is not applicable" to agreements entered into for resale of 
drinks in premises used for the sale and consumption of
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beer or for the resale of petroleum products in service 
stations."
However, many agreements still benefit from Regulation
1983/83 and the clauses permitted in Article 2 of the 
295Regulation. E.g. allowed are obligations not to sell 
competing products, the distributor's exclusive purchasing 
obligations and qualified territorial protections. The 
latter may - as in Regulation 67/67 - take whole selective 
distribution systems out of the block exemption. Pursuant 
to Article 2 (3), obligations may be attached to stock
holding, selling under trademarks etc. and certain pro-
i 296motional measures.
In four recent Decisions in 19 85 the Commission gave 
further indications on the interpretation of Regulation 
1983/83. Two decisions referred to Article 3 of Regulation 
1983/83, the other ones to the question as to which clauses 
are to be allowed under Regulation 1983/83.
In the Decision in Sole distribution agreements for whisky 
and gin (Distillers), the Commission examined the distri­
bution system of the Distillers Company, U.K. which had
appointed other firms of the spirits sector for the distri-
297bution in the different member states. The Commission 
confirmed that with reference to Article 3 (b) of Regula­
tion 1983/83 the producers of certain categories of
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alcoholic beverages, e.g. whisky and gin, are not to be 
looked upon as competing manufacturers.
Therefore, 17 of the 21 noticed agreements fell within the 
block exemption, only four had to be decided upon under EEC 
Article 85 (3) in connection with an individual exemption 
(this aspect is dealt with below).
The other Decision the Commission took in respect of
Article 3 (b) of Regulation 19 83/83 concernes Siemens-Fanuc.
Although the Decision was based on Regulation 67/67, the
Commission regarded this decision relevant also for the
299interpretation of Article 3 (a) of Regulation 1983/83.
In this agreement Siemens and Fanuc had appointed each 
other as exclusive distributors in their respective selling 
areas. The Commission looked upon this agreement as 
reciprocal and therefore pursuant to Article 3 (a) of 
Regulation 1983/83 not fit for a block exemption. ^
301The other two recent cases are Sperry New Holland and 
302Ivoclar . The Decisions in them confirm the constant
practice of the Commission to regard obligations exceeding
those mentioned in Article 2 of Regulation 19 83/83 ("white
303list") as being opposed to block exemption.
298
In Sperry New Holland the Commission found the distribution 
agreement infringing EEC Article 85 (1) and not apt for a
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block exemption under Regulation 1983/83 as the clauses 
were obstructing parallel imports.
In Ivoclar the Commission found the selective distribution
system infringing EEC Article 85 (1) and Regulation 1983/83
not being applicable, as the restrictions imposed on the
resellers were exceeding provisions of Article 2 of Regu- 
305lation 1983/83. The Commission stated that Article 2
3 06contains definitive provisions which may not be altered.
These Decisions indicate that the Commission is developing 
a reserved attitude when interpreting Regulation 1983/83, 
especially when undertakings with large market power are 
concerned. This seems correct as a starting-point as it 
secures the detailed examination of each case in question; 
if the Commission finds no objections, the possibility of 
an individual exemption may be envisaged, an application 
for the exemption may be made, and the exemption may be 
granted.
Another trend can be observed relating to export bans. The 
Commission is still pursuing its determined policy of 
preventing export bans and does not hesitate to implement 
it when examining an agreement under Regulation 1983/83.
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(iii) Regulation 1984/83 
(c<) General
In difference to Regulation 1983/83, Regulation 1984/83 
contains more modifications in comparison with Regulation 
67/67.
The Commission has defined block exemption for certain 
categories of exclusive purchasing agreements as follows in 
the figure below:
Regulation 1984/83 on categories of 
exclusive purchasing agreements'^
exclusive purchasing 
agreements of short 
and medium duration 
(i.e. for a maximum 
period of 5 years) in 
all sectors of the 
economy
relevant regulations: 
Title I Articles 1-5
long term exclusive 
purchasing agreements 
entered into for the 
resale of beer in 
premises used for the 
sale and consumption 
(beer supply agree­
ments)
relevant regulations: 
Title II (Articles 6-9)
long term exclusive 
purchasing agree­
ments entered into 
for the resale of 
petroleum products 
in filling stations 
(service station 
agreements) 
relevant regula­
tions: Title III 
(Articles 10-13).
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Thus, the Regulation provides for block exemptions 
applicable to all kinds of exclusive purchasing agreements 
of short duration, beer supply agreements and filling 
station agreements.
This categorisation makes clear, that the Commission could 
- from the experience gained during the period of applica­
tion of Regulation 67/67 - make out certain types of 
exclusive purchasing agreements and attune special pro­
visions to the requirements of economic life as well as to 
competition policy.
The special provisions for beer supply and filling station 
agreements indicate that the Commission regarded exclusive 
purchasing agreements as particularly necessary for the 
relevant sectors of the economy and for one of its main 
application fields.
However, the Commission has shaped the structure of the 
provisions in a form similar to that of Regulation 1983/83 
(see the figure showing the differences, p. 118-119 above). 
Regulation 1984/83 contains, besides definitions of the 
respective agreements, "white lists" of the permitted 
obligations (Articles 2,7,11) and "black lists" of the 
prohibited clauses (Articles 3-5 ,8,9,12,13).
With this survey we will conclude and turn to the pro­
visions in detail.
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(ft) The provisions of Regulation 1984/83 in detail
As already pointed out, Title I of Regulation 1984/83
contains general provisions, while Title II and III contain
special provisions for beer and petrol, and Title IV
contains various miscellaneous provisions.
Before Regulation 1984/83 came into force the Commission
took the various aspects - the negative aspects as well -
into consideration and "therefore sought to achieve a
balance between what it considers to be desirable and
30 8undesirable exclusive purchasing commitments."
(As a detailed discussion the individual provisions would
309exceed the scope of the present study, we will con­
centrate on recent developments as reflected in decisions.)
In 1985 the Commission examined a standard exclusive
purchasing agreement notified by the German ice-cream
310producer Scholler. As the exclusive purchasing agreement 
was intended for indefinite duration, the Commission found 
that a block exemption was not applicable: the agreements 
were not in accordance with Article 3 (d) of Regulation 
1984/83. However, the Commission took into consideration 
that the agreements could be terminated yearly, after a 
period of two years, with six months1 notice. Thus the 
Commission found the agreements' average duration to be 
three years. Furthermore, the Commission assessed that 
Scholler's (and the main competitor's) networks of
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exclusive purchasing agreements added up to not more than a 
total of 30 % of the given economic sector of the market.
As a result, the Commission found Scholler's agreement not 
falling within EEC Article 85 (1) and quashed proceedings 
with a "comfort letter
The Commission took another recent decision on purchasing
312agreements in VEB/Shell. The Commission had to examine 
Shell's exclusive purchasing agreements; some of the 
leaseholders complained about the rebate system as in­
volving alleged indirect resale price maintenance and price 
discrimination. The Commission found these complaints to be 
untenable as Shell ran the rebate system in order to
support the local leaseholders dependent on the local
313competition conditions. The Commission came to the
conclusion that the agreements were containing no indirect
resale price maintenance and that the system was within
314Regulation 1984/83. The complaint was quashed.
The few decisions passed on exclusive purchasing agreements 
indicate that many agreements, particularly in the special 
sectors, now benefit from the block exemptions.
The system of block exemption seems to make - as intended 
by the Commission - many individual decisions redundant. It 
is significant that, compared with other agreements, e.g. 
the exclusive distribution agreements under Regulation 
1983/83, there have thus far been only a few decisions with
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reference to exclusive purchasing agreements and Regulation 
1984/83. One of the reasons for it may be that most of the 
exclusive purchasing agreements are concluded in the 
sectors of beer and petrol, and thus fall within the system 
of block exemption.
Future decisions will show, if this trend will continue.
(iv) Regulation 123/85
In 19 84 the Commission adopted a block exemption for the
sector of motor vehicle distribution. With Regulation
123/85 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the EEC
Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution
315and servicing agreements , the Commission exempted 
certain distribution agreements in this sector of the 
economy. The Commission stated that "in the light of 
experience since Commission Decision 75/73/EEC and of the 
many motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements 
which have been notified to the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 4 and 5 of Council Regulation No.17, as last 
amended by Regulation (EEC) No.2821/71, a category of 
agreements can be defined as satisfying the conditions laid 
down in Regulation No. 19/65 EEC."^^
This approach was a response by the Commission to meet the 
requirements in the motor vehicle sector and laid down the 
permitted obligations.
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On the interpretation of the block exemption the Commission
317issued its Notice on Regulation 123/85. The block
exemption is applicable to certain exclusive and selective
29 5distribution clauses m  the motor vehicle sector. Thus
the Commission has for the first time exempted agreements
318with selective distribution clauses by block exemption.
Moreover, Regulation 123/85 exempts agreement systems with
supply to a "specified number of resellers within the
319distribution system". "This is thought to cover the "
closed" system of selective distribution used by motor
vehicle suppliers who appoint a limited number of dealers
321and sub-dealers within a given territory". The Commis­
sion considered that selective and exclusive distribution 
systems are generally indispensable measures in this sector 
of the economy. Furthermore, the Commission took into
account that motor vehicles are long-lived goods needing
. . 322regular repairing and servicing.
As competition in the motor vehicle sector is one con­
centrating between brands, the Commission put up with
certain restrictions in competition between producer and
, n 323 resellers.
The Commission has, however, also proceeded in several
cases against infringments of the general principles laid
324down m  the Regulation and confirmed by the ECJ.
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3 25One of the decisions referred to British Leyland , 
refusing, respectively aggravating, the issue of 
certificates of conformity for parallel imported motor 
vehicles. The Commission found that the practices in 
question contravened EEC Article 86, and imposed the 
obligation to discontinue such practices and imposed a fine 
of ECU 350,000 on the undertaking.
This Decision was confirmed on appeal by the European Court
327of Justice in British Leyland v Commission.
The Court established that the obstruction of parallel 
imports may also contravene Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
It rejected British Leyland's argument that the measures 
were taken in order to protect the - permitted - selective 
distribution system. The Commission's view was entirely 
confirmed and the appeal dismissed.
Several other decisions have also dealt with obstructures
of parallel imports, but the Commission examined the cases
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, e.g. Distribution
3 28System of Ford Werke AG (No.2) , on appeal Ford v
o o q  ”3 "3 0 ”3 “3 1
Commission (No.2) , Alfa Romeo and Fiat , where the
latter also referred to the problems of guarantee systems.
These decisions make clear that both the ECJ and the 
Commission are pursuing their determined view to intervene 
in order to secure parallel imports in this sector of the 
economy as well.
332
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In its Sixteenth Report on Competition policy the Com­
mission explained that until then a revocation of the block 
exemption under Regulation 123/85 had not been necessary in
a particular case, because in most cases the causes for
333complaints could be removed. However, the Commission
stated again the three basic principles to be observed when
334examining a complaint. The Commission once again con­
firmed its objection to any hindrances to parallel imports 
obstructing the achievement of a uniform European Market.
These recent decisions and statements are in accordance 
with the past practice. Emphasis has been on the 
significance attached to unrestricted parallel imports and 
on intent to continue the adopted policy and practice.
(b) Individual exemptions
(i) General remarks
Individual exemptions are important for agreements to which 
a block exemption does not apply, or where no block 
exemption is provided.
The following sections examine whether certain trends can 
made out in the current practice of the Commission and the 
ECJ.
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(ii) Exclusive agency agreements
Concerning exclusive agency agreements, the Commission took 
a recent Decision in Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe . 
Because the Commission found the agreement system infringed 
Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty, it detailed, in con­
nection with the possibility of fines to be imposed, that 
the deficient notification of an agreement is no valid 
notification able to protect against fines or to be the 
basis for an exemption under Article 85 (3) of the EEC 
Treaty. 336
This indicates that the Commission is generally prepared to 
examine exclusive agency cases which infringe EEC Article 
8 5 (1), i.e. where the "agent" is not a true agent in the 
light of EEC Article 85 (3). The Commission did not find 
the above mentioned case qualifying for an exemption, but 
refrained from imposing fines.
It can be observed that, as stated in Chapter 4 (2) (b)
(ii), the question of an exemption under EEC Article 85 (3) 
is only relevant for such agreements, which are not "true" 
agency agreements, as they in no way fall within EEC 
Article 85 (1). As the Commission did not regard the 
agreements in Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe as 
"true" agency agreements, but as agreements made with 
independent traders, it had to take EEC Article 85 (3) into 
consideration.
335
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It can in general be said that exclusive agency agreements 
are not in the centre of gravity of the Community decision. 
One reason for it may be the guidelines the Commission has 
set up in its Notice on Exclusive Agency agreements ex­
plaining which agreements do not not fall within EEC 
Article 85 (1). Another reason may be that the exclusive 
agency agreements are of minor economic importance in 
contrast to the other types of exclusive dealing agree­
ments, and thus generate less controversial points.
(iii) Exclusive distribution agreements
More relevance to individual exemptions have exclusive 
distribution agreements.
In 1980 the Commission refused an individual exemption in
337Hennessy-Henkell as it found (unacceptlable) clauses 
granting absolute territorial protection and agreements on 
price terms.
An exemption from the brazen principle not tolerating any
direct or indirect export bans made the Commission in the
33 8Decision in Distillers Company PLC (Red Label).
In order to enable Distillers to penetrate a new market, 
respectively re-establish the brand in the U.K., the 
Commission was prepared to grant an individual exemption
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with respect to differential price terms for a limited 
339period. The exemption was indeed given only for a 
limited period, in circumstances different from other 
decided cases: the clauses were not operated to fix a 
maximum profit for Distillers and to cement the market 
positions, but to stimulate and improve competition, and 
make more products available for the customers.
The decision should not be misunderstood, as it means no 
alteration of the previous adjudications, in which the EEC 
authorities continually disapproved of export bans, which 
reduced competition, lead to compartmentalisation of the 
market and placed the customers at a disadvantage.
This can be seen in the Decision in Hasselblad v Commission 
where export bans were effected by economic pressure and 
concerted practices and an exemption under EEC Article 85
(3) was not granted and fines were imposed.
. 'k
An individual exemption was also refused in the Decision 
for VBBB and VBVB, where the agreement was found to in­
fringe EEC Article 85 (1) by pricing and mutual ex- 
341clusivity. The ECJ confirmed the Decision and upheld
the Commission's view to the effect of not granting an
342individual exemption.
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To exclusive distribution agreements between producers of
competing products refers also the Decision in Sole distri-
343bution agreements for whisky and gin (Distillers).
The Commission found some of the exclusive distribution
clauses with competing producers contravening EEC Article
34485 (1) and not fit for a block exemption. However, the
Commission considered the rough competition in this sector
and the relatively weak market position of the undertakings
in question, and thus was able to grant an individual
345exemption under EEC Article 85 (3).
Although many agreements now benefit from block exemptions, 
the EEC authorities' decisions explain that there are 
nevertheless some agreements which have to be examined 
under EEC Article 85 (3).
It has to be taken into account that each case is con­
sidered separately and there are still some agreements - 
mostly on export bans - where the Commission and the ECJ do 
not hesitate to refuse an individual exemption and impose 
large fines on infringing undertakings.
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(iv) Exclusive purchasing agreements
A detailed Decision referring to exclusive purchasing
346agreements took the Commission in Carlsberg. As it found 
the agreements contrary to EEC Article 85 (1) and Regula­
tion 1984/83 as not applicable, the question of an in­
dividual exemption had to be reviewed.
The Commission exposed:
"The Lager Agreement and the restrictions of competition contained in 
it must be seen in the light of the peculiar structure of the British 
beer market and the economic and conmercial position of Carlsberg on 
that market. The Cooperation Agreement has enabled Carlsberg to 
establish itself more quickly ond over a wider area thanks to GM's 
large network of tied outlets. Without this co-operation Carlsberg 
would as yet be unable to keep its Northampton brewery fully occupied. 
In view of the economic advantages of the arrangements, which will be 
shown below, the restrictions of competition resulting from the Agree­
ment can be tolerated until 30 September 1991, since this period 
should be sufficient for Carlsberg to build up its own sales network
and progressively become independent of any other large brewery for
347distributing its output."
This argumentation makes clear that the Commission took, as
in the above mentioned Decision in Distillers Company PLC 
348(Red Label) , into consideration the economic situation 
of the parties and, above all, the fact that new products 
were being introduced onto the market. Once again the 
Commission took a benign view on efforts to introduce 
products to new markets, as means to an improvement in
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distribution, competition and, last but not least, a fair 
share of the benefits in form of more variety and quality 
of the products for the consumers.
(v) Selective distribution systems
Of vital importance in the past have been and currently are 
individual exemptions for selective distribution systems.
As selective clauses may take whole systems out of the 
applicability of a block exemption, quite a few agreements 
depend entirely on the granting of an individual exemption.
When reviewing the decisions recently passed on selective 
distribution systems, it can be observed that - as in the 
past - introductorily the adequacy of the system for the 
products has been examined.
In a recent judgment, where the ECJ did not find a 
selective distribution system adequate for the goods in
questions, that is in SA ETA Fabriques d'Ebauches v SA DK
349Investment and others "Swatch* , it was stated that such
systems would infringe Article 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty. It
is remarkable that although the system contravened EEC
Article 8 5 (1), an individual exemption for such in-
350fnngements seemed to be beyond question.
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In another Decision, referring to the sale of plumbing 
equipement, the Commission did find a selective distri­
bution system not adequate and thus contrary to EEC Article 
3 5185 (1) . Even though in this Decision the question of EEC 
Article 85 (3) was broached, it was refused as a re­
striction in reselling plumbing equipment by plumbers only
352was not considered necessary.
Thus, the Commission seems not to grant individual 
exemptions for agreements, which, in general, are not ad­
equate for the distributed products. It remains to be seen 
if this approach will be pursued in the future, or if ex­
emptions will be granted.
From systems, where selective criteria were not considered 
necessary, we will now proceed to decisions on selective 
distribution systems which are considered adequate for the 
products in question.
In respect of cars, the selective system was found neces-
353sary for the distribution in Ford v Commission (No. 2).
Although the Commission examined the agreement under EEC
Article 85 (3), an individual exemption was refused because
parallel imports were obstructed by Ford ceasing to supply
354RHD cars to Germany. The Commission held that "the 
effects of a restictive agreements must be considered in 
its economic and legal context" and it stated further that
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"it is normally a prerequisite for an Article 85 (3)
exemption that intra brand competition at the distribution
level across notional frontiers should be possible, at
least unobstructed and hence that distribution systems
within the Community should not cause a substantied part of
35
the Community to be deliberately isolated from the rest
The Decision was confirmed by the European Court of 
3 5 6Justice, making it again clear that the Court's and
Commission's attitude towards export bans of all types has 
not altered. Thus the refusal of an individual exemption is 
in accordance with previous decisions.
Likewise not fit for an individual exemption are agreements
357 . .containing resale price maintenances. In the Decision m
358Ivoclar the Commission found the restrictions on the
resellers apt for an individual exemption as it effected a
concentration of the efforts in the distribution sector and
was of advantage for the consumer. This decision was
regarded as an example set for the Commission's policy on
359selective distribution systems.
This policy is reflected as well in the Decision in Grundig
360distribution system , where the Commission was prepared 
to grant an individual exemption too, on grounds, that 
every reseller meeting the requirements was admitted to the 
system. The Commission explained that the agreements are 
fullfilling even the stricter criteria which the ECJ
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3 61established in 1983. The Commission took also into
consideration the economic situation and the fierce com-
362petition in this sector. As this Decision is in agree­
ment with the policy of the ECJ and the Commission, it 
seems probable that it will be later upheld on appeal.
In another recent judgment referring to individual ex­
emptions of selective distribution systems passed by the
36 3ECJ the Metro v Commission (No.2) , the Court
corroborated the Commission's view that the economic
364situation of each case has to be taken into account. The 
ECJ held that self-service wholesalers were in fact not - 
as alleged by Metro - discriminated as distributors in the 
electronics market and that the requirements of EEC Article 
85 (3) were still fulfilled.^^
Another aspect of the Court's judgment is also of general 
significance. With respect to the renewal of the individual 
exemption the Court held that when a distribution system 
corresponds to a former system already exempted in all im­
portant points, the Commission can take for granted that
the new system is fullfilling, until disproved, the con-
366ditions of EEC Article 85 (3) as well. This decision 
will make the future renewal of exemptions easier, and many 
other firms will benefit it.
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All in all, the ECJ upheld the Decision of the Commission
with respect to EEC Article 85 (3), the appeal was dis-
. 367 missed.
So, this decision with regard to EEC Article 85 (3) has 
confirmed the previous decisions and is a further develop­
ment of past judicial practice. Again, changes in 
evaluation by the Commission and the ECJ are not to be 
expected in the near future.
* 3 6 8This is confirmed by the Decision in Peugeot-Talbot.
Details of the Commission's reasoning explained in Ford v 
369Commission , were re-affirmed and the Commission again 
made clear that the refusal to supply RHD cars to the 
member states on the continent was obstructing parallel 
imports and was thus restricting competition. Hence, the 
Commission refused to grant an individual exemption under 
EEC Article 85 (3).
Peugeot-Talbot was in addition fined with ECU 4,000 as it
had supplied false information; however, the Commission
refrained from imposing fines for the agreement, as it was
notified and, additionally, the obligations with reference
to the supply of RHD cars were (in Ford v Commission
3 70(No.2)) only recently made absolutely clear.
The reviewing of these recent cases shows that no grave 
changes in the judicial practice have taken place. The EEC
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authorities have rather adopted the starting-points already 
established in the past and have developed them further. 
Especial emphasis was laid on the necessity to take all 
economic circumstances into account. The view on parallel 
imports has also been confirmed and especially explained 
when RHD supplies to the continental memeber states were in 
question. It may be expected that this policy will be 
maintained in the future.
3. The situation of small and medium-sized businesses, 
undertakings and enterprises.
In the recent period (1980s) the Commission has intensified 
its endeavours to improve the situation of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Among other efforts there 
can be observed three main directions in the Commission's 
attempts: firstly, the information to the undertakings in
question; secondly, legislation with reference to SMEs; and
. . . . 371thirdly, case-by-case decisions, involving SMEs.
Concerning the information sector, the Commission had 
before 19 83 found that with reference to European com­
petition policy one of the SMEs' main problems was their 
shortage of information about their rights and obligations. 
In order to remedy it, in 1983 - on the occasion of the
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year of the SMEs - the Commission published a guideline on
the European competition rules for small and medium-sized 
372firms. With the help of national ministries, industrial
associations and chambers of commerce nearly 100,000 copies
3 73of the guideline were distributed free to the SMEs. The 
Commission recieved a feed-back which was positive 
throughout.
In 19 85 the Commission published further information as
guidance on the Commission's powers of investigation under
European competition law; the guideline is especially meant
for those firms which do not have a legal advisor at their 
374disposal. With this publication the Commission made 
another important contribution in order to reduce the 
information deficit of the SMEs, all the more so, as 
practice shows that many of the disadvantages such firms 
sustain in everyday economic life are due to the fact that 
they do not dispose of the necessary legal informations, 
unlike large firms with legal departments or their perma­
nent legal advisers.
Concerning legislation affecting the SMEs, an important 
improvement was made with the new block exemption 
Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83. In the recitals the 
Commission again emphasised its concern about the SMEs. It 
explained with reference to exclusive distribution agree­
ments: "... whereas the appointment of an exclusive distri­
butor who will take over sales promotion, customer service
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and carrying of stocks is often the most effective way, and
sometimes indeed the only way, for the manufacturer to
enter a market and compete with other manufacturers already
present; whereas this is particularly so in the case of
375small and medium-sized untertakings".
The Commission exlained further with reference to exclusive 
purchasing agreements:
" ... whereas the appointment of several resellers, who are
bound to purchase exclusively from the manufacturer and who
take over sales promotion, customer sevices and carrying of
stock, is often the most effective way, and sometimes the
only way, for the manufacturer to penetrate a market and
compete with other manufacturers already present; whereas
this is particularly so in the case of small and medium-
376sized undertakings;"
To pursue this issue further, the Commission provided 
additional provisions especially relevant to the SMEs.
The Commission issued Article 3 (b) and Article 5 of 
Regulation 1983/83 in order to give small and medium-sized 
undertakings the possibility to enter into non-reciprocal 
exclusive distribution agreements not normally allowed 
under the Regulation.
3 77Further provisions are anchored in Article 5. Article 3 
(b) of Regulation 1983/83 permits non-reciprocal agreements 
between competing manufacturers up to a total turnover of 
100 million ECU.
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Similar provisions are found in Articles 3 (b) and 5 of
Regulation 1984/83. These provisions are applicable mutatis
mutandis to exclusive purchasing agreements for beer and
3 78petrol (Articles 9 and 13 of Regulation 1984/83).
These provisions show that, with SMEs in mind, the 
Commission was prepared to stand off principles prohibiting 
distribution/purchasing agreements between competing manu­
facturers. The relaxations are meant to faciliate the 
access of SMEs into new markets. The Commission did not 
disregard, however, the facts that exclusive purchasing 
agreements may often concern the SMEs, e.g. landlords or 
leaseholders of filling stations, and secured with Regula­
tion 1984/83 that these resellers do not get into too
strong temporal and assortment dependence in relation to 
379the supplier.
Further important provisions for SMEs were also issued with
Regulation 123/85. The Commission regards this Regulation
as particularly important for the SMEs. It realised that
the Regulation on the one hand grants the advantages of a
network of selected dealers, but on the other hand provides
more protection for the dealers, which are often SMEs, and
3 80opens up the spare part market for them.
The Commission thought the aspect of the Regulation pro­
tecting the SMEs to be important. It took into con­
sideration that the SME-motor-vehicle-dealers should not
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get into too strong a dependence on the supplier, and that
they should have enough a margin in the spare part sector
3 81and for supplies to other approved dealers.
Concern for the SMEs was pursued further when in 1986, with
view to the de-minimis-rule, the Commission published a new
3 82Notice concerning agreements of minor importance.
This Notice replaced the former Commission Notice con-
383cerning agreements of minor importance. With the new 
Notice the Commission intended both the establishement of 
provisions and the improvement of information for the 
undertakings.
Thus, the above mentioned improvements with reference to 
access to information have been continued. The Notice 
explains which agreements are to be considered as not 
falling within the scope of EEC Article 85 (1), because of 
their minor importance and non-effect of competition to a 
significant degree.384
The Commission proceeded from the principle that com­
petition is not affected when the market share of the
parties in question does not exceed 5 % and their joint
3 85turnover does not exceed 2 00 million ECU.
The Commission details that the new Notice is different 
from the preceding Notice in three main points: firstly, 
the market shares are found out with reference to the 
region where the agreement takes effect; secondly, the 
turn-over limits are raised from 50 million to 200 million
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ECU; and thirdly, the Notice is now also applicable to the
386services sector.
Especially important for the SMEs are the second and third 
innovations. With the increase of the turn-over limits more 
undertakings will benefit from the Notice.
In practice even more importance will have the third point;
many of the service-rendering-businesses are SMEs which
will now benefit from the Commission's view. With such
references in the Notice, the Commission acknowledged the
38 8increasing economic significance of this sector.
Thus, the Commission intended, as already said, not only to
publish a new Notice, but also to supply more information
for the SMEs, to provide more legal security in their
389everyday economic activities. In order to collect itself 
more information about the SMEs, as a relevant point for 
its future competition policy, the Commission has . 
established a common study group in order to examine the 
EEC and national programs for the promotion of establish­
ment and expansion of SMEs, the simplification of 
Regulations and removal of encumbrances when founding a
SME, and improving the effects of the instruments of
390financial policy for the SMEs.
All these recent developments show that the Commission is 
prepared to intensify its exertions for the SMEs, and, in
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reaction to the requirements of the SMEs, is providing the 
necessary factual materials.
With regard to case-by-case decisions with reference to
SMEs, it can in general be observed that both the ECJ and
the Commission are intent on considering the economic sides 
391of a case.
This is of importance also for SMEs. As an example, a
detailed analysis of the economic circumstances and the
relevant market is found in the judgment in Hasselblad v 
392Commission.
In respect of the amount of fines to be imposed on a firm, 
the EEC authorities have taken into consideration the 
question whether the undertaking is an SME, a circumstance 
which would extenuate the negative effects of the infringe­
ment and therefore be the reason for a reduction of fines.
An example on SMEs has been provided in the Commission's
394Decision m  Ivoclar. The Commission based its Decision
granting an individual exemption, amongst other grounds, on
the fact that Ivoclar was a medium-sized enterprise and had
to face substantial competition by larger undertakings
39 5throughout the EEC.
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Reverting to the fact that in the past there were only few 
decisions concerning SMEs, it can be seen that the situ­
ation has not fundamentally changed. There are still only 
few decisions referring to SMEs.
One reason may be the provisions in the system of block 
exemptions (Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83), which have 
been developed further, as well as the publication of the 
new block exemption Regulation 123/85 and the Notice on 
minor agreements. However, the question of the costs of a 
case should be additionally considered, as an aspect, which 
is not to be underestimated in practice.
Each court proceeding have involves a considerable risk for 
bearing costs.
"So an unsuccessful applicant challenging a decision of the
Commission under Article 173 should expect to pay not only
39 6his own costs, but also those of the Commission."
This aspect should not be neglected in practice. For an SME
the question of costs is much more important than for a
large undertaking. For the latter, costs are no risk, but
eventually just another operating expense to be shown in
the balance sheet. For SMEs costs are a substantial risk,
and quite often this is just the reason for refraining from
proceedings, all the more as firms are not entitled to
apply for legal aid, only in exeptional circumstances, even
3 97under national law.
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Thus, with regard on. the financial risks of bearing lawsuit 
costs, improvements for SMEs are still to be made. It 
should be considered how the dreaded risk could be removed 
from SMEs, e.g. by the establishment of new provisions 
granting legal aid to them.
Another reason explaining the few cases found in judicial 
proceedings may be the fact that SMEs still do not 
primarily seek their sales markets in the whole EEC, but 
are traditionally tending more to their "hereditary" 
national markets. With reference to the common market, the 
integration into new markets will become interesting and 
necessary also for the SMEs in order to keep their 
competitiveness.
Hence it is to be expected that the Commission will proceed
further in its efforts to support the SMEs, as it regards
the SMEs as making an important contribution to the
39 8economic development of Europe.
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P A R T  II/B
CHAPTER 6 
Procedure and enforcement
1. Introductory remarks
Having examined the exclusive dealing agreements under 
substantive law, we now turn to the aspects of the pro­
cedural law. As we have already seen this side of the law 
is not to be underestimated and is important for many 
aspects, such as when applying for negative clearance, 
notifying in order to obtain an individual exemption, and 
as well when imposing fines, or appealing from Decisions of 
the Commission.
It has already been pointed out above, how vital the exact
observance of procedural provisions may be for the under-
399takings concerned and their distribution networks.
However, while procedural law may be important, the de­
cisions of the Commission and the European Court of Justice 
made clear, especially those referring to export bans, how 
for the benefit of both consumers and competitors, the 
observance of all the competition rules is indispensable. 
The decisions on export bans and similar agreements and /
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other cases in general, where fines were imposed, also show 
that it is important to provide the EEC authorities with 
suitable means in order to enforce, wherever necessary, the 
rules of competition policy. Only where this is ensured 
will the EEC be able to pursue and implement economic 
objectives and promote the common market.
Thus, it is important to consider that the provisions of 
both substantive and procedural law are serving the purpose 
of realising the Community's competition policy. Hence, not 
only the substantive, but also the procedural aspects of 
EEC competition law have to satisfy two following funda­
mental requirements, one of which is economic, the other 
legal in nature.
The economic aspect requires the procedural law to assist 
the undertakings in question to get a maximum economic 
benefit from their competitive products (possibly connected 
with high development and production costs) within a 
commercially reasonable time.
As already mentioned at the beginning of the study, the 
time element should not be neglected.
An undertaking notifying its exclusive dealing agreements 
or seeking adequate protection under the competition law 
(e.g. a dealer who is not allowed to operate a selective
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distribution system) wants to safeguard the benefits 
derived from is products or investments.
In order to effect that, the time element, together with 
enhanced competition assumes more and more importance. 
Certain products may become economically worthless once the 
competitiors achieve the same technical standards; the 
technical advance may be lost, production and development 
costs wasted.
Practice shows that competitiveness of high-quality brand 
products, which usually are the object of exclusive dealing 
agreements, is normally eroded within 4-6 years. Thus, 
exclusive dealing agreements are usually concluded for an 
average period of five years. This is of great importance 
when considering the lenght or duration of procedures.
However, the time element is as well relevant for the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice, to ensure the 
proper functioning of competition with regard to economic 
aspects.
In respect of competitiveness it can be understood that the 
termination of infringements and the imposition of fines 
can be effective only when the infringing party is not 
permitted to profit from procedural delays, as otherwise 
the products can be marketed and profits be made by the 
prohibited conduct.
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Equally important is the second, the legal requirement of 
the procedural law referring to exclusive dealing agree­
ments. The parties entering into vertical distribution 
agreements are, in order to market their products, de­
pendent on maximum legal security and predictability of 
decisions within the framework of competiton law. In this 
respect, especially the Commission's Notices and the 
interpretation of the block exemptions should be kept in 
mind. The undertakings have to rely, when concluding their 
agreements, on previous comments and decisions. Thus, 
timely information about the intentions of the EEC 
authorities is not only important for the SMEs, as already 
seen above, but also for other undertakings if they are to 
bring their exclusive dealing agreements in line with the 
current legislation and judicial practice.
Beyond these general observations we will proceed to 
the details of procedural questions relevant to exclusive 
dealing agreements.
When reviewing the procedural dimension of competition law, 
four steps are to be observed as a line of action:
(1) institution of proceedings; fact-finding;
(2) Decision(s) by the Commission;
(3) judicial review by the European Court of Justice;
(4) enforcement of the decision(s) of the Commission 
and/or the European Court of Justice.
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In what follows below we will consider this classification 
and begin with the instituion of proceedings and fact­
finding .
2. The institution of proceedings; fact-finding
(a) General remarks
While the Community rules on competition with reference to 
substantive law are directly applicable provisions in the 
member states, concerning EEC procedural law "the 
Commission is the principal enforcement agency. "4^°
The legal basis for the Commission's procedures is provided
401 .by Regulation 17. Under Regulation 17 the Commission is
empowered to grant negative clearances or individual 
exemptions to an exclusive dealing agreement, or to take 
Decisions requiring the termination of infringements.402 
The procedure of the Commission is essentially administra­
tive; its decisions are quasi-judicial and may be subject
403to appeals to the European Court of Justice.
The relevant provisions show that the Commission is not 
only acting as an administrative organ, but also as ad­
judicating and enforcing organ. This status does not seem
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to be unproblematic in the light of the principle of 
separation of powers, because the Commission is acting as a 
quasi-judicial authority.404
When reviewing the administrative procedure in competition 
cases referring to exclusive dealing agreements, there are 
basically three possibilities to commence proceedings: 
firstly, one (or both) parties initiate proceedings in 
order to obtain a negative clearance, respectively an 
individual exemption; secondly, the Commission by itself 
may initiate proceedings in order to terminate in­
fringements of the competition rules; thirdly, in con­
nection with infringement, proceedings may be started by 
complaints of third parties.
(b) Application for negative clearance
An important procedure for the parties of an exclusive 
dealing agreement is the above mentioned application for a 
negative clearance.
"Application for negative clearance is the procedure under 
which a declaration may be obtained from the Commission 
that in the light of the information available to it an
405agreement falls outside Articles 85 and 86 altogether.".
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Article 2 of Regulation 17 provides:
"Upon application by the undertakings or associations of under­
takings concerned, the Commission may certify that, on the basis 
of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under Article 
85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty for action on its part in 
respect of an agreement, decision or practice."
Based on that legal definition, the application for nega­
tive clearance with its respective functions has to be 
defined against the procedure for a notification to obtain 
exemption. While a negative clearance serves to certify 
that the whole agreement is not falling within EEC Article 
85 (1) at all, as e.g. a (true) agency agreement, 
notification is required for those agreements which 
possibly fall within EEC Article 85 (1), e.g. certain 
selective distribution systems with quantitative criteria, 
and need an exemption under EEC Article 85 (3), in order 
not to contravene EEC Article 85 (1) and not to be void 
(EEC Article 85 (2)).406
A negative clearance may be applied for under EEC Article
40785 (1) and/or EEC Article 86. However, for vertical 
exclusive dealing systems mostly a decision in respect of 
EEC Article 85 (1) will have to be considered.40^
Article 2 of Regulation 17 establishes that the party 
seeking a negative clearance has to apply for it, i.e. the
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Commission will not initiate proceedings by itself: an 
undertaking has to act on its own initiative.
Details of the formal requirements which an undertaking has
to consider, when making an application, are laid down in 
40 9Regulation 27. It provides that the application has to
be made on Form A/B and include all the information re-
410quested by the Form and the Complementary Note.
When applying for a negative clearance, it is important to 
provide the Commission with a complete set of information 
on the agreement.
"Although the Commission has the right to seek further 
information from applicants or third parties, and is 
obliged to publish a summary of the application before 
granting negative clearance or an exemption under Article 
85 (3), it will usually base its decision on the in­
formation provided by the applicant. Any decision taken on 
the basis of incomplete information could be without effect 
in the case of a negative clearance or voidable in that of 
an exemption. For the same reasons, it is also important to 
inform the Commission of any material changes to your
arrangements made after your application or notification" 
411
These requirements governing complete information and 
information about changing circumstances are not to be
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neglected in practice. Especially, when the applicant 
parties do not seek legal advice and make the application 
themselves, they must see to it that they do not omit 
mention of (legally) important circumstances which they may 
erroneously think to be unimportant. Besides, it should be 
remembered that the Commission is empowered to impose fines 
on parties supplying intentionally or negligently incorrect 
or misleading information. 4^2
It should be furthermore realised that an application for a
negative clearance provides no protection against fines
(Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 17), if the Commission
thinks the agreement contrary to EEC Article 85 (1).
Article 15 (5) of Regulation 17 is applicable only to
413applications for negative clearance. Thus, in case of 
doubt, it is in practice highly recommendable to scrutinise 
closely the exclusive dealing agreement and the circum­
stances related thereto before making an application for 
negative clearance.
Once the application is made the Commission is entitled, 
pursuant to Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17, to request 
all the necessary information. Moreover, the Commission, 
under Article 19 (3) of Regulation 17 "shall publish a 
summary of the relevant application or notification and 
invite all interested third parties to submit their
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observations within a time limit which it shall fix being 
not less than one month."
(c) Notification to obtain an individual exemption
As already suggested, the procedure to obtain an individual 
exemption is another important aspect of exclusive dealing 
agreements.
"The purpose of the procedure for exemption under Article 
85 (3) is to allow undertakings to enter into arrangements
which, in fact, offer economic advantages but which,
without an exemption, would be prohibited under Article 85
414 
(1) ."4
If an agreement falls within EEC Article 85 (1), the 
situation may in practice have serious (and expensive) 
consequences for the parties concerned:
Firstly, the Commission is empowered under Articles 15 and 
16 of Regulation 17, to impose fines or periodic penalty 
payments on the undertakings.
Secondly, pursuant to EEC Article 85 (2), any agreement
infringing EEC Article 85 is declared automatically void.
Lastly, third parties may be in a positition to claim
415damages and injunction.
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"A principal object of notification, therefore, is to 
secure the legal validity of the agreement by obtaining an 
exemption under Article 85 (3)."4^0
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, an individual exemption is 
necessary only for agreements which do not benefit from the 
provisions of a block exemption. Agreements meeting the 
stated requirements for a block exemption, are 
automatically exempted. The Commission has explained: 
"Whereas agreements and concerted practices which satisfy 
the conditions set out in this Regulation need not be 
notified; whereas an undertaking may nonetheless in a 
particular case where real doubt exists request the Com­
mission to declare whether its agreements comply with this 
417Regulation".
For the notification, too, it is most important to consider
that the procedure is initiated by the parties in question;
the Commission is not authorised to make a decision on
418individual exemption without a notification. Even m
cases where notification is not required, e.g. under
Article 4 (2) of Regulation 17, notification is in practice
nonetheless highly recommended, because of its positive
419effects upon the parties.
The notification must be made on Form A/B; "ommission to do
42 0so is fatal to the grant of an exemption". An exception
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from this principle was made by the European Court of
421Justice m  the recent judgment m  Metro v Commission , 
where it held that formal notification is not required, 
when a renewal of an already granted exemption is sought. 
Besides the form, the principles shown in respect of 
negative clearances do apply here as well.
A notification with insufficient information is not able to
422effect the benefits of a valid notification.
As already suggested, the notification has positive effects 
for exclusive dealing agreements.
The most important effect is provided by Article 15 (5) of 
Regulation 17: on an undertaking having notified its 
agreement, no fines can be imposed, even if the agreement 
is contrary to EEC Article 85 (1). This may have, for 
exclusive dealing agreements, far-reaching consequences. 
Taking into consideration that pursuant to Article 15 and 
16 of Regulation 17, large fines up to one million ECU or 
more can be imposed, non-notification may have grave 
economic effects for the undertakings in question, all the 
more so as the vertical exclusive dealing agreements, not 
seldom, are made between large corporate entities and SMEs. 
Heavy fines may lead an SME straight into bankruptcy or 
total economic dependence, where a large undertaking may 
just add to the balance sheet another item for operating 
costs may even get a tax refund by doing so. Thus, a
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substantial risk lies on the side of the SMEs, which may be 
quite often dependent on concluding the agreement in order 
to keep their competitiveness and meet the customers' 
demands.
423Although the Commission m  recent cases has sometimes 
refrained from imposing fines on a contracting partner who 
did not willfully agree to infringing clauses the residual 
risk can only be removed by notifying the agreement.
However, the protection under Article 15 (5) of Regulation
17 is removed where "the Commission has informed the
undertakings concerned that after preliminary examination
it is of opinion that Article 85 (1) of the Treaty applies
and that application of Article 85 (3) is not justified"
424
Another effect of notification that of the retroactivity,
which can be granted by the Commission under Article 6 (1)
of Regulation 17. "A retroactive exemption will render the
agreement fully valid and enforcable for the period fixed
4 25by the Commission.". On the other hand, it should not be
disregarded that if the retroactivity is derived, the
agreement is void ab initio pursuant to EEC Article 85 
426(2). Regarding these effects, notification is in 
practice most recommendable for clarifying the legal 
validity of exclusive dealing agreements.
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These advantages are prevail by far over such disadvantages
as, for example, requests for information by the Commission
427and publication m  the Official Journal.
(d) Infringement proceedings
There have been quite a few exclusive dealing agreements 
infringing EEC Article 85 (1), and as such not eligible for 
a block exemption or an individual exemption under EEC 
Article 85 (3). Good example therefore are exclusive 
dealing agreements with clauses which impede parallel 
imports. As the cases demonstrate, for such agreements 
frequently neither an application is made for negative 
clearance nor a notification submitted for an individual 
exemption.
In order to deal with them, the Commission is therefore 
dependent on information from third sources before initiate 
proceedings, beginning with fact- finding.
Fact-finding is of fundamental importance as far as the 
Commission's work is concerned, for enforcing procedure on 
firms, whose agreements are not in accordance with the 
competition rules and thus distort competition on the 
market.
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Facts are obtained on various occasions as beside 
applications and notifications, there exists an abundance 
of other channels to obtain information, e.g. through 
announcements in newspapers, financial press, trade 
journals and, very importantly, the complaints made to the 
Commission by third parties.
For exclusive dealing agreements complaints are generally 
information sources which should not be underrated, when' 
third parties express their grievances about refusal to 
supply certain goods.
On the basis of - sometimes fragmentary - information the 
Commission may pursue the matter further by its own fact­
finding powers. "In practice it is not unknown for their 
(the Commission's) officials to appear at 09.00 at the 
reception desk of your office and request to be given 
access to your filing cabinets and drawers. Of course, this
only happens in a small minority of cases. But it is
429important to keep in mind what can happen." Although m
such dramatic situations there is no entitlement to the
presence of a lawyer, the Commission may nevertheless be
430prepared to wait while one is summoned.
The Commission is generally entitled to obtain information 
under Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17. The officials of 
the Commission are especially authorised
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1 - to examine books and other business records;
- to take copies of extracts from the books and business 
records;
- to ask for oral explanation on the spot;
- to enter any premises; land and means of transport of 
undertakings"
However, within the Commission's right of information
certain documents are privileged (doctrine of privilege)
such as correspondence between a client and an independent
(not staff) lawyer, although it has to be remembered that
this principle applies only to correspondence relating to
the defence of the client after initiation of proceedings
432by the Commission.
The investigation of the Commission can be carried out by 
agreement (Article 14 (1) and (2) of Regulation 17), or can 
be carried out formally (Article 14 (3) of Regulation 17).
If an undertaking does not supply the requested information
requested, the Commission may take a decision under Article
11 (5) of Regulation 17. Failing to comply with such a
decision entails fines for the undertaking concerned
433pursuant to Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 17. A
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decision imposing fines may be challenged under Article 17 
of Regulation 17 (see below).
3. The Decisions of the Commission
(a) "Positive" decisions
(i) Negative clearance
It should introductorily be said that all Decisions of the 
Commission have to be taken subject to the general 
principles of law and fundamental rights as well as in
434accordance with the procedural rules of the Commission.
As Article 2 of Regulation 17 provides that "the
Commission may certify", the Commission has administrative
discretion when delivering the decision. A decision
. . 435granting negative clearance is a final decision.
However, in this context some elements of legal uncertainty 
should not be overlooked.
To begin with, there are the facts to be considered.
Article 2 of Regulation 17 lies down that the Commission 
shall decide "on the basis of the facts in its possession".
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Even if a decision is based on complete information about 
the case, changing circumstances may soon make it worth­
less. Connected thereto is a substantial uncertainty which 
should not be underestimated by the parties, about the 
question as to which changes of circumstances do have and 
do not have effects on the decision. This is all the more 
important as the decision may at any time be reconsidered 
by the Commission. The principle of res judicata does not 
apply to decisions on negative clearance/^ Any com­
plaining person or incidental investigations may convince 
the Commission to re-examine an agreement.
Moreover, the case can be taken up before national courts
in order to review the agreements under EEC Article 85
43 7 .(1). A national court may take the Commission's view
into consideration, but there is no legally binding rule
that the national court should be bound by the Commission's
, . . 438decision.
Another aspect to consider is that the decision granting a
negative clearance under EEC competition law is not likely
to be of great value when stricter provisions of national 
439law apply.
As held by the European Court of Justice in the Perfumes 
cases, the negative clearance will not prevent from 
applying (stricter) national competition law.44 1^
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There is, in addition, the problem of uniformity to be
considered in the decisions of the Commission:
"A decision may at the same time give negative clearance to
one agreement and exemption for another, or, for example,
give negative clearance to one part of a distribution
441system, whilst granting exemption to the remainder."
This quoted critical view seems to neglect the fact that
the Commission stresses the importance of the detailed
economic circumstances in a case-by-case examination,
whereby comparisons of alleged unequal treatment become
difficult. As for the rest, the Commission - as all
authorities - stands committed to the principle of legal 
442certainty.
(ii) Individual exemptions
A second matter to consider relates to decisions granting 
individual exemption under EEC Article 85 (3). A decision 
granting an individual exemption declares the prohibition 
of EEC Article 85 (1) not applicable.
As to all its decisions, the Commission has abide by
443certain procedural requirements.
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If an individual exemption is granted, the nullity of EEC 
Article 85 (2) does not apply; under Article 6 of Regula­
tion 17 the Commission has "to specify the date from which 
the decision shall take effect". Article 8 (1) of Regula­
tion 17 provides that the decision "shall be issued for a
444 .specified period". Under Article 8 (2) the Commission is
empowered to revoke or amend its decision on the basis that
445the requirements of Article 8 (3) (a)-(d) are met.
A decision granting an individual exemption provides the 
parties concerned with more protection than a negative 
clearance.
Firstly, the decision "can be relied on as against a third 
44 6party." Also the Commission is not entitled to re­
examine the agreement; only a revocation or amendment is 
permitted, if the requirements of Article 8 (3) of Regula­
tion 17 are fulfilled.
Secondly, the question arises, if an exemption under EEC 
Article 85 (3) provides protection against stricter pro­
visions of national law or whether the agreement has to
meet both the requirements of Community and national law 
, 447(the so-called double-barrier theory. In this respect,
the status of the individual exemption is still unclear and 
44 8contested. Judging at least from discussion and opinions 
on the matter, it seems that with difference to negative
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clearances, it is not absolutely clear whether stricter 
provisions of national law apply off-hand and shall over­
ride EEC competiton law.
The Commission has explained that national authorities of
the member states are bound to respect Community decisions
and to refrain from applying the stricter standards of 
4 49national law. With respect to block exemptions which 
place certain types of agreements outside the scope of 
application of EEC Article 85 (1), there remain still many 
questions which could be raised. For example how do natio­
nal competition rules which are stricter than EEC com­
petition rules relate to the legal dimensions of block 
exemption when national rules would happen to be stricter 
than the comparable EEC rules.
In recital (19) of Regulation 1984/83 the Commission 
indicates that "the application and enforcement of such 
national laws or measures must therefore be regarded as 
compatible with this Regulation."
It remains, however, unclear why a block exemption, which 
most of all is meant to reduce the administrative expenses 
for a multitude of agreements, but would otherwise require 
individual decisions, should be treated as different from 
an individual exemption.
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With these considerations we will conclude the point 
"individual exemptions" and will turn to the informal 
settlements.
(iii) Informal settlements
The two preceding sections of the present study were on the 
formal ways in which the Commission may deal with an 
agreement.
Beside that, "for many years the Commission has also 
attempted to settle informally cases where parties have 
, applied to it for negative clearance or notified to it for 
individual exemption" .
For exclusive dealing agreements the most relevant form of
451informal settlements are the "comfort letters". As many
hundreds of agreements are notified to the Commission each 
452year , it seems sensible that the Commission attempts to
settle quite a few of them without taking a formal
decision. Instead of taking a formal decision the
Commission often writes a simple letter (a so-called
"comfort-letter") to the parties, informing them that on
the facts in its possession it sees no need to take action
453under EEC competition law.
- 174 -
Recently, the Commission, in addition to "comfort letters", 
has developed a more formal type to enhance the declaratory 
value, hereinafter referred to as a "formal comfort letter".
The comfort letters, however practical they may be for the 
Commission to close a file, involve several problems for 
the parties in question.
Firstly, it should be considered that a comfort letter may 
have thoroughly positive effects for the parties. The 
agreement remains notified, and the protection from fines 
continues under Article 15 (5) of Regulation 17.
However, the legal situation remains unclear including the
application of (stricter) provisions of national law by
. . 454national authorities.
Secondly, it can be said that with reference to a re­
examination by the Commission itself, the general legal
principles of legal certainty and non venire contra factum 
455proprium have to be observed, and reconsideration is to 
be admitted only when there is a material change in circum­
stances or incomplete or wrong information was supplied.
Thirdly, it must be taken into account that the interests 
of third parties are only insufficiently considered.
Under Article 19 (3) of Regulation 17 the Commission is 
bound to publish a summary in the Official Journal of the
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European Communities and give third parties the opportunity 
to be heard. This is not provided when the Commission sends 
a "simple" comfort letter to the parties.
In order to improve the legal quality of the comfort
letters, the Commission recently developed the "formal
comfort letter". This is issued after the publication of a
summary of the agreement in the Official Journal, so that
457third parties have an opportunity to be heard.
However, the problems of stricter provisions of national 
law and the value of a formal comfort letter in a national 
Court proceedings still remain unsolved.
Therefore, the question of the parties being entitled to 
enforce a decision continues to be of substantial 
importance (see section 4 below).
(b) "Negative" decisions relating to the termination of 
infringements; fines.
Article 3 of Regulation 17 empowers the Commission that 
where it finds undertakings acting contrary to EEC Article 
85 or 86 "it may by decision require the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings concerned to bring such 
infringement to an end".
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As we have seen, the Commission has in quite a few cases on
exclusive dealing agreements required the parties to end an
infringement, especially where export bans were in 
458question.
Under Article 3 of Regulation the Commission is also
entitled to order positive measures to terminate the 
4 5 9infringement. In addition to that the Commission "may by 
decision impose on undertakings or associations of under­
takings fines"^^ or periodic penalty payments. In 
several cases referring to exclusive dealing agreements the 
Commission has up to now imposed substantial fines on 
undertakings (see Chapter 5 above); especially export bans 
have been severely punished with a tendency to increase 
amounts of the imposed fines.
With these decisions the infringement proceedings them­
selves have acquired growing importance for exclusive 
dealing agreements.
In the light of this situation, it is, in practice, impe­
rative to submit, especially in cases of doubt, a 
notification under Article 15 (5) of Regulation 17 with the 
benefit that as a result no fines can be imposed.
It can in conclusion be noted that these "negative" 
decisions equally require certain rules of procedure to be 
observed by the Commission.
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(c) Interim decisions
As already pointed out, the question of time may be very 
important for an undertaking which is party to an exclusive 
dealing agreement, as the effective marketing of products 
is involved in the implementation of the agreement. Above 
all, sectors with fast innovation, e.g. the clothing 
industry, electronics industry, are dependent on decisions 
within reasonable time. If the proceedings pend for too 
long, even a positive decision may be without value; but 
the time element is also relevant when the Commission 
initiates infringement proceedings. The sooner an infringe­
ment is ended, the more effective is the decision, as the 
undertaking is not able to gain considerable economic 
benefits from the infringement.
Hence, the question of the Commission being empowered to 
take interim decisions has been the subject of long­
standing debates. In the judgment in Camera Care v 
464Commission the ECJ put an end to the debate when it
held that the Commission has powers to take interim 
measures with relevance to the termination of infringements 
under Article 3 of Regulation 17.
The Commission has since then passed three Decisions on
465interim measures: Ford Werke AG No.l (Interim measures) , 
ECS/AKZO^^ and BBI/Boosey and Hawkes.^^
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Although this approach is commendable, there are never­
theless many more exclusive dealing agreements awaiting a
"positive" decision for granting negative clearance or an
4 6 8individual exemption. In respect of these, the
Commission is entitled to pass only a provisional Decision
under Article 15 (6) of Regulation 17. An interim measure
seeking a favourable decision cannot be taken.
Therefore exclusive dealing agreements depend entirely on
the Commission providing a Decision within a(n)
469(economically) reasonable time.
4. Judicial review by the European Court of Justice: 
the judgments of the European Court of Justice.
(a) General remarks
All decisions giving cause for complaint may be challenged
before the European Court of Justice. Under Article 172 of
the EEC Treaty and Article 17 of Regulation 17, the Court
has unlimited jurisdiction to review a decision, even where
administrative discretion is concerned, the administrative
470discretion can be replaced by the Court's own discretion.
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It should be remarked that for all types of actions there
are certain procedural requirements to be fulfilled, as
e.g. time limits under EEC Article 173 (3), locus standi
under EEC Article 173 (2). The present study will refrain
471from explaining these provisions in detail ; it will 
concentrate on the effects relate to exclusive dealing 
agreements.
(b) Action for annulment: EEC Articles 173, 174
This action applies, as provided by EEC Article 173, to all 
"acts of the Council and the Commission other than re­
commendations of opinions". As a result with respect to 
exclusive dealing agreements, annulment is regularly sought 
for decisions terminating infringements and/or imposing 
fines on the parties in question; but annulment may as well 
be sought for a decision granting an individual exemption,
or refusing an individual exemption or a negative 
473clearance.
An important aspect in this context is the question, 
whether a comfort letter may be challenged, and the 
Commission may thus be forced to take a (formal) decision.
Where a notification is concerned, the Commission would 
deal with it anyhow only on a comfort letter basis, on the
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premises that the parties agree to that, otherwise a
4 74decision will be passed. In cases referring to negative 
clearance, the Commission regularly writes its comfort 
letters, with or without consent of the parties.
On the grounds detailed above, it may for the parties of an 
exclusive dealing agreement be very important, to obtain a 
formal decision and not a comfort letter. The comfort
letters are, as shown by the Court's decision in the
47 5 .e"Perfumes" Cases , usually not looked upon as "acts" of
the Commission.476
This does not seem to be unproblematic in the light of the 
judgment of the European Court of Justice in IBM v 
Commission , where the ECJ held on the definition of acts:
"Any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and
capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing
about a distinct change in his legal postition is an act or
decision which may be object of an action under Article 713 for a
477declaration that it is void".
It has already been mentioned that even the comfort letters 
are in a way binding (e.g. under the principle of legal 
certainty), and effect even considerable changes in the 
legal position of the parties concerned, or third parties 
who are, where simple comfort letters are in question, 
deprived of a right to be heard. It is thus it is not 
perfectly understandable why comfort letters should not be
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considered as legally relevant acts, all the more when they 
may implicitly or otherwise inspire certain legally rele­
vant conclusions with possible effects on the rights and 
obligations of known or unknown parties, while depriving an 
applicant or third parties from a right to challenge them 
and to be heard on them.^*^
It remains to be seen how in this respect the European 
Court of Justice will develop its practice.
(c) Action for failure to act (EEC Article 175)
Whereas EEC Articles 172 and 173 enable actions against
acts of the Commision, EEC Article 175 provides for an
action against the Commission's failure to act. With
reference to exclusive dealing agreements it is important
to examine whether the Commission can be obligated to
continue proceedings up to the stage of a final decision.
As shown above, this point is especially relevant where
479comfort letters are concerned. In GEMA v Commission the 
ECJ made a general statement that under Article 3 of 
Regulation 17 neither the parties of the agreement nor 
third party are authorised to obtain a final decision from 
the Commission; but under Article 2 of the Regulation 17 a 
different legal reasoning may apply.
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In Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission^^ the ECJ has indicated 
that, if Hoffmann-La Roche had wanted to know its position 
under EEC Articles 85 and 86, it should have applied for a 
negative clearance under Article 2 of Regulation 17. This 
decision is important for exclusive dealing agreements, 
when a negative clearance is sought. Important is also the 
question whether the Commission can be obligated to pass a 
formal decision instead of sending a comfort letter.
There is thusfar no definite decision on this point.
The obligation of the Commission to issue a final decision 
instead of sending a comfort letter is not altogether 
clear, in spite of the stipulation in EEC Article 175 that 
the Commission by not acting, may commit an "infringement 
of (the) Treaty". Nor is it yet clear how far the Court 
will develop its practice as found in Hoffmann-La Roche. 
Although it would be of much advantage for the parties of 
agreements and third parties (e.g. those who are not 
supplied with the goods they request), the obligation of 
the Commission to pass on to a final decision is currently 
"still in doubt, but highly unlikely".4*^
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(d) Interim relief
When considering actions brought before the Court of 
Justice, it is important to emphasise that under EEC 
Article 185 they are not to have suspensory effects. This 
is relevant especially where fines are imposed as extra­
ordinary expenses for the undertakings.
Under EEC Article 185, 2 "the Court of Justice may, 
however, if it considers that circumstances so require, 
order that application of the contested act be suspended". 
And EEC Article 186 provides that "the Court of Justice may 
in any cases before it prescribe any necessary interim 
measures". These provisions empower the Court to provide 
interim measures, but there is a substantial limitation.
The Court can only provide these measures in a case that is 
already pending.
In respect of exclusive dealing agreements it has the 
effect that the parties cannot go directly to the ECJ for a 
decision, e.g. on a comfort letter, as these interim 
measures can only be sought when a case is already pending. 
Thus, interim measures do not grant relief also in cases 
where the Commission's Decision is requiring too much time. 
However, they may prove to be useful in cases, where the 
court proceedings require considerable time.
482
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Before the establishment of a Court of First Instance, 
cases were pending for a longer time and the duration of 
proceedings was increasing. This is explained, among other 
reasons, also by the increasing number of cases brought 
before the Court.
In 1953 were four in 1973 already 192 cases were
• 4.-+. 4.  ^ 483instituted.
The following graphs show recent developments:
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General trend in the number of cases 
brought, decided and pending
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In order to improve the situation, the Single European 
484Act provides for the establishment of a Court of First 
Instance (already in action since October 1989) :
"The second court must ease the workload of the EC’s
current Court of Justice, which has a backlog of cases,
485many of which wait up to 22 month for a final ruling."
However, the European Community agreed to keep dumping
cases out of the second Court's jurisdiction, thus "the new
12-judge court will handle other unfair competition cases,
disputes over state subsidies to ailing industries, steel
4 86output and EC staff cases."
It is to be expected that the exclusive dealing agreements
too will benefit from the new Court and from expedited 
487proceedings.
5. Enforcement of the decisions of the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice
In order to complete the procedural review the present 
study includes also the enforcement of the decisions.
Concerning the enforceability of the decisions of the 
Commission, Article 192 of the EEC Treaty provides:
"Decisions of the Council or of the Carmission which inpose a 
pecuniary obligation on persons other than states shall be 
enforceable. Enforcement shall be governed by the rules of civil 
procedure in force of the state in the territory of which it is 
carries out ..."
From this provision the conclusion can be drawn that only 
decisions imposing a pecuniary obligation are enforceable. 
It can furthermore be concluded that other decisions, e.g. 
under Article 3 of Regulation 17, are not enforceable.
The enforceability of decisions enhances the importance of 
the Commission power to impose fines on the undertakings 
concerned.
As to the enforceability of judgments of the European Court 
of Justice, the same principles prevail, as EEC Article 187 
provides that the judgments of the Court are enforceable 
pursuant to EEC Article 192.
Therefore, the power to impose fines is an important 
measure in order to enforce European competition law.
This aspect has been considered by the European Court of 
Justice too. It has emphasised the function of fines as 
deterrents and ruled:
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"Article 15 of Regulation 17 does not limit the impostition of 
fines exclusively to cases of recurrence of infringements already 
found to have taken place and forbidden by the Conmission under 
Article 3. Such limitation of Article 15 would considerable reduce 
the deterrent effect of fines"
4 89This view was developed further in Pioneer , where it was 
held that the Commission must ensure the necessary 
deterrent effect of the measures, especially where infringe­
ments, particularly harmful to the competition principles 
of the Community, are concerned. Taking these points into 
consideration, the Commission has continued to rise the 
amounts of imposed fines.
With respect to exclusive dealing agreements, substantial
j-. . j  • -r u  490, (two million ECU) ,fines were imposed m  John Deere '
4 91 4 9 2Tipp-Ex (40 0,0 00 and 10,000 ECU), and Sandoz (80 0,00 0
ECU) .
It is noteworthy that these decisions all deal with export 
bans and the prevention of parallel imports, showing once 
more the great importance which both the ECJ and the 
Commission attach to the unobstructed movement of goods 
between the member states.
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P A R T  III
CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions
Trends in EEC competition law with reference to exclusive 
dealing agreements; adaptation to economic circumstances; 
time reguired for decision taking by the Commission and the 
European Court of Justice; is the current system satis­
factory?
An objective the European Community is to ensure the
economic and social progress of the member states by
removing national barriers and by instituting an integrated 
492Common Market. In this framework the Commission
emphasises the important function and responsibility of
competition policy, to ensure the complete opening of the
markets (free movement of goods) and generating the
493expected economic effects.
Thus, with respect to competition policy, the principle
purpose of competition law, especially "of Articles 85 and
49486, is to serve as instruments of market integration."
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The decisions mentioned earlier in the present study show 
that, in exclusive dealing agreements, the Commission found 
especially clauses obstructing parallel imports and im­
posing export bans as being contrary to EEC Article 85, and 
contrary to the purpose of an integrated Common market. The 
Commission has from the beginning pursued the principle
that export bans are not to be tolerated, as recently in
495 .Sandoz , as a good example to illustrate vividly this
point.
The decisions refer not only to substantive law, but are 
also to be considered in repect of procedural law.
Where the latter is concerned, the decisions show that the 
Commission is determined to pursue their purposes not only 
by Decisions under Article 3 of Regulation 17, but also 
under Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 17 to make them, 
wherever necessary, enforceable; the Commission explains 
its practice (especially with respect to the integrated 
Common Market in 19 92) with emphasis.
The position of the Commission towards export bans has 
throughout found the approval of the European Court of 
Justice. The ECJ has adopted an equally determined 
attitude. Moreover, in the judgments of the European Court 
of Justice, a distinct line of continuity can be made out.
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As to export bans and territorial restricitions we may 
assume that as the Common Market is not yet fully 
integrated, firms may be tempted to indulge in such bans 
and restrictions; but we may ask whether they will continue 
to do so after 199 2, when the internal market is expected 
to be completed. The view of the EEC authorities is suf­
ficiently clear, and the infringing undertakings are in 
general no SMEs lacking adequate legal and other
information. The prevailing situation can only be inter­
preted in terms that the infringing undertakings derive not 
unimportant economic benefits by agreed restrictions, to 
the point of inducing them to risk even more and more 
substantial fines.
With this and the establishment of the single integrated 
European market in 19 9 2 in mind, we may consider as ap­
propriate the determination of the EEC authorities to 
increase the amounts of fines in order to enhance the 
deterrent effects (and thus remove the economic profits).
Similarly harmful to competition have been, in the eyes of 
the Commission and the ECJ, exclusive distribution systems 
containing resale maintenance clauses.
These also have been uniformly found to be infringing EEC
49 6Article 85 (1), as the decision in Hennessy/Henke11 m
recent times shows. However, in respect of other re­
strictions on resale, the EEC authorites take a
- 193 -
comparatively liberal view, as e.g. the new block 
exemptions indicate.
The same may in general also be said for the selective 
distribution systems, although the Commission is closely 
scrutinising to see whether the selective distribution 
system is necessary for the marketing of the goods in 
question.
This approach has been evolved in the past and developed
further in recent decisions, as e.g. in Grohe and Ideal- 
497Standard , but also in such decisions dealing with 
restrictions on resale, it can be observed that the 
Commission's attitude became quickly negative, when the 
selective distribution systems were abused and the re­
strictions effected export bans or similar infringements of 
competition law.
When reviewing these trends, and decisions delivered by the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice, it should not 
be disregarded that both authorities in a case-by-case 
examination closely take the economic circumstances and 
their effects into consideration. This manner of proceeding 
has led on the one hand to large fines for large corporate 
entities, e.g. Sandoz (above), but, on the other hand, to 
alleviations for SMEs struggling to keep their competitive­
ness.
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With regard to policy towards SMEs the trend has been to 
the effect that because of their important role within the 
competition system of the EEC, the Commission has 
intensified its efforts to improve the competitive position 
of the SMEs.
Having ascertained that one of the SMEs1 main problems has 
been the lack of adequate information, the Commission has 
tried to improve the situation and continues to do so.
A further problem concering all undertakings, the time 
problem, has been recognised as such by the EEC 
authorities.
It is essential to recall that the effectiveness of 
competition law, and connected thereto competition policy, 
depends above all upon the time requested for decision 
taking. This applies to decisions of both the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice.
The time factor is relevant for the parties of the agree­
ment as well, for the termination of infringements.
Pending a decision, the parties of the agreeement do not 
have the necessary legal certainty which they need for the 
marketing of their products, while the infringing parties
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continue to benefit from their unlawful behaviour. The 
developments show that the EEC authorities are aware of 
these problems. As a measure indirectly related thereto, 
the Commission has issued several new block exemptions in 
order to reduce the need for individual notifications and 
applications.
At the level of judicial matters, the establishment of the 
new Court of First Instance is expected to reduce the 
workload of the ECJ. However, with 1992 approaching even 
more cases may come up with aspects relating to EEC 
competition law, as more undertakings will expend into 
transfrontier bi- or multi-lateral marketing.
Itthus remains to be seen whether the adopted measures will 
really lead to shorter time periods required for the 
decision taking.
It may otherwise become inevitable to enlarge the relevant 
EEC authorites in order to endow the Community citizens 
after 1992 with a functioning competition law capable to 
ensure fair competition in an integrated common market.
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A P P E N D I X  2
EEC ARTICLE 85
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market: all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and con­
certed practices which may affect trade between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the commom market, and in particular those 
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling 
prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical 
development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent trans­
actions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to 
this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be 
declared inapplicable in the case of,
any agreement or category of agreements between 
undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associa­
tions of undertakings;
any concerted practice or category of concerted 
practies;
which contributes to improving the production or 
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a sub­
stantial part of the products in question.
- 249 -
A P P E N D I X  3
REGULATIONS
(Excerpts)
REGULATION 17/62
Article 1.
Basic provision.
Without prejudice to Articles 6, 7 and 23 of this 
Regulation, agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
of the kind described in Article 85 (1) of the Treaty and 
the abuse of a dominant position in the market, within the 
meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, shall be prohibited, 
no prior decision to that effect being required.
Article 2.
Negative clearance.
Upon application by the undertakings or associations 
of undertakings concerned, the Commission may certify that, 
on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no 
grounds under Article 85 (1) or Article 86 of the Treaty 
for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision 
or practice.
Article 3.
Termination of infringements.
1. Where the Commission, upon application or upon its 
own initiative, finds that there is infringement of Article 
85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by decision require 
the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned 
to bring such infringement to an end.
2. Those entitled to make application are:
(a) Member States;
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate 
interest.
3. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Regulation, the Commission may, before taking a decision 
under paragraph (1) adress the undertakings or associaitons 
of undertakings concerned recommendations for termination 
of the infringement.
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Article 4.
Notification of new agreements, decisions and practices.
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of 
the kind described in Article 85(1) of the Treaty which 
come into existence after the entry into force of this 
Regulation and in respect of which the parties seek ap­
plication of Article 85(3) must be notified to the Com­
mission. Until they have been notified, no decision in
application of Article 85(3) may be taken.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply to agreements, de­
cisions or concerted parctices where:
(1) the only parties thereto are undertakings from 
one Member State and the agreements, decisions or 
practices do not relate either to imports or to 
exports between Member States;
(2) not more than two undertakings are party thereto, 
and the agreements only:
(a) restrict the freedom of one party to the
contract in determining the prices or
conditions of business upon which the goods 
which he has obtained from the other party 
to the contract may be resold; or
(b) impose restrictions on the exercise of the
rights of the assignee or user of industrial 
property rights - in particular patents, 
utility models, designs or trade marks - or 
of the person entitled under a contract to 
the assignment, or grant, of the right to 
use a method of manufacture or knowledge 
relating to the use and to the application 
of industrial processes;
(3) they have as their sole object:
(a) the development or uniform application of
standards or types; or
(b) joint research and development;
(c) specialisation in the manufacture of products, 
including agreements necessary for achieving 
this,
where the products which are the subject of 
specialisation do not, in a substantial part 
of the common market, represent more than 15 
per cent of the volume of business done in 
identical products or those considered by 
consumers to be similar by reason of their 
characteristics, price and use, and 
- where the total annual turnover of the
participating undertakings does not exceed 
200 million units of account.
These agreements, decisions and practices may be notified 
to the Commission.
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Article 5.
Notification of existing agreements, decisions an practices.
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of 
the kind described in Article 85(1) of the Treaty which are 
in existence at the date of entry into force of this 
Regulation and in respect of which the parties seek ap­
plication of Article 85(3) shall be notified to the Com­
mission before 1 November 19 62. However, notwithstanding 
the foregoing provisions, any agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices to which not more than two undertakings 
are party shall be notified before 1 February 1963.
2. Pargraph 1 shall not apply to agreements, decisions 
or concerted practices falling within Article 4(2); these 
may be notified to the Commission.
REGULATION 1983/83
On Application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Exclusive Distribution Agreements
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community,
Having regard to Council Regulation 19/65 of March 2, 
19 65 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices, 
as last amended by the Act of Accession of Greece, and in 
particular Article 1 thereof,
Having published a draft of this Regulation,
Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive 
Practices and Dominant Positions,
(1) Whereas Regulation No. 19/65/EEC empowers the 
Commission to apply Article (5 (3) of the Treaty 
by regulation to certain categories of bilateral 
exclusive distribution agreements and analogous 
concerted practices falling within Article 85(1);
(2) Whereas experience to date makes it possible to 
define a category of agreements and concerted 
parctices which can be regarded as normally 
satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 
85(3) ;
(3) Whereas exclusive distribution agreements of the 
category defined in Article 1 of this Regulation 
may fall within the prohibition contained in 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty; whereas this will 
apply only in exceptional cases to exclusive 
agreements of this kind to which only under­
takings from one Member State are party and which 
concern the resale of goods within that Member
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State; whereas, however, to the extent that such 
agreements may affect trade between Member States 
and also satisfy all the requirements set out in 
this Regulation there is no reason to withhold 
from them the benefit of the exemption by cat­
egory;
(4) Whereas it is not necessary expressly to exclude 
from the defined category those agreements which 
do not fulfil the conditions of Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty;
(5) Wereas exclusive distribution agreements lead in 
general to an improvement in distribution because 
the undertaking is able to concentrate its sales 
activities, does not need to maintain numerous 
business relations with a larger number of 
dealers and is able, by dealing with only one 
dealer, to overcome more easily distribution 
difficulties in international trade resulting 
from linguistic, legal and other differences;
(6) Whereas exclusive distribution agreements facil­
itate the promotion of sales of a product and 
lead to intensive marketing and to continuity of 
sales of a product and lead to intensive market­
ing and to continuity of supplies while at the 
same time rationalising distribution: whereas 
they stimulate competition between the products 
of differnt manufacturers; whereas the appoint­
ment of an exclusive distributor who will take 
over sales promotion, customer services and 
carrying of stocks is often the most effective 
way, and sometimes indeed the only way, for the 
manufacturer to enter a market and compete with 
other manufacturers already present; whereas this 
is particularly so in the case of small and 
medium-sized undertakings; whereas it must be 
left to the contracting parties to decide whether 
and to what extent they consider it desirable to 
incorporate in the agreements terms providing for 
the promotion of sales;
(7) Whereas, as a rule, such exclusive distribution 
agreements also allow consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit as they gain directly from 
the impovement in distribution, and their econ­
omic and supply position is improved as they can 
obtain products manufactured in particular in 
other countries more quickly and more easily;
(8) Whereas this Regulation must define the obliga­
tions restricting competition which may be 
included in exclusive distribution agreements; 
whereas the other restrictions on competition 
allowed under this Regulation in addition to the 
exclusive supply obligation produce a clear
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division of functions between the parties and 
compel the exclusive distributor to concentrate 
his sales efforts on the contract goods and the 
contract territory; whereas they are, where they 
are agreed only for the duration of the agree­
ment, generally necessary in order to attain the 
improvement in the distribution of goods sought 
through exclusive distribution; whereas it may be 
left to the contracting parties to decide which 
of these obligations they include in their 
agreements; whereas further restrictive obliga­
tions and in particular those which limit the 
exclusive distributor's choice of customers or 
his freedom tho determine his prices and con­
ditions of sale cannot be exempted under this 
Regulation;
(9) Whereas the exemption by category should be 
reserved for agreements for which it can be 
assumed with sufficient certainty that they 
satisfy the conditions of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty;
(10) Whereas it is not possible, in the absence of a 
case-by-case examination, to consider that 
adequate improvements in distribution occur where 
a manufacturer entrusts the distribution of his 
goods to another manufacturer with whom he is in 
competition; whereas such agreements should, 
therefore, be excluded form the exemption by 
category; whereas certain derogations from this 
rule in favour of small and medium-sized under­
takings can be allowed;
(11) Whereas consumers will be assured of a fair share 
of the benefits possible; whereas agreements 
relating to goods which the user can obtain only 
from the exclusive distributor should therefore 
be excluded from the exemption by category; 
whereas the parties cannot be allowed to abuse 
industrial property rights or other rights in 
order to create absolute territorial protection; 
whereas this does not prejudice the relationship 
between competition law and industrial property 
rights, since the sole object here is to de­
termine the conditions for exemption by category;
(12) Whereas, since competition at the distribution 
stage is ensured by the possibility of parallel 
imports, the exclusive distribution agreements 
covered by this Regulation will not normally 
afford any possibility of eliminating competition 
in respect of a substantial part of the products 
in question; whereas this is also true of agree­
ments that allot to the exclusive distributor a
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contract territory covering the whole of the 
common market;
(13) Whereas, in particular cases in which agreements 
or concerted practices satisfying the require­
ments of this Regulation nevertheless have 
effects incompatible with Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty, the Commission may withdraw the benefit 
of the exemption by category from the under­
takings party to them;
(14) Whereas agreements and concerted practices which 
satisfy the conditions set out in this Regulation 
need not be notified; whereas an undertaking may 
nonetheless in a particular case where real doubt 
exists, request the Commission to declare whether 
its agreements comply with this Regulation;
(15) Whereas this Regulation does not affect the 
applicability of Commission Regulation (EEC)
No. 360/82 of 23 December 1982 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
specialisation agreements, whereas it does not 
exclude the application of Article 86 of the 
Treaty.
Has adopted this regulation:
Article 1.
Pusuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and subject to 
the provisions of this Regulation, it is hereby declared 
that Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agree­
ments to which only two undertakings are party and whereby 
one party agrees with the other to supply certain goods for 
resale within the whole or a defined area of the common 
market only to that other.
Article 2.
1. Apart from the obligation referred to in Article 1 
no restriction on competition shall be imposed on the 
supplier other than the obligation not to supply the 
contract goods to users in the contract territory.
2. No restriction on competition shall be imposed on 
the exclusive distributor other than:
(a) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute goods 
which compete with the contract goods;
(b) the obligation to obtain the contract goods for resale 
only from the other party;
(c) the obligation to refrain, outside the contract 
territory and in relation to the contract goods, from 
seeking customers, from establishing any branch, and 
from maintaining any distribution depot.
3. Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding that the 
exclusive distributor undertakes all or any of the follow­
ing obligations:
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(a) to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum 
quantities;
(b) to sell the contract goods under trademarks, or packed 
and present as specified by the other party;
(c) to make measures for promotion of sales, in par­
ticular :
to advertise,
to maintain a sales network or stock of goods, 
to provide customer and guarantee services, 
to employ staff having specialised or technical 
training.
Article 3.
Article 1 shall not apply where:
(a) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are 
considered by users as equaivalent in view of their 
characteristics, price and intended use enter into 
reciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between 
themselves in respect of such goods;
(b) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are 
considered by users as equivalent in view of their 
characteristics, price and intended use enter into a 
non-reciprocal exclusive distribution agreement 
between themselves in respect of such goods unless at 
least one of them has a total annual turnover of no 
more than 100 million ECU;
(c) users can obtain the contract goods in the contract 
territory only from the exclusive distributor and have 
no alternative source of supply outside the contract 
territory;
(d) one or both of the parties makes it difficult for 
intermediaries or users to obtain the contract goods 
from other dealers inside the common market or, in so 
far as no alternative source of supply is available 
there, from outside the common market, in particular 
where one or both of them:
1. exercises industrial property rights so as to 
prevent dealers or users form obtaining outside, 
or from selling in, the contract territory 
properly marked or otherwise properly marketed 
contract goods;
2. exercises other rights or take other measures so
as to prevent dealers or users from obtaining 
outside, or from selling in, the contract 
territory contract goods.
Article 4.
1. Article 3(a) and (b) shall also apply where the 
goods there referred to are manufactured by an undertaking 
connected with a party to the agreement.
2. Connected undertakings are:
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(a) undertakings in which a party to the agreement, 
directly or indirectly:
owns more than half the capital or business 
assets, or
has the power to exercise more than half the 
voting rights, or
has the power to appoint more than half the 
members of the supervisory board, board of 
directors or bodies legally representing the 
undertaking, or
has the right to manage the affairs;
(b) undertakings which directly or indirectly have in or 
over a party to the agreement the rights or powers 
listed in (a).
3. Undertakings in which the parties to the agreement 
or undertakings connected with them jointly have the rights 
or powers set out in paragrah 2(a) shall be considered to 
be connected with each of the parties to the agreement.
Article 5.
1. For the purpose of Article 3(b), the ECU is the 
unit of account used for drawing up the budget of the 
Community persuant to Articles 207 and 209 of the Treaty.
2. Article 1 shall remain applicable where during any 
period of two consecutive financial years the total turn­
over referred to in Article 3 (b) is exceeded by no more 
than 10 per cent.
3. For the purpose of calculating total turnover 
within the meaning of Article 3 (b), the turnovers achieved 
during the last financial year by the party to the agree­
ment and connected undertakings in respect of all goods and 
services, excluding all taxes and other duties, shall be 
added together. For this purpose, no account shall be taken 
of dealings between the parties to the agreement or between 
these undertakings and undertakings connected with them or 
between the connected undertakings.
Article 6.
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this Regulation, 
pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC, when it 
finds in a particular case that an agreement which is 
exempted by this Regulation nevertheless has certain 
effects which are incompatible with the conditions set out 
in Article 85(3) of the Treaty, and in particular where;
(a) the contract goods are not subject, in the contract 
territory, to effective competition from identical 
goods considered by users as equivalent in view of 
their characteristics, price and intended use;
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(b) access by other suppliers to the different stages of 
distribution within the contract territory is made 
diffcult to a significant extent;
(c) for reasons other than those referred to in Article
3 (c) and (d) it is not possible for intermediaries or 
users to obtain supplies of the contract goods from 
dealers outside the contract territory on the terms 
there customary;
(d) the exclusive distributor:
1. without any objectively justified reason refuses 
to supply in the contract territory categories of 
purchasers who cannot obtain contract goods 
elsewhere on suitable terms or applies to them 
differing prices or conditions of sale;
2. sells the contract goods at excessively high 
prices.
Article 7.
In the period 1 July 19 83 to 31 December 19 86, the pro­
hibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to 
agreements which were in force on 1 July 1983 or entered 
into force between 1 July and 31 December 19 8 3 and which 
satisfy the exemption conditions of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC.
(The provisions of the proceeding paragraph shall 
apply in the same way to agreements which were in force on 
the date of accession of the Kingdom of Spain and of the 
Portuguese Republic and which, as a result of accession 
fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.)
Anendment.
The second para, was added by the Act of Accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of Portugal, Annex I (iv)
(10) .
Article 8.
This Regulation shall not apply to agreements entered into 
for the resale of drinks in premises used for the sale and 
consumption of beer or for the resale of petroleum products 
in service stations.
Article 9.
This Regulation shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
concerted practices of the type defined in Article 1.
Article 10.
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 Juli 19 83. 
It shall expire on 31 December 1997.
Done at Brussels, 22 June 1983.
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REGULATION 1984/83
On Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of
exclusive purchasing agreements
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community,
Having regard to Council Regulation 19/65 of March 2,
19 65 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices, 
as last amended by the Act of Accession of Greece, and in 
particular Article 1 thereof,
Having published a draft of this Regulation,
Having consulted the Advisory Committe on Restrictive 
Parctices and Dominant Positions.
(1) Whereas Regulation No. 19/65/EEC empowers the 
Commission to apply Article 85(3) of the Treaty by 
regulation to certain categories of bilateral ex­
clusive purchasing agreements entered into for the 
purpose of the resale of goods and corresponding 
concerted practices falling within Article 85;
(2) Whereas experience to date makes it possible to define 
three categories of agreements and concerted practices 
which can be regardet as normally satisfying the 
conditions laid down in Article 85(3); whereas the 
first category comprises exclusive purchasing agree­
ments of short and medium duration in all sectors of 
the economy; whereas the other tow categories comprise 
long-term exclusive purchasing agreements entered into 
for the resale of beer in premises used for the sale 
and consumption (beer supply agreements) and of 
petroleum products in filling stations (service- 
station agreements);
(3) Whereas exclusive purchasing agreemenst of the cate­
gories defined in this Regulation may fall within the 
prohibition contained in Article 85(1) of the Treaty; 
whereas this will often bei the case with agreements 
concluded between undertakings form different Member 
States; whereas an exclusive purchasing agreement to 
which undertakings from only one Member State are 
party and which concerns the resale of goods within 
that Member State may also be caught by the pro­
hibition; whereas this is in particular the case where 
it is one of a number of similar agreements which 
together may affect trade between Member States;
(4) Whereas it is not necessary expressly to exclude from 
the defined categories those agreements which do not 
fulfil the conditions of Article 85(1) of the Treaty;
(5) Whereas the exclusive purchasing agreements defined in 
this Regulation lead in general to an improvement in
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distribution; whereas they enable the supplier to plan 
the sales of his goods with greater precision and for 
a longer period and ensure that the reseller's re­
quirements will be met on a regular basis for the 
duration of the agreement; whereas this allows the 
parties to limit the risk to them of variations in 
market conditions and to lower distribution costs;
(6) Whereas such agreements also facilitate the promotion 
of the sales of a product and lead to intensive 
marketing because the supplier, in consideration of 
the exclusive purchasing obligation, is as a rule 
under an obligation to contribute to the improvement 
of the structure of the distribution network, the 
quality of the promotional effort or the sales 
success; whereas, at the same time, they stimulate 
competition between the products of different manu­
facturers;
whereas the appointment of several resellers, who are 
bound to purchase exclusively from the manufacturer 
and who take over sales promotion, customer services 
and carrying of stock, is often the most effective 
way, and sometimes the only way, for the manufacturer 
to penetrate a market and compete with other manu­
facturers already present; whereas this is particular­
ly so in the case of small and medium-sized under­
takings;
whereas it must be left to the contracting parties to 
decide whether and to what extent they consider it 
desirable to incorporate in their agreements terms 
concerning the promotion of sales;
(7) Whereas, as a rule, exclusive purchasing agreements 
between suppliers and resellers also allow consumers a 
fair share of the resulting benefit as they gain the 
advantages of regular supply and are able to obtain 
the contract goods more quickly and more easily;
(8) Whereas this Regulation must define the obligations 
restricting competition which may be included in an 
exclusive purchasing agreement; whereas the other 
restrictions of competition allowed under this Regu­
lation in addition to the exclusive purchasing obli­
gation lead to a clear division of functions between 
the parties and compel the reseller to concentrate his 
sales efforts on the contract goods; whereas they are, 
where they are agreed only for the duration of the 
agreement, generally necessary in order to attain the 
improvement in the distribution of goods sought 
through exclusive purchasing; whereas further re­
strictive obligations and in particular those which 
limit the reseller's choice of customers or his 
freedom to determine his prices and conditions of sale 
cannot be exempted under this Regulation;
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(9) Whereas the exemption by categories should be reserved 
for agreements of which it can be assumed with 
sufficient certainty that they satisfy the conditions 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty;
(10) Whereas it is not possible, in the absence of a 
case-by-case examination, to consider that adequate 
improvements in distribution occur where a manu­
facturer imposes an exclusive purchasing obligation 
with respect to his goods on a manufacturer with whom 
he is in competition; whereas such agreements should, 
therefore, be excluded from the exemption by cate­
gories; whereas certain derogations from this rule in 
favour of small and medium-sized undertakings can be 
allowed;
(11) Whereas certain conditions must be attached to the 
exemption by categories so that access by other 
undertakings to the different stages of distribution 
can be ensured; whereas, to this end, limits must be 
set to the scope and to the duration of the exclusive 
purchasing obligation; whereas it appears appropriate 
as a general rule to grant the benefit of a general 
exemption from the prohibition on restrictive agree­
ments only to exclusive purchasing agreements which 
are concluded for a specified product or range of 
products and for not more than five years;
(12) Whereas, in the case of beer supply agreements and 
service-station agreements, different rules should be 
laid down which take account of the particularities of 
the markets in question;
(13) Whereas these agreements are generally distinguished 
by the fact that, on the one hand, the supplier 
confers on the reseller special commercial or 
financial advantages by contributing to his financing, 
granting him or obtaining for him a loan on favourable 
terms, equipping him with a site or premises for 
conducting his business, providing him with equipment 
or fittings, or undertaking other investments for his 
benefit and that, on the other hand, the reseller 
enters into a long-term exclusive purchasing obli­
gation which in most cases is accompanied by a ban on 
dealing in competing products;
(14) Whereas beer supply and service-station agreements, 
like the other exclusive purchasing agreements dealt 
with in this Regulation, normally produce an 
appreciable improvement in distribution in which 
consumers are allowed a fair share of the resulting 
benefit;
(15) Whereas the commercial and financial advantages 
conferred by the supplier on the reseller make it 
significantly easier to establish, modernize, maintain 
and operate premises used for the sale and consumption 
of drinks and service stations; whereas the exclusive
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purchasing obligation and the ban on dealing in 
competing products imposed on the reseller incite the 
reseller to devote all the resources at his disposal 
to the sale of the contract goods; whereas such 
agreements lead to durable cooperation between the 
parties allowing them to improve or maintain the 
quality of the contract goods and of the services to 
the customer and sales efforts of the reseller; 
whereas they allow long-term planning of sales and 
consequently a cost effective organisation of pro­
duction and distribution; whereas the pressure of 
competition between products of different makes 
obliges the undertakings involved to determine the 
numer and character of premises used for the sale and 
consumption of drings and service stations, in accord­
ance wiht the wishes of customers;
(16) Whereas consumers benefit from the improvements 
described, in particular because they are ensured 
supplies of goods of satisfactory quality at fair 
prices and conditions while being able to choose 
between the products of different manufacturers;
(17) Whereas the advantages produced by beer supply agree­
ments and service-station agreements cannot otherwise 
be secured to the same extent and with the same degree 
of certainty; whereas the exclusive purchasing obli­
gation on the reseller and the non-competition clause 
imposed on him are essential components of such 
agreements and thus usually indispensable for the 
attainment of these advantages; whereas, however, this 
is true only as long as the reseller's obligation to 
purchase from the supplier ist confined in the case of 
premises used for the sale and consumption of drings 
to beers and other drings of the types offered by the 
supplier, and in the case of service stations to 
petroleum-base fuel for motor vehicles and other 
petroleum-base fuels; whereas the exclusive purchasing 
obligation for lubricants and related prtroleum-based 
products can be accepted only on condition that the 
supplier provides for the reseller or finances the 
procurement of specific equipment for the carrying out 
of lubrication work; whereas this obligation should 
only relate to products intended for use within the 
service-station;
(18) Whereas, in order to maintain the reseller's com­
mercial freedom and ot ensure access to the retail 
level of distribution on the part of other suppliers, 
not only the scope but also the duration of the 
exclusive purchasing obligation must be limited; 
whereas it appears appropriate to allow drinks sup­
pliers a choice between a medium-term exclusive 
purchasing agreement covering a range of drinks and a 
long-term exclusive purchasing agreement for beer;
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whereas it is necessary to provide special rules for 
those premises used for the sale and consumption of 
drinks which the supplier lets to the reseller; 
whereas, in this case, the reseller must have the 
right to obtain, under the conditions specified in 
this Regulation, other drinks, except beer, supplied 
under the agreement or of the same type but bearing a 
different trademark; whereas a uniform maximum 
duration should be provided for service-station 
agreements, with the exception of tenancy agreements 
between the supplier and the reseller, which takes 
account of the long-term character of the relationship 
between the parties;
(19) Whereas to the extent that Member States provide, by 
law or administrative measures, for the same upper 
limit of duration for the exclusive purchasing obli­
gation upon the reseller as in service-sttion agree­
ments laid down in this Regulation but provide for a 
permissible duration which varies in proportion to the 
consideration provided by the supplier or generally 
provide for a shorter duration than that permitted by 
this Regulation, such laws or measures are not con­
trary to the objectives of this Regulation which, in 
this respect, merely sets an upper limit to the 
duration of service-station agreements; whereas the 
application and enforcement of such national laws or 
measures must therefore be regarded as compatibel with 
the provisions of this Regulation;
(2 0) Whereas the limitations and conditions provided for in 
this Regulation are such as to guarantee effective 
competition on the markets in question; whereas, 
therefore, the agreements to which the exemption by 
category applies do not normally enable the parti­
cipating undertakings to eliminate competition for a 
substantial part of the products in question;
(21) Whereas, in particular cases in which agreements or 
concerted practices satisfying the conditions of this 
Regulation nevertheless have effects incompatibel with 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty, in Commission may with­
draw the benefit of the exemption by category from the 
undertakings party thereto;
(22) Whereas agreements and concerted practices which 
satisfy the conditions set out in this Regulation need 
not be notified; whereas an undertaking may none­
theless, in a particular case where real doubt exists, 
request the Commission to declare whether its agree­
ments comply with this Regulation;
(23) Whereas this Regulation does not affect the applica­
bility of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 3604/82 of 
23 December 1982 on the application of Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of specialisation
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agreements; whereas it does not exclude the ap­
plication of Article 86 of the Treaty;
Has adopted this regulation:
Article 1.
Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty, and subject 
to the conditions set out in Articles 2 to 5 of this 
Regulation, it is hereby declared that Article 85(1) of the 
Treaty shall not apply to agreements to which only two 
undertakings are party and whereby one party, the reseller, 
agrees with the other, the supplier, to purchase certain 
goods specified in the agreement of resale only from the 
supplier or from a connected undertaking or from another 
undertaking which the supplier has entrusted with the sale 
of his goods.
Article 2.
1. No other, restriction of competition shall be 
imposed on the supplier than the obligation not to distri­
bute the contract goods or goods which compete with the 
contract goods in the reseller's pricipal sales area and at 
the reseller's level of distribution.
2. Apart from the obligation described in Article 1, 
no other restriction of competition shall be imposed on the 
reseller than the obligation not to manufacture or distri­
bute goods which compete with the contract goods.
3.Article 1 shall apply notwithstanding hat the 
reseller undertakes any or all of the following obli­
gations:
(a) to purchase complete ranges of goods;
(b) to purchase minimum quantities of goods which are 
subject to the exclusive purchasing obligation;
(c) to sell the contract goods under trademarks, or packed 
and presented as specified by the supplier;
(d) to take measures for the promotion of sales, in 
particular:
to advertise,
to maintain a sales network or stock of goods, 
to provide customer and guarantee services, 
to employ staff having specialised or technical 
training.
Article 3.
Article 1 shall not apply where:
(a) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are
considered by users as equivalent in view of their
characteristics, price and intended use enter into 
reciprocal exclusive purchasing agreements between 
themselves in respect of such goods;
(b) manufacturers of identical goods or of goods which are
considered by users as equivalent in view of their
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charcteristics, price and intended use enter into a 
non-reciprocal exclusive purchasing agreement between 
themselves in respect of such goods, unless at least 
one of them has a total annual turnover of no more 
than 10 0 million ECU;
(c) the exclusive purchasing obligation is agreed for more 
than one type of goods where these are neither by 
their nature nor according to commercial usage con­
nected to each other;
(d) the agreement is concluded for an indefinite duration 
or for a period of more than five years.
Article 4.
1. Article 3(a) and (b) shall also apply where the 
goods there referred to are manufactured by an undertaking 
connected with a party to the agreement.
2. Connected undertakings are: •
(a) undertakings in which a party to the agreement, 
directly or indirectly:
owns more than half the capital or business 
assets, or
has the power to exercise mor than half the 
voting rights, or
has the power to appoint more than half the 
members of the supervisory oard, board of 
directors or bodies legally representing the 
undertakings, or
has the right to manage the affairs;
(b) undertakings which directly or indirectly have in or
over a party to the agreement the rights or powers
listed in (a);
(c) undertakings in which an undertaking referred to in
(b) directly or indirectly has the rights or powers
listed in (a).
3. Undertakings in which the parties to the agreement 
or undertakings connected with them jointly have the rights 
or powers set out in paragraph 2(a) shall be considered to 
be connected with each of the parties to the agreement.
Article 5.
1. For the purpose of Article 3(b), the ECU is the 
unit of account used for drawing up the budget of the 
Community pursuant to Articles 207 and 209 of the Treaty.
2. Article 1 shall remain applicable where during any 
period of two consecutive financial years the total turn­
over referrd to in Article 3(b) is exceeded by no more than 
10 per cent.
3. For the purpose of calculating total turnover 
within the meaning of Article 3 (b), the turnovers achieved 
during the last financial year by the pary to the agreement 
and connected undertakings in respect of all goods and
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services, excluding all taxes and other duties, shall be 
added together. For this purpose, no account shall be taken 
of dealings between the parties to the agreement or between 
these undertakings and undertakings connected with them or 
between the connected undertakings.
Article 6.
1. Pursuant to Article 85(3) to the Treaty, and 
subject to Articles 7 to 9 of this Regulation, it is hereby 
declared that Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply 
to agreements to which only two undertakings are party and 
whereby one party, the reseller, agrees with the other, the 
supplier, in consideration for according special commercial 
or financial advantages, to purchase only from the sup­
plier, an undertaking connected with the supplier or 
another undertaking entrusted by the supplier with the 
distribution of his goods, certain beers, or certain beers 
and certain other drinks, specified in the agreement for 
resale in premises used for the sale and consumption of 
drinks and designated in the agreement.
2. The declaration in paragraph 1 shall also apply 
where exclusive purchasing obligations of the kind de­
scribed in paragraph 1 are imposed on the reseller in 
favour of the supplier by another undertaking which is 
itself not a supplier.
Article 7.
1. Apart from the obligation referred to in Artcle 6, 
no restriction on competition shall be imposed on the 
reseller other than:
(a) the obligation not to sell beers and other drinks 
which are supplied by other undertakings and which are 
of the same type as the beers or other drinks supplied 
under the agreement in the premises designated in the 
agreement;
(b) the obligation, in the event that the reseller sells
in the premises designated in the agreement beers
which are supplied by other undertakings and which are 
of a different type from the beers supplied under the 
agreement, to sell such beers only in bottles, cans or 
other small packages, unless the sale of such beers in 
draught form is customary or is necessary to satisfy a 
sufficient demand from consumers;
(c) the obligation to advertise goods supplied by other
undertakings within or outside the premises designated 
in the agreement only in proportion to the share of 
these goods in the total turnover realised in the 
premises.
2. Beers or other drinks of the same type are those 
which are not clearly distinguishable in view of their 
compostion, appearance and taste.
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Article 8.
1. Article 6 shall not apply where:
(a) the supplier or a connected undertaking imposes on the 
reseller exclusive purchasing obligations for goods 
other than drinks or for services;
(b) the supplier restricts the freedom of the reseller to 
obtain from an undertaking of his choice either 
services or goods for which neither an exclusive 
purchasing obligation nor a ban on dealing in com­
peting products may be imposed;
(c) the agreement is concluded for an indefinite duration 
or for a period of more than 10 years and the ex­
clusive purchasing obligation relates only to 
specified beers;
(e) the supplier obliges the reseller to impose the
exclusive purchasing obligation on his successor for a 
longer period than the reseller would himself remain 
tied to the supplier.
2. Where the agreement relates to premises which the 
supplier lets to the reseller or allows the reseller to
occupy on some other basis in law or in fact, the following
provisions shall also apply:
(a) notwithstanding paragraphs (1)(c) and (d), the ex­
clusive purchasing obligations and bans on dealing in 
competing products specified in this Title may be 
imposed on the reseller for the whole period for which 
the reseller in fact operates the premises;
(b) the agreement must provide for the reseller to have 
the right to obtain:
drinks, except beer, supplied under the agreement 
from other undertakings where these undertakings
offer them on more favourable conditions which
the supplier does not meet,
drinks, except beer, which are of the same type 
as those supplied under the agreement but which 
bear different trade marks, from other under­
takings where the supplier does not offer them.
Article 9.
Articles 2(1) and (3), 3(a) and (b), 4 and 5 shall 
apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 10.
Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and subject ot 
Articles 11 to 13 of this Regulation, it is hereby declared 
that Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agree­
ments to which only two undertakings are party and whereby 
one party, the reseller, agrees with the other, the sup­
plier, in consideration for the according of special 
commercial or financial advantages, to purchase only form 
the supplier, an undertaking connected with the supplier or 
another undertaking entrusted by the supplier with the
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distribution of his goods, certain petroleum-based motor- 
vehicle fuels or certain petroleum-based motor-vehicle and 
other fuels specified in the agreement for resale in a 
service station designated in the agreement.
Article 11.
Apart form the obligation referred to in Article 10, 
no restriction on competition shall be imposed on the 
reseller other than:
(a) the obligation not to sell motor-vehicle fuel and 
other fuels which are supplied by other undertakings 
in the service station designated in the agreement;
(b) the obligation not to use lubricants or related 
petroleum-based products which are supplied by other 
undertakings within the service station designated in 
the agreement where the supplier or a connected 
undertaking has made a available to the reseller, or 
financed, a lubrication by or other motor-vehicle 
lubrication equipment;
(c) the obligation to advertise goods supplied by other 
undertakings within or outside the service station 
designated in the agreement only in proportion to the 
share of these goods in the total turnover realised in 
the service station;
(d) the obligation to have equipment owned by the supplier
or a connected undertaking or financed by the supplier
or a connected undertaking serviced by the supplier or
an undertaking designated by him.
Article 12.
1. Article 10 shall not apply where:
(a) the supplier or a connected undertaking imposes on the 
reseller exclusive purchasing obligations for goods 
other than motor-vehicle and other fuels or for 
services, except in the case of the obligations 
referred to in Article 11(b) and (d);
(b) the supplier restricts the freedom of the reseller to 
obtain, from an undertaking of his choice, goods or 
services, for which under the provisions of this Title 
neither an exclusive purchasing obligation nor a ban 
on dealing in competing products may be imposed;
(c) the agreement is concluded for an indefinite duration 
or for a period of more than 10 years;
(d) the supplier obliges the reseller to impose the 
exclusive purchasing obligation on his successor for a 
longer period than the reseller would himself remain 
tied to the supplier.
2. Where the, agreement relates to a service station 
which the supplier lets to the reseller, or allows the 
reseller to occupy on some other basis, in law or in facts, 
exclusive purchasing obligations or prohibitions of
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competition indicated in this Title may, notwithstanding 
paragraph 1(c), be imposed on the reseller for the whole 
period for which the reseller in fact operates the 
premises.
Article 13.
Article 2(1) und (3), and 3(a) and (b), 4 and 5 of 
this regulation shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Article 14.
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this 
Regulation, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation No. 19/65/ 
EEC, when it finds in a particular case that an agreement 
which is exempted by this Regulation nevertheless has 
certain effects which are incompatible with the conditions 
set out in Article 85(3) of the Treaty, and in particular 
where;
(a) the contract goods are not subject, in a substantial 
part of the common market, to effective competition 
from identical goods or goods considered by users as 
equvalent in view of their characteristics, price an 
intended use;
(b) access by of other suppliers to the different stages 
of distribution in a substantial part of the common 
market is made difficult to a significant extent;
(c) the supplier without any objectively justified reason:
1. refuses to supply categories of resellers who
cannot obtain the contract goods elsewhere on 
suitable terms or applies to them differing 
prices or conditions of sale;
2. applies less favourable prices or conditions of
sale to resellers bound by an exclusive pur­
chasing obligation as compared with other re­
sellers at the same level of distribution.
Article 15.
1. In the period 1 July 1983 to 31 December 1986, the 
prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply 
to agreements of the kind described in Article 1 which 
either were in force on 1 Juli 1983 or entered into force 
between 1 July and 31 December 1983 and which satisfy the 
exemption conditions under Regulation No. 67/67/EEC.
2. In the period 1 July 1983 to 31 December 19 88, the 
prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply 
to agreements of the kinds described in Article 6 and 10 
which either were in force on 1 Juli 19 83 or entered into 
force between 1 July and 31 December 1983 and which satisfy 
the exemption conditions of Regulation No. 67/67/EEC.
3. In the case of agreements of the kinds described in 
Articles 6 and 10, which were in force on 1 July 19 83 and 
which expire after 31 December 19 88, the prohibition in 
Article 86(1) of the Treaty shall not apply in the period
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from 1 January 1989 to the expiry of the agreement but at 
the latest to the expiry of this Regulation to the extent 
that the supplier releases the reseller, before 1 January 
1989, from all obligations which would prevent the ap­
plication of the exemption under Titles II und III.
(4. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall 
apply in the same way to the agreements referred to re­
spectively in those paragraphs, which were in force on the 
date of accession of the Kingdom of Spain and of the 
Portuguese Republic and which, as a result of accession, 
fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.)
Amendment.
Para. 4 was added by the Act of Accession of the 
Kingdom of Spain and the-Portuguese Republic, Annex 
I(iv) (ii) .
Article 16.
This Regulation shall not apply to agreements by which 
the supplier undertakes with the reseller to supply only to 
the reseller certain goods for resale, in the whole or in a 
defined part of the Community, and the reseller undertakes 
with the supplier to purchase these goods only from the 
supplier.
Article 17.
This Regulation shall not apply where the parties or 
connected undertakings, for the purpose of resale in one 
and the same premises used for the sale and consumption of 
drinks or service station, enter into agreements both of 
the kind referred to in Title I and of a kind referred to 
in Title II or III.
Article 18.
This Regulation shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
categories of concerted practices defined in Articles 1, 6 
and 10.
Article 19.
This Regulation shall enter into force on 1 July 19 83. 
It shall expire on 31 Decemer 1997.
Done at Brussels, 22 June 1983.
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A P P E N D I X 4
Note. This form must be accompanied by an Annex 
containing the information specified in the attached 
Complementary Note
The form and Annex must be supplied in 13 copies (one 
for the Commission and one for each Member State). 
Supply three copies of any relevant agreement and one 
copy of other supporting documents.
Please do not forget to complete the Acknowledgement of 
Receipt annexed.
If space is insufficient, please use extra pages, specifying 
to which item on the form they relate.
F O R M  A/B
TO THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Directorate-General for Competition,
Rue de la Loi, 200,
B-1049 Brussels.
A. Application for negative clearance pursuant to Article 2 of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962 relating to 
implementation of Article 85 (1) or of Article 86 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community.
B. Notification of an agreement, decision or concerted practice under Article 4 (or 5) of Council Regulation No 17 of 6 
February 1962 with a view to obtaining exemption under Article 85 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, including notifications claiming benefit of an opposition procedure.
Identity of the parties
1. Id en tity  o f  app lican t/no t ifier
Full name and address, telephone, telex 
and facsimile numbers, and brief 
description (') of the undertaking^ ) or 
association(s) of undertakings submitting 
the application or notification.
For partnerships, sole traders or any 
other unincorporated body trading 
under a business name, give, also, the 
name, forename(s) and address of the 
proprietors) or partner(s).
Where an application or notification is 
submitted on behalf of some other 
person (or is submitted by more than 
one person) the name, address and posi­
tion of the representative (or joint repre­
sentative) must be given, together with 
proof of his authority to act. Where an 
application or notification is submitted 
by or on behalf of more than one 
person they should appoint a joint 
representative (Article 1 (2) and (3) of 
Commission Regulation No 27).
(') E.g. ‘Motor vehicle manufacturer, ‘Computer service bureau’, ‘Conglomerate’.
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2. Id e n tity  o f  an y  other p a rtie s
Full name and address and brief 
description of any other parties to the 
agreement, decision or concerted prac­
tice (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
arrangements’).
State what steps have been taken to 
inform these other parties of this appli­
cation or notification.
(This information is not necessary in 
respect of standard contracts which an 
undertaking submitting the application 
or notification has concluded or intends 
to conclude with a number of parties 
(e.g. a contract appointing dealers).)
Purpose of this application/notification 
(see Complementary Note)
(Please an sw er yes or no to the 
questions)
Are you asking for negative clearance alone ? (See Complementary Note —  Section IV, 
end of first paragraph —  for the consequence of such a request.)
Are you applying for negative clearance, and also notifying the arrangements to obtain 
an exemption in case the Commission does not grant negative clearance ?
Are you only notifying the arrangements in order to obtain an exemption ?
Do you claim that this application may benefit from an opposition procedure ? (See 
Complementary Note —  Sections III, IV, VI and VII and Annex 2). If you answer ‘yes’, 
please specify the Regulation and Article number on which you are relying.
Would you be satisfied with a comfort letter ? (See the end of Section VII of the 
Complementary Note).
The undersigned declare that the information given above and in the ... pages annexed hereto is correct to the best of 
their knowledge and belief, that all estimates are identified as such and are their best estimates of the underlying facts 
and that all the opinions expressed are sincere.
They are aware of the provisions of Article 15 (1) (a) of Regulation No 17 (see attached Complementary Note).
Place and date : ........................
Signatures :
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COMMISSION Brussels
OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Directorate-General for Competition
To
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T  O F  RECEIPT
(This form will be returned to the address inserted above if the top half is completed in a single copy by the person lodging it)
Your application for negative clearance dated: ...............................
Your notification dated: .............................................
concerning : .....................................................
Your reference : ...................................................
Parties :
1..........................................................
2.............................................................  and others
(There is no need to name the other undertakings party to the arrangement)
(To be completed by the Commission.)
was received on : ................................
and registered under No IV/ : .................. . .....
Please quote the above number in all correspondence
Provisional address: Telephone: Telex: Telegraphic address:
Rue de la Loi 200 D irect lin e : 2 3 5 . . . .  COMEU B 21877 COM EUR Brussels
B-1049 Brussels Telephone exchange: 235 11 11
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